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Abstract. 
It is my intention in this thesis to demonstrate that there exists a clear and 
explicit formal relationship between the seemingly exclusive descriptions of 
spatio-temporal and purely temporal continuity, and further, that this 
relationship manifests itself within our most fundamental understanding of the 
physical world itself, namely; within our understanding of the identity, diversity 
and re-identification of material bodies (Book 1). It may therefore be claimed 
that behind that cultural understanding which leads us to imagine that the 
physical world is located in both space and time, whereas our thoughts and 
feelings are located in time alone, there lies a formal logical framework, or an 
explicit formal description of how being in space and time relates to being in 
time alone - leading us to wonder, perhaps, whether these two things are really 
as distinct as we might at first imagine. 
That I should then go on (albeit without a formal methodology) to apply to this 
analysis a philosophical interpretation of Bergson's conception of the 
relationship between the intuition and the intellect (Book 2) is of lesser 
importance - indicating as it does little more than my own philosophical 
inclinations. However, something will be gained, I hope, from this further 
exercise. Along the way it will allow me to clarify a number of technical points 
of which the general philosopher may be unaware; for example the 
unobservable nature of numerical identity and re-identification, the importance 
of the principle of special relativity to the topic of mind and the technical 
difficulties of claiming that mental events are 'in time' at all. 
Notwithstanding these latter points, however, the intentions 
predominantly analytical and are adequately described as 
consolidate spatio-temporal and purely temporal description 
logical framework. 
of this work are 
an attempt to 
under a unified 
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I Introduction. 
LI A Question Which Has about It at Least the Form of Epistemological 
Query? 
If S is an individual who knows, or believes, or thinks, or who finds it 
convenient in certain circumstances to accept, that the world is one of material 
bodies moving about in space and time, then we may be tempted to ask how S 
may come to 'see' the world in this way, or to ask what is necessary and 
sufficient (either for S or the world) in order that S should arrive at this view: 
Ql. How does S know (or believe, or think) that the world is one of 
material bodies moving about in space and time? 
That this question should be of genuine interest to the philosopher or the 
psychologist, or that it should form the basis of wide ranging academic 
investigations (or indeed that it should be of interest to anyone other than S) 
relies upon the rarely emphasised assumption that S is not alone in holding this 
view. We assume, in posing Ql, that S could in fact be any one of us, or more 
formally perhaps, we say that S is a variable within a range or set of individuals 
(including me and you)'. But if this 'range of individuals' is determined upon 
the basis of their 'knowing' something (or believing something, or thinking 
something - in this case; believing or thinking the world to be one of material 
bodies moving about in space and time), and if we both believe (or 'know') this 
range to exist and believe (or 'know') ourselves to be a member of it, then the 
very possibility of this 'range of individuals' (or the possibility of our 
1S c= [G IG knows (or believes or thinks) that the world is one of material bodies moving 
about in space and time). 
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knowledge of it and membership within it) presupposes the more 
characteristically epistemological question: 
Q2. How does S know that T knows that the world is one of distinct 
material bodies moving about in space and time? 2 
In other words, how do I know that you, or indeed anyone else, also knows the 
world to be of this nature? 
The question Q2 therefore necessarily accompanies Q1 if it is to be assumed 
that Ql is a question of interest to anyone other than S, or if it is to be assumed 
that S is in some sense a variable amongst a range of individuaIS3. In claiming 
that Q2 necessarily accompanies Q1 I mean to suggest, not only that Q2 should 
be answerable in order to justify the variable status of S (and thus make Q1 of 
interest to more than one individual) but that our ability to answer Q2, or the 
extent to which we could possibly answer Q2, determines the nature of Q1 
itself In other words, if Nve Nvere to ask what exactly is it that S knows in 
knowing the world to be one of material bodies moving around in space and 
time, we should need to divide our answer into two categories. Firstly, that 
element of S's knowing the world to be one of material bodies in space and time 
which is private to S and unknowable to T (if indeed there exists such an 
'element'), and secondly, that element of S's knowing the world to be one of 
material bodies in space and time which can equally be known by T (again, if 
indeed there should exist such an 'element'). Only in as much as QI may 
2 Q2 is a question which we might equally ask if our concerns were to lie with establishing 
an understanding of the methods of an empirical science based upon S's view. 
3 In Q2 both S and T are variables within the same range of individuals. If we define the set of 
ordered pairs B= ((H, I) IH knows that I knows (or believes or thinks) that the world is one of 
material bodies moving around in space and time), then (S, T)E=-B. 
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address the second of these categories may S genuinely be a variable within a 
range of individuals, and S may only be genuinely variable within this range of 
individuals to the extent that this second category defineS4 . Thus Q1 
is in fact 
itself restricted (in its ansiver) purely to aspects of S's understanding failing 
within this second category. In as much as S may also have aspects of 
understanding which fall within the first of these categories, S is no longer a 
variable within a range or set of individuals - and thus these 'elements' of S's 
knowing the world to be one of material bodies in space and time cannot be the 
subject of Ql, nor any answer which we might propose in response to Ql. Any 
deferral or avoidance in addressing Q2, or any attempt to suggest that Q2 is 
somehow secondary to Ql (or in some sense follows from, or is 'begged by' 
Ql) must unavoidably leave QI somewhat ambiguous (a fuller exposition of 
this epistemological position -a position which is central to the methods of this 
cuffent thesis - is outlined in Appendix 11). 
It is, of course, tempting to ignore this argument and claim that regardless of 
whether or not S is to be treated as a variable it is still perfectly sensible, for any 
given individual S, to ask how S knows P. My argument is firstly, that this is 
4 The formal nature of this relationship between QI and Q2 can be captured in the following 
ternis: 
a/ S knows P. 
b/ If S is a variable: A=[Gl G knows P), S (=-A. 
cl SI knows that S knows P. 
d/ If SI and S are variables: B=[(KI) IH knows I knows P), (SI, S)r=B. 
Terminate the regress: 
e/ If the I" projection of B, i. e. (I I Q, K)r= B) is the set A and the 2 nd projection of B, i. e. 
(M I (L, M)r=B) is also the set A (as is the case in asking QI and Q2) 
then B itself may be defined as the Cross Product of the set A, i. e. B= [(I-I, I) I HeA, Ic=A) 
AxA- Finally: 
f/ If S is a variable then A exists. If A exists then AxA exists. Thus A is defined such that: 
SEAA (S 1, S) e AxA and thus A is defined such that both a/ aind c/ are consistently 
accommodated. a/ is therefore inseparable for c/ if b/ and d/ apply. 
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disingenuous; since we are only interested in such questions in the first place 
because we believe that S is a variable (or could in principle be anyone of us), 
and secondly, that by employing any general term or terms in our answer to this 
question, or in citing any general terms in the nature of S's knovNing P, we must 
once again reinforce the variable status of S. Neither Q2 nor the variable status 
of S may be ignored in addressing ourselves to Ql. 
Unfortunately, an answer to Q2 (in the sense that it is informally and somewhat 
ambiguously stated here) is likely to be extremely difficult to formulate. In our 
everyday lives, of course, we more or less accept a solution by way of its being 
the simplest explanation. If we see other people acting as though and talking as 
though they perceive the world in a way similar to ourselves, then the simplest 
solution is to assume that they do indeed perceive the world in a qualitatively 
similar fashion. Such a process is, however, unlikely to stand up to the 
philosophical scrutiny required to establish an epistemological criterion of S's 
knowing that T knows that the world is one of distinct material bodies moving 
about in space and time. For example, although S may observe T acting as 
though T knows the world to be one of material bodies moving around in space 
and time, if S 'knows' the world to be of this nature, then could S observe T 
acting in any other way (particularly if, as may or may not be the case, part of 
S's 'knowing' this arises from observing T acting as though T 'knows' this)? 
Thus while QI may seem to be a perfectly sensible question to ask, it is in fact a 
question which sits uncomfortably, although necessarily, Nvith a question (Q2) 
for which we have no immediate epistemological criterion for its solution. We 
therefore need, I would suggest, to ask Q1 in a slightly different way, or to 
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replace QI with a different question of S knowing something which sits more 
comfortably with the question of S knowing that T knows something. 
The method of arriving at this 'slightly different' version of QI is, of course, to 
firstly find a relevant question referring to S knowing that T knows something 
(a relevant re-working of Q2 perhaps) for which we feel that a strict 
epistemological criterion for its solution is possible. I intend to propose the 
following: 
Q3. If S knows that there are n (rather than n+ I or n- 1) material bodies 
moving about within a given region space over some given interval of 
time, then how does S know that T knows that there are n. (rather than 
n+1 or n-1) material bodies moving about within this same region of 
space at this same time? 5 
So why should we believe that an epistemological criterion for the solution of 
Q3 is any more likely to present itself than an epistemological criterion for the 
solution of Q2? The answer to this is that we may formulate it with respect to 
something which, in theory at least, is independent of what either S or T 
perceive the world to be like. In addressing Q3 we may refer to the properties 
of a consistent integer arithmetic - an arithmetic whose properties may, in 
theory at least, be enumerated quite independently of what S and T know about 
the world (or independently of S and T's 'knowing' the world to be one of 
material bodies moving about in space and time). For example, we may 
It could of course be argued that if we had to hand a criterion of S Mowing that T latows 
there to be n (rather than n+ I or n-1) material bodies moving about within a given region of 
space over some given interval of time, then it would not be unreasonable to assume that we 
had also developed a criterion for answering Q2 in certain circumstances and to a certain 
quantifiable degree - since if S knows that T knows there to be n material bodies moving about 
within a given region of space over some given interval of time (rather than n+I or n-1), then 
surely S must also know that T knows (to a certain quantifiable degree) the world to be one of 
material bodies moving about in space and time? 
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develop the system of ordinal nwnbers from an axiomatic set theory and derive 
their arithmetic proper-ties directly. Moreover, we may consider the principles 
employed in the application of this integer arithmetic to what S and T 'know' 
the world to be. For example, in my own understanding of the material bodies 
which I perceive to be around me I generally think that two such objects cannot 
be at the same place at the same time, or that one such object cannot be at two 
places at the same time - and it is principles such as these that allow me to 
count objects (and add to and subtract from their number) in accordance with 
an abstract integer arithmetic. These additional 'applying principles' are not 
themselves part of the integer arithmetic of S (or T) but are principles (about S 
or T's understanding that the world is one of material bodies moving about in 
space and time) via which the properties of this arithmetic are applied to the 
world and revealed. 
Consider, for example, that S claims that there are three tea-cups upon a 
particular table at a particular time and that T agrees with S. From this 
corroboration alone nothing can be deduced about S's knowledge of what T 
knows. If however S removes one of the tea-cups and claims that there are now 
only two, and if T agrees, or if S adds another tea-cup and claims that there are 
now four, and if T agrees, then the combination of these corroborations indicate, 
although perhaps only partially in this limited case, the common application of 
both a consistent integer arithmetic (for we may independently determine what 
both S and T mean by 'two', 'three' or Iour') and a common set of applying 
principles (such as two tea-cups cannot be at the same place at the same time 
and one tea-cup cannot he at two places at the same time). 
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Of course, the simple set of corroborations discussed above do not, in 
themselves, amount to much; they do not, in themselves, justify that a common 
integer arithmetic and common set of applying principles are at play between S 
and T. However, Nve may imagine that over many such corroborations and over 
many different conditions and circumstances (in the empirical justification of 
the theories of classical vector mechanics for example), that S may, in effect, 
test the properties of T's integer arithmetic and the principles by which these are 
applied to the world and find them to correspond to the properties of S's own. 
Thus S may establish (to a certain degree limited, perhaps, by the logical nature 
of the arithmetic itself) that S and T share a common integer arithmetic and that 
S and T apply the properties of this arithmetic via common principles (for if T, 
unlike S, did not 'know', for example, that two objects cannot be at the same 
place at the same time, then we should expect to be alerted to this fact via 
differences in the counting claims of S and T). There is then no certainty in the 
epistemological solution to Q3; simply an increasing and repeated corroboration 
which leads us to believe that S may know that T knows that there are n material 
bodies moving about vAthin a given region space over some given interval of 
time. In other words, no matter what is going on inside T's head, no matter how 
different T's understanding of the world is from S's, S may corroborate that in 
some sense both S and T apply a similar integer arithmetic via a common set of 
applying principles. 
Now perhaps it may be argued that a suitable criterion for Q2 (a criterion of Ss 
knowing that T knows that the world is one ofmaterial bodies moving about in 
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space and litne) may be formulated by not dissimilar methods; that by an 
increasing and repeated corroboration of statements between S and T, S may 
somehow come to know (independently of Q3) that T represents the world in a 
qualitatively similar fashion (as indeed Nve actually do in our everyday lives). 
My argument is simply that it is extremely unlikely that we could rigorously 
formulate and express the criterion thus developed - and since this doubt exists, 
and since no such doubt (or at least a lesser doubt) exists in connection with the 
epistemological criterion of Q3, then it is to Q3 rather than Q2 that any serious 
investigation of these matters should be directed - at least in the first instance. 
Let me then recap. We (philosophers, psychologists, physicists, biologists) may 
well want to ask Q1 [How does S know (or believe, or think) that the world is 
one ofmaterial bodies moving about in space and time? ]. There may well be, of 
course, many different motives behind asking this question, and equally no 
doubt, many methods of addressing it. All of these 'motives' and 'methods', 
however, unavoidably assume (except via unacceptable construction) that S is 
not alone in this view, or that S is a variable amongst a range of individuals 
(including you and me) - othenvise philosophers, psychologists, physicists and 
biologists would not be interested in asking it (and universities would certainly 
not be interested in funding research for it). It is possible to argue, of course, 
that as a question about S (an individual) it stands in its own right. But this is 
not really how the question is asked (and to pursue this particular line of 
argument is disingenuous). It is asked specifically in the sense that S is a 
variable - and if it is asked in this sense then QI must be necessarily associated 
(even if we choose to ignore it) with the epistemological question Q2. My 
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argument is that Q2 is simply too difficult to answer in a strict epistemological 
sense; it is unlikely (although I could of course be wrong) to have an explicit 
criterion. A much better question, in the sense of the availability of an 
epistemological criterion, is Q3 [IfS knows that there are n (rather than n+ I or 
n-1) material bodies moving about within a given region space over some given 
interval of time, then how does S know that T knows that there are n (rather 
than n +I or n-1) material bodies moving about within this same region ofspace 
at this same time? ]. So if we can actually arrive at an answer to this question (as 
an epistemological exercise), but cannot arrive at an answer to Q2 in equally 
rigorous terms, or if we can only answer Q2 (in some quantifiable sense) by 
recourse to Q3, then let us ask Q3 and (for the moment at least) forget about Q2. 
We arrive then, via this somewhat torturous route, at that question which bears 
to Q3 the relationship that Ql bears to Q2. or that question which (now that Q2 
is to be rejected) must replace Ql: 
Q4. How does S know that there are n (rather than n+I or n-1) material 
bodies moving about within a given region of space over some given interval 
of time? 6 
This is essentially the question which (with some slight modification discussed 
below) will concern me in this current thesis. It is a question which we may at 
first address purely via analysis - for we may transform the claim that S 
'knows' there to be n material bodies within a given region of space over a 
given interval of time into the claim that S 'claims' there to be n such objects (as 
6 This is a question which is not the concern of establishing an epistemological understanding of 
the methods of empirical science (since this is already contained in the answer to Q3) but a 
question about S and T themselves, or at the very least perhaps, a question about the types of 
theories that S and T might put forward for empirical testing. 
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part of an intersubjective corroboration perhaps), and having expressed Q4 in 
terms of a statement formulated by S we may ask what is it exactly that is being 
claimed. Thus I shall be concerned initially with the analysis of statements (or 
that statement formulated by S) pertaining to there being n material bodies 
moving about within a given region of space over some given interval of time 
(Book 1). 
However, it should be emphasised that, given the route by which we have 
arrived at the question Q4 (the need for a strict criterion for Q3), it is not in any 
sense a trick question. There is nothing hidden within it. It simply asks how S 
knows that there are n (rather than n+1 or n-1) material bodies moving within a 
given region of space over some given interval of time; how S knows that there 
are three rather than four, or four rather than five - for it is only this number, 
and its relation to a common arithmetic, which may be intersubjectively 
corroborated. It does not ask what material bodies are, nor what space and time 
are, nor what it is to be moving in space and time. In other words, we may 
express Q4 as: given that S knows the world to be one of material bodies 
moving around in space and time (regardless of whether or not T knows this 
also), how does S know that there are n (rather than n+ I or n- 1) material bodies 
moving about within a given region of space over some given interval of time 
(because we can know that T also knows this - to some quantifiable degree)? 
Now, of course, anyone, be they philosopher, psychologist, physicist, biologist, 
or whatever, may ask whatever question they wish - and if they can answer it to 
their own satisfaction, then all well and good (and if they can get funding to 
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answer it, then even better). My opinion, however (and it is, of course, only an 
opinion), is that the question QI [How does S know (or believe, or think) that the 
world is one of material bodies moving about in space and time? ] is not a 
question which we should, at the outset at least, be asking; or at least not if S is 
intended to be a variable amongst a range of individuals (it may be of interest to 
S but it is not of interest to T). The question Q4 is as close as we may come to 
addressing Ql. Simply because 'S' in Q4 may be a legitimate variable amongst a 
range of individuals (because we can have an epistemological criterion for Q3) 
whereas 'S' cannot be a legitimate variable amongst a range of particulars in Q1 
(because we have no epistemological criterion for Q2 except that which we have 
for Q3). 
1.2 Re-identification, Continuity and the Infinitesimal IntervaL 
Although I have therefore presented at least some justification for the question 
which is to concern me in this theses, I am not yet in a position to outline the 
analytical claims which I shall make regarding this question (Book 1), nor the 
philosophically speculative interpretations of these 'claims' which I shall 
consider later (Book 2). For whereas until now I have been content to simply 
pass over the expression "moving about in space and time" (in the formulation 
of Ql, Q2, Q3 and Q4) I shall not be able to precede further (in a discussion of 
this analysis) until I have a presented to the reader a more accurate description 
of what this expression means. Thus while I hesitate to burden the reader so 
soon Avith a description of the infinitesimal interval and the derivative, so 
important is this topic to this current work (and to an understanding of this 
introduction) that its inclusion at this stage is unavoidable. Let me then, as 
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briefly as possible, introduce the important relationship between our 
understanding of continuity (or more specifically 'continuous motion') and the 
formal nature of infinitesimal terms - for it is upon the basis of an 
understanding of this relationship, as much as anything perhaps, that the 
analytical claims of this thesis depend. 
Unless it can be argued that Kinematic concepts are either reducible to, or 
derived from, Dynamic concepts 7, then Kinematics (the analysis of mechanical 
systems in terms of the concepts of position, time, velocity and acceleration) 
must capture a description of the continuous re-identification of material bodies 
(the numerical re-identification of material bodies over continuous spatial and 
temporal intervals). For we cannot conceive of velocity, in any classical sense, 
except in terms of the velocity of a single entity, nor can we conceive of 
acceleration except in terms of the acceleration of that which is accelerated and 
which remains the same throughout the acceleration. The concepts of velocity 
and acceleration are therefore inseparable fonn our understanding of the 
continuous numerical re-identifi cation of material bodies. If then our description 
of spatial and temporal continuity, or at least that description which is free of 
the seeming absurdities and infinite regresses of Zeno, is one which employs the 
derivative and the definite integral (as described in Appendix 1), then this 
'description' must itself be based upon the description of the re4dentification of 
material bodies over infinitesimal spatial and temporal intervals; for the 
derivative is nothing more than the finite ratio of infinitesimal terms, and the 
definite integral is nothing more than the finite sum of the infinite addition of 
7 TNs would be Kant's view for example. 
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infinitesimal terms. The description of numerical re-identification over 
infinitesimal intervals is therefore central to the formal description of the 
Kinematic concepts of velocity and acceleration - and thus to the description of 
the cardinality (total number) of moving bodies within some designated region 
ofspace. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that the infinitesimal is in some sense a real 
cbaracteristic of the world - that infinitesimal intervals in some sense exist 
independently of our own chosen analysis of movement. They almost certainly 
do not. The infinitesimal interval is a product of logical analysis alone; it is the 
recognition that an infinite regress lies at the heart of the analysis of continuity 
(Zeno) and that this infinite regress must be terminated in order to reach a 
conclusion or avoid logical absurdity. The infinitesimal exists, in as much as it 
&exists' at all, in order that we may consolidate our understanding of continuity 
with our understanding of logical analysis. The infinitesimal interval is simply 
the point at which we decide to stop regressing. Nor should we believe that we 
bave some understanding of the infinitesimal beyond purely its logical role in 
the analysis of continuity (its logical role in the construction of the derivative or 
definite integral). To say that an infinitesimal term is nether finite nor Zero but 
'tends towards Zero' is to say nothing at all. To say that the infinitesimal is 
indivisible is equally uninformative (although it does exhibit certain important 
characteristics of indivisibility). The infinitesimal is a term described solely by 
its logical operations (operations designed solely to facilitate the termination of 
the infinitely regressive analysis of continuity); firstly, that the ratio of two 
infinitesimal terms may yield a finite result (and in this operation may 'mimic' 
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the properties of finite magnitudes and numbers), and secondly, that they vanish 
when taken in product with finite terms (and in this operation may 'mimic' the 
I 
properties of Zero), or as Leibniz put it: "quantities infinitely small such that 
when their ratio is sought, they may not be considered zero but which are 
rejected as often as they occur with quantities incomparably greater" (Kline 
1980. p 137). It is in this latter operation, of course, that the infinitesimal term 
plays its most important role in the termination of infinitely regressive 
arguments. For if the infinitesimal exhibits the properties of Zero when taken in 
product with a finite term (i. e. remains itself the same, as in 0x5= 0), then the 
infinitesimal has no properties of finite division. It may be taken in ratio with 
another infinitesimal term but may not be taken in ratio with a finite one. You 
cannot have half an infinitesimal, or a quarter of an infinitesimal - although one 
infinitesimal may 'mimic' the property of being half the magnitude of another, 
or a quarter of the magnitude of another. Thus if the infinitesimal interval is 
'indivisible' in this somewhat technical sense (not submitting to finite division), 
then you cannot carry on an infinitely regressive argument across it. If the same 
arrow is claimed to be re-identified over an infinitesimal interval of space and 
time, then, in terms of analysis at least, there is no sense in asking if it was also 
somewhere 'in-between' these locations; for there is no 'in-between' these 
locations (the infinitesimal does not submit to finite division) and thus any 
infinite regression is terminated. 
That we should look upon the infinitesimal as some kind of 'sleight of hand' on 
the part of the logician and the mathematician is perhaps understandable. 
Equally, the accusation that the infinitesimal is simply a response to, rather than 
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a solution of, the paradoxes of Zeno may be legitimately made (no doubt). Yet 
it must be admitted that these paradoxes themselves arise only because there are 
things which we "know dam well to be the case" (that a body may move from A 
to B for example) but which logic will allow us to approach only via an infinite 
number of steps. It is then perhaps to the genius of Newton and Leibniz that we 
are indebted for placing what we 'know darn well to be the case' above the 
sterile necessities of logic, or more likely perhaps, for having drawn our 
attention to the absurdity of explaining physical continuity in terms of the 
properties of real numbers8. It is not that the infinitesimal is real, or corresponds 
in some way to a characteristic of the world, but that our own concept of the 
continuous re-identification of material bodies (what we call 'motion') is real - 
or real to us. The formal properties of the infinitesimal term (most notably its 
resistance to finite division) is therefore to be treated within this thesis as no 
more than a fon-nal representation of our intuitive and familiar ideas about 
continuity - or the sense in which these 'intuitive and familiar ideas' are 
consolidated Nvith our (no doubt equally intuitive and familiar) ideas about the 
logical consistency of arguments. 
My task then, as I see it here, is to address the question Q4 [How does S (or T) 
know that there are n (rather than n+J or n-1) material bodies moving about 
within a given region of space over some given interval of time? ] in terms of 
The application of the arithmetic of real numbers to physics depends solely upon the 
emergence of finite terms (whose properties are like those of real numbers) in the derivative and 
the definite integral, and so long as the principles of physics may yield these finite terms the 
physicist has little need to scrutinise the infinitesimal itself. And yet surely it cannot be the case 
that physics is really secure in relying upon the derivative and the definite integral (the finite 
ratio of infinitesimal terms and the finite sum of the infinite addition of infinitesimal terms 
respectively) unless it has, within its conceptual armoury as it were, some understanding of what 
the infinitesimal actually is; and where else should we look for this 'understanding' than in the 
concept of motion itself - that concept which relies primarily upon an understanding of what it 
is to re-identify a material body over infinitesimal intervals of space and time? 
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this understanding of the relationship between things "moving about" and the 
infinitesimal term (or between things "moving about" and our intuitive and 
familiar ideas about continuity). As such, the actual question which I shall 
address is not Q4 (as stated in the previous question) but a question from which 
Q4 may itself be constructed via the methods of integration: 
Q4a. How does S (or T) know that there are n (rather than n +I or 
n-1) material bodies moving about within a given region of space 
over some iven infinitesimal interval oftime? 91 
If we should be capable of finding a solution to this question, then we should 
have equally answered Q4; since Q4 may be re-captured from Q4a simply by 
the integration of infinitesimal terms over finite regions - as we do all the time, 
for example, in the application of the principles of classical mechanics (which 
are invariably expressed in terms of first and second order differential 
expressions) to real world (finite) situations. 
1.3 A Summary of the Analysis of Lockean Cardinality 
(A Summary of Book 1). 
We have arrived then, finally, at that question which we may submit to the 
methods of analysis. For we may analyse the statement (formulated by S): 
"There are n (rather than n+1 or n-1) material bodies moving about within a 
given region of space over some given infinitesimal interval of time" and may 
reveal, in formal terms, what it is exactly that is being claimed within this 
statement. 
Of course, in the analysis of any statement we may find nothing essentially 
new; merely a logical clarification of what is already held within it. In this 
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case, however, I feel that what we may reveal about S's statement via analysis 
is of such importance to an understanding of Q4a, that not only shall I dedicate 
three sections of this thesis to its analysis alone (Sections 2,3 and 4), but I shall 
take the risk of presenting a summary of this analysis at the outset. And while it 
may appear premature to summarise such an analysis before its full derivation 
has been presented to the reader, in this case I feel that a far greater 
understanding of my concerns will result form its early presentation and 
summary. 
In addressing Q4a via the methods of analysis (Book I of this thesis) I shall in 
fact do little more than address those identity and diversity relationships which 
together both indicate and justify the value of n. When we come to consider 
material bodes, however, we are confronted with various identity and diversity 
conditions which must somehow be consistently accommodated in order to 
arrive at our common understanding of this number. Firstly, we have (for 
historical reasons and perhaps due to a slight informality in our consideration of 
material objects) what we might call the "identity and diversity properties of 
material bodies at a given time". These are those principles to which I have 
already referred, namely; that two objects cannot be at the saine place at the 
same time and that one object cannot be at two places at the same time (two 
principles which I shall later refer to as "Locke's Principles" and whose nature 
Nvill be explored more fully in Section 2). Secondly, Nve have what Nve might 
more commonly refer to as "re-identifications" - the all too common 
understanding that the same material body may be re-identified over finite 
intervals of space and time (as when, for example, I claim that the tea-cup which 
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is currently upon my desk is the same tea-cup thatwas on the draining board in 
the kitchen this morning). Finally, we have that peculiar relationship between 
re-identification and spatial and temporal continuity which we call motion 
(roughly speaking, we feel that the tea-cup that was on the draining board in the 
kitchen this morning can only be re-identified as the tea-cup that is cmTently 
upon my desk if it has somehow 'moved' between these two locations along 
some sort of continuous spatial and temporal path). Put simply then, in order to 
break down a cardinality claim concerning material bodies we need to take 
account of the various senses in which we say that one is the same as another or 
different from another - 'identity and diversity' relationships which are an 
accommodation of the 'identity and diversity properties of material bodies at a 
given time' with 're-identiflication over space and time' via our concept of 
'niotion' (this topic, together with its philosophical implications, is covered 
fullY in Section 3). 
1.3.1 Identity and Diversity 'at a given tinte' and Re-identification Over Space 
and Time 
In addressing the topic of the identity and diversity of material bodies, whether 
cat a given time' or over finite regions of space and time, we may do little more 
(in terins of analysis) than define a class of names appropriate to our 
understanding of these relationships. 
24 
We may capture the re-identification of material bodies over finite intervals of 
space and time in the ftee part conjunction of terms9: 
P(a): # P(b) A T(a) #T(b) Aa=b (i) 
where 'a' and V are temporary names applied in accordance with two 
principles [which ensure the transitivity of the identity relationship cited in (i)]; 
the first being a principle of identitylo and the second being a principle of 
diversity' 1: 
P(a) = P(b) A T(a) = T(b) ab... LP. la 
P(a): # P(b). /\ T(a) = T(b) ab... LP. 2a 
I shall later refer to these principles as "Locke's principles ofIdentity and 
diversiV' (see section 2). 
1.3.2 Continuity and re-ideWicatiom 
The relationship between re-identification (over space and time) and continuous 
motion may be captured by firstly formulating (i) for the small but finite spatial 
and temporal intervals 8Pab and 8T,,, b: 
P(a) = P(b)+ 8Pa, b A T(a) =T(b)+ 8T,,, b Aa=b (ii) 
9 The object which is temporarily named 'a' is at a different position [P(a) # P(b)] and a 
different time [T(a) #T(b)] from that object which is temporarily named V, and 'a' and V are 
two names for one and the same object (a = b]. 
10 If that object which is temporarily named 'a' is at the same position and time of that objects 
which is temporarily named V, then 'a' and V are two names of one and the same object (a 
claim which we might usually express as: two objects cannot he at the same place at the smile 
time). 
11 If that object which is temporarily named 'a' is at a different position ftorn that object which 
is temporarily named V at the same time, then 'a' and V are not names for one and the same 
object (a claim which we mýight usually express as: one object cannot he at two places at the 
same time). 
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and then allowing the third conjunction (A) of this expression to become an 
inference (in the sense that the symbol "->" occurs in the definitions LP. Ia and 
LP. 2a) in the limit as 8Ta, b tends towards zero, or as 8Pab /8T,,, b becomes the 
instantaneous velocity of a material body in the limit as 8Tý,, b tends towards 
Zero: 
P(a)=P(b)+dP,,, b A T(a)=T(b)+dTab -> a--b ... LP. lb 
where dP,,, b / dTi b= Lim 8Pab /8T,, b. 5TZ; 40 
Here then we see the role of the infinitesimal term in the formation of logical 
arguments (we have employed it in the process of transitioning from a mere 
statement to a principle or definition), and we note that as dp,,, b and dT,,, b vanish 
in LP. lb we arrive at the expression LP. la. 
The equivalent continuous form of LP. 2a (or an expression which becomes 
LP. 2a as its infinitesimal terms vanish) suffers from the fact that it requires an 
isolated infinitesimal term, and at the outset we must note that there exists 
nothing within our understanding of the motion of material bodies which might 
lead us to believe that such 'isolated' (or non-quotiented 12) infinitesimal terms 
are possible or meaningftil. We may overcome this problem, bowever, by 
formulating it in relation to two instances of LP. lb in which an infinitesimal 
term may be defined in terms of the first order derivative of position with 
respect to time of a material body: 
P(a)=P(a')+dP,,,. A T(a)=T(a)+dT,,,,, -> a=a' 
P(b)=P(b')+dPb. b'A T(b)=T(b')+dTbb, --> b=b' 
12 An infinitesimal term which is defined otherwise than via a derivative, or otherwise than in 
terms of the ration of two infinitesimal terms. 
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and 
P(a) # P(b') AT(a)=T(b')+dTab'-> a#b' ... LP. 2b 
and where dT,,, b'= = 
dTbb'. 
Again we note that as dT,,, b, becomes zero in LP. 2b we obtain LP. 2a, i. e. that 
LP. 2a and LP. 2b are logically continuous. 
1.3.3 Cardinality. 
If the cardinality (total number) of a collection of entities is n, then we must 
account for n instances of the reflective, symmetric and transitive relationship of 
identity (=), and 1/2(n2-n) instances of symmetric but non-transitive relationship 
of 'difference' (: t) 13 . Having fonnulated the identity and diversity principles of 
material bodies over a vanishing temporal interval (LP. lb and LP. 2b) we may 
then say that the claim that there are n material bodies within a given region of 
space over such a given temporal interval requires n instances of LP. lb and 
1/2(n 2 
-n) instances of LP. 2b. 
For the set of objects al, a2, a3, ..., an, we may express this as: 
a/ P(al)=P(al')+dP,,,,,,,. AT(al)=T(al)+dTal, al'-> al=al' n 
b/ P(a2)=P(a2')+dPa2, a2'/\T(a2)=T(a2')+dTa2, a2'-> a2=a2' - instances 
of LP. lb 
C/ P(an)=P(an')+dP., ýa,,, AT(an)=T(an')+dTan, an'-> an--a 
' 
d/ P(al): #P(a2') AT(al)=T(a2')+dTal, a2'-> al:; 6a2' 1/2(n 
2 
-n) 
C/ P(al)#P(a3') AT(al)=T(a3')+dTal, a3'-> al#a3' instances 
of LP. 2b 
f/P(an- 1)#P(an') AT(an- 1)=T(an')+dT,,,., -> an- I#W 
13 For n objects we may consider n2 relationships of identity and distinction between them. Of 
these ný relationships, n will refer to the identity of each object with itself-, thus leaving F? -n 
relationships of distinction. However, since the relationship of 'difference' is symmetric (but not 
transitive) half of these relationships are redundant, and thus the total number of distinction 
relationships will be 1/2(ný-n). 
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We note that due to the definition of LP. 2b (its necessary relation to at least two 
instances of LP. lb) and the transitivity of the diversity relationship (or that for 
each pair of distinct objects within the system there must exist at least one 
symmetric diversity statement of the form LP. 2b) all infinitesimal temporal 
terms in a/-f/ are equal. 
Given the equality of infinitesimal temporal terms in a/-f/ the following 
condition is true of a/-f/: 
S: 3 .. ý, P(m)=P(m')+dP., M, A T(m)=T(m')+dT ... .. m=m' 
T(ax)=T(m) A T(ax')=T(m) for all x in 1,2,3,. n. 
where m may be any of the objects al, a2, a2,. . ., an or any other object whose 
continuity principle is captured by LP. 1b. Substituting this term in a/=f/ then 
gives: 
0/ 3, in'P(M)--P(M)+dP., A T(m)=T(m')+dTn,., -> m=m' 
al/ P(al)=P(al')+dPal, al'A [T(al)= T(m) A T(al')=T(m')]-> al=al' 
bl/ P(a2)--P(a2)+dPii2, a2'A [T(a2)= T(m) A T(a2)=T(m')]-> a2=a2' 
cl/ P(an)=P(an')+dP,,,,,,,,, A [T(an)= T(M) A T(an')=T(m')]-> an=an" 
dl/ P(al)#P(a2') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a2')=T(m')]-> al#a2' 
el/ P(al)#P(a3') A [T(al)=T(M) A T(a3')--T(m')]-> al: p'-a3' 
fil P(an-l)-AP(an') A [T(an-l)=T(m) A T(an')=T(m')]-> an-1; 6an' 
This gives an expression of those relationships required to claim that there are n 
material bodies (rather than n+I or n-l), %vithin a given region of space over an 
infinitesimal interval of time which is itself defined from the first order 
derivative of position with respect to time of the object rn (this expression is 
derived fully in Section 4). 
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We now make the important step of recognising that 0/-fl/ is not a necessary 
and sufficient forra (or that it contains terms and expressions which contribute 
nothing to the determination of a cardinality statements). The term 
P(m)=P(m')+dP. ým, in 0/ plays no active role in the actual expression of the 
cardinality statement. Firstly, we note that: (a) The spatial terms in a/-c/ are 
vanishing (infinitesimal) and the meaning of a/-c/ is dependent upon these terms 
being vanishing. (b) That the spatial terms in d/-f/ are finite and the meaning of 
d/-f/ is dependent upon these tenns being finite. (c) That we cannot substitute a 
finite, or non-vanishing, spatial term [P(m)#P(m)] for a vanishing one 
[P(m)=P(m')+dP ....... ], nor a vanishing spatial term for a finite one, without 
losing the meaning of either a/-c/ or d/-f/. Thus while we may make a common 
temporal substitution S in a/-f/ (as in 0/-fl/) we cannot make a common spatial 
substitution within a/-f/. The condition P(m)=P(m')+dP,,,, n, (in Oý therefore 
plays no role in the construction of al/-fl/ (the cardinality statement itself). It is 
not substituted within al/-fl/, and could not be alternatively employed as a 
substitute within a/-f/ (because a/-f/ will not submit to a common spatial 
substitution). 
In other words, all that the term P(m)=P(m')+dP. jn, does is (in conjunction with 
T(m)=T(m')+dT.,,,. ) ensure that the common temporal infinitesimal term dT.,,. 
is well defined (in this case via the first order derivative of position with respect 
to time of the object in) and that in being 'well defined' as an infinitesimal is not 
therefore subject to finite division and is thus suitable for the inferential tenn 
(->) employed in 0/ to fl/. The actual determination of those relationships 
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required to claim that there are n material bodies within a given region of time 
over a given infinitesimal interval only require that a valid infinitesimal interval 
be supplied - how it is defined is irrelevant to these relationships themselves. In 
other words, those relationships required to claim that there exists n material 
bodies within a given region of space over a given infinitesimal interval are 
formally independent of the spatial properties of the reference object m. 
As such we may equally formulate 0/-fl/ with the omission of the condition 
P(m)=P(m')+dP . ..... providing we replace 
the inference in 0/ with a conjunction, 
i. e. 
Ol/ 3, ý, vnl, T(m)=T(m')+dTmm- 
A M=M' 
al/ P(al)=P(al')+dP.,,,,,, - A [T(al)= T(m) A T(al')=T(m')]-> al=al' 
bl/ P(a2)--P(a2)+dPa2, a2'A [T(a2)= T(m) A T(a2)--T(m')]-> a2=a2' 
cl/ P(an)=P(an)+dP.,., A [T(an)= T(m) A T(an')=T(m')]-> an--an' 
dl/ P(al)#P(a2') A [T(al)=T(M) A T(a2')=T(m')]-> al#a2' 
el/ P(al)#P(a3') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a3')=T(m')]--> al#a3' 
fl/ P(an-])#P(an') A [T(an-l)=T(m) A T(an')=T(m')]-> an-I: Aan' 
The sufficiency of these expressions (to capture those relationships required to 
claim that there are n material bodies within a given region of space over a 
given infinitesimal interval) remains unchanged - providing that dT,,,,,, is still a 
valid infinitesimal and exhibits the property of resistance to finite division. The 
necessity of them, however, arises in eliminating the possibility of an 
interpretation of Ol/ in terms of a single instance of LP. 2b - i. e. an interpretation 
which would involve an undefined isolated temporal infinitesimal. We might 
say that 0/ is a classical interpretation of the necessary and sufficient form 01/, 
or that 0/ is an interpretation of 01/ in which the infinitesimal temporal reference 
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(dT . .... ) is defined in the first order derivative of position with respect to time of 
a classical material body. 
Of course, the expressions 01/-fl/ will always stand in need of interpretation to 
ensure the validity of the infinitesimal reference term dT,,,, n (that the this term 
exhibits the properties of an infinitesimal interval - most importantly; a 
resistance to finite division in the sense discussed in section 1.2) but does not 
insist that this infinitesimal reference term be defined via the first order 
derivative of position vAth respect to time of a material body. If there should 
exist other equally valid ways of defining such a tenn, then these 'other equally 
valid ways' would do as well for the formal definition of cardinality statements. 
In summary then, the analysis of the question Q4a reveals to us the wholly 
unremarkable fact that if you say that there are n material bodies within a given 
region of space over a given infinitesimal interval of time, then you have to say 
what 'given infinitesimal time' you are talking about. What is important, 
however (and indeed so important, in my opinion, that I shall require to dedicate 
three whole sections of this thesis to demonstrating it rigorously) is that there is 
nothing in the formal structure of those relationships required to claim that there 
are n such material bodies which in any way demands that this 'infinitesimal 
temporal interval' is defined from the first order derivative of position with 
respect to time of a material body. As long as dT. is 'supplied', and 'supplied' 
as a legitimate infinitesimal term possessing the properties (of resistance to 
finite division) that an infinitesimal term must possess, then these relationships 
can be fully realised and n can be claimed. 
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It must therefore be admitted that this analysis leads us directly to two questions 
more immediately suited to a doctoral thesis in philosophy than the analysis of 
statements itself Firstly, it begs the purely logical question of whether an 
infinitesimal temporal interval can be legitimately defined (i. e. maintaining the 
properties of an infinitesimal term) other than in terms of the first order 
derivative of a continues function of position and time, or other than in terms of 
the motion of material bodies. Secondly (and this is where the philosophy 
comes in, or where the analytical concerns of Book I of this thesis must give 
way to the philosophical concerns of Book 2) it begs the question of whether 
there exists, within any established, accepted, or even merely muted philosophy, 
an understanding of time within which an infinitesimal temporal interval may be 
defined otherwise than in terms of the motion of material bodies. 
The second of these questions must, of course, stand in need of a positive 
response to the first; since if an infinitesimal temporal interval defined 
otherwise than in ternis of the first order derivative of position with respect to 
time of a material body is simply logically impossible (or if Ol/ has one and 
onlY one legitimate solution - that solution held in 0/), then no legitimate 
philosophy of time may posit such terms. It is essential then, at the outset, that I 
should argue that isolated (or non-quotiented) infinitesimal intervals are at least 
logically possible, or that it is possible to define an infinitesimal temporal term 
otherwise than with respect to the first order derivative of position with respect 
to time of a material body. As I shall demonstrate in the next sub-section of this 
introduction, however, it is perfectly logically feasible to define an isolated 
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infinitesimal temporal term, and further, that we already know how to do it from 
my previous discussions on motion. 
1.4 The Logic of Isolated (non-quotiented) Infinitesimal Temporal Terms. 
The analysis that I shall outline and summarise here is more naturally, perhaps, 
the topic of Book 2 of this thesis - since it concerns more than simply the 
analysis of question Q4a itself. However, it not only justifies those purely 
philosophical questions that I shall address in Book 2 (in attempting to address 
the "HoW' part of Q4a), but points the way to these questions themselves - it 
does not therefore sit uneasily between my concerns of analysis (Bookl) and 
philosophical speculation (Book 2) but occupies instead a central role in the 
method by which I shall pass between these concerns. I should re-emphasise, 
however, that in addressing the question of isolated (or non-quotiented) 
infinitesimal temporal terms I am not necessarily addressing a question about 
the world or ourselves (I shall argue later that it does indeed refer to something 
about ourselves but, at this stage, this need not concern us). At this stage, or for 
the purpose of this introduction, I am simply interested in demonstrating that 
such terms are logically possible and, if indeed they are possible, in considering 
how this may guide us in the philosophical concerns of Book 2 of this thesis. 
Let us firstly then remind ourselves about the importance of the infinitesimal 
term (and its property of resistance to finite division) in the description of 
motion. 
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I have previously argued that the three-part conjunction of tenns involved in the 
claim of the re-identification of a material body: 
P(a) = P(b)+ 5Pa, b A T(a) =T(b)+ 8T,, b Aa=b (ii) 
is continuous with that 'principle' which determines the transitivity of identity 
relationships expressed in terms of what I have called 'temporary names' 
(Locke's first principle LP. la: P(a)=P(b) A T(a)=T(b) -> a--b) under the 
condition: 
P(a)=P(b)+dPa, b A T(a)--T(b)+dLb -* a--b ... LP. lb 
where dP,,, b / dT., b = Lim 8P,,, b /8T,, b. 8T&, b-->O 
In this case then, it is the logical properties of the infinitesimal (its resistance to 
finite division) which allows us to move from the third conjunction (A) of (ii) to 
the inference (-->) of LP. lb. 
As a logical exercise only we may therefore equally define an infinitesimal 
temporal term from the description of purely temporal re-identification 
statements, i. e. statements which claim the re-identification of an entity over 
time without any reference whatsoever to spatial terms (and whether or not such 
're-identification statements' correspond to anything in reality is irrelevant to 
the concerns of this sub-section). 
Suppose, for example, that we were to claim that the object temporarily named 
m (and I make no assumption as to what object, or even what type of object, m. 
may be) is re-identified as the object which is temporally named n and that the 
time of m is not the time of n: 
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T(m): # T(n) A m=n (iii) 
The validity of this statement is then dependent upon a principle (referring to 
the application of such temporary names) which ensures the transitivity of the 
identity relationship (m=n) cited in (iii). By analogy to LP. I a, we might (as a 
logical exercise only) posit the principle: 
T(m) = T(n) -> m=n (iv) 
We may then (by analogy to the formulation of LP. lb) introduce a continuity 
term firstly by expressing (iii) in terms of the small but finite temporal interval 
8T : 
T(m)=T(n)+6T ..... Am=n 
and then defining a principle (which is logically continuous with the principle 
(iv)] in the limit as BT.,,, tends towards Zero: 
T(m)=T(n)+dT -> m =n *II (V) 
Where dT.,,, is Lim 8T.,,, 14 
8T.,. -+O 
In this case then the infinitesimal term dT ..... is defined at the point of transition 
from (iv) to (v) - the transition from a conjunction of terms to the inference of 
one term from another Oust as it occurs and is defined in the description of the 
motion of material bodies) in the temporal continuity of m and nis. 
14 This expression of the limit as 5Tm, 'tends towards Zero' is not ideal. Normally we would 
simply interpret it as Zero. In this case, however, I use it merely as a convenient notation to 
indicate that (v) should really be expressed: 
Lim T(m)=T(n)+5T,, --ý m=n 
15 It is obvious that the expression T(m)=T(m')+dT.,. -> m--m' can apply neither to the case 
where rn and m' are material bodies, nor to the case where T(m) and T(rn') are times in the 
sense of the measured times of the physicist. The properties of this expression are also rather 
abstract (and the implications of applying it as a solution to Ol/ are somewhat complex) and thus 
I shall leave any further discussion of it until Book 2 of this thesis. 
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We have therefore defined a temporal infinitesimal term (dT,,,, n -a term which 
exhibits the logical properties of an infinitesimal, i. e. a resistance to finite 
division) other than in terms of the first order derivative of position with respect 
to time of a material body. Thus we may claim, in purely logical terms at least, 
that the necessary and sufficient expression Ol/ (arising in the analysis of 
Lockean Cardinality statements) is not restricted purely to the classical 
interpretation 0/ - and thus, Nvith some relief perhaps, my analysis of Lockean 
Cardinality statements is not trivial. 
Really this is all I need to say to summarise the topics of Book I of this thesis 
(whose concerns lie solely with the analysis of statements - those statements 
fonnulated by S). However, it will undoubtedly leave the reader somewhat 
unclear about my intentions if I do not, even at this early stage, give some 
indication of the solution to Q4a which I hope to develop in Book 2. Let me 
then return briefly to that question which is to concern me throughout this work. 
Given the question Q4a: 
Q4a. How does S (or T) know that there are n (rather than n+1 or 
n-J) material bodies moving about within a given region of space 
over some given infinitesimal interval oftime? 
then we may claim (via the methods of analysis alone) the following to be a 
perfectly logically acceptable, although only partial, answer (which is no doubt 
simply one logically acceptable answer among several): 
S (or T) knows that there are n (rather than n+l or n-1) material 
bodies moving about within a given region of space over some 
given infinitesimal interval of time because S (or T) has reference 
to, or equally 'knows' about, purely temporal re-identification 
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statements of the form T(m)=T(n)+bT,,, /i in =n which are 
themselves dependent upon a continuity condition 
T(m)=T(n)+dT,, -- ,n ;ý In =n where 
dT,,,,, is 6T,,,,, in the limit as bT,,,,, 
'tends towards Zero. 
Or, if I Nvere to be brave enough to make an as yet unjustified leap (but one 
which I shall attempt to justify in Book 2 of this thesis): 
S (or T) knows that there are n (rather than n+1 or n-J) material 
bodies moving about within a given region of space over some 
given infinitesimal interval oftime because S (or T) is, in part, or in 
some aspect of S associated with Ss knowing things, itseýf a thing 
persisting through time alone with no spatial properties (whether 
actually or only seemingly so to S). 
It should be evident to the reader by now that it is my intention to argue that our 
ability to formulate cardinality statements (or our ability to 'see' the world in 
terms of material bodies moving about in space and time) is dependent upon our 
recognition of ourselves as temporally persistent entities - thatwe can 'feel time 
passing' in some peculiar way. 
In moving from the analytical claims of Book 1 to the philosophically 
speculative arguments of Book 2,1 am therefore interested in philosophies in 
which S (a thing that can 'know things' about the world) is itself, in part at least, 
cca thing persisting through time alone with no spatial properties (whether 
actually or only seemingly so to S)". And there is no point in my pretending to 
the reader that I do not intend to claim that this is consciousness, or that the 
condition T(m)=T(n)+dT,., -* m=n is not a property of measured time, as the 
physicist might measure it, but a property of phenomenological time: tinze as 
experienced by consciousness. 
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But this need not concern us in Book I of this thesis and, as a claim, is best laid 
to one side for the moment. 
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Book I- An Analysis of Identity, Diversity 
and Re-Identification Statements. 
The Formal Properties of the Identity, Diversity and Re-ldentification of 
Material Bodies over Infinitesimal Spatial and Temporal Displacements. 
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2. The Lockean Principles of Identity and Diversity. 
2.1 Identity, Diversity and Locke 
Before we can address ourselves to the topic of re-identification across the 
infinitesimal interval (Chapter 3) we must firstly acquaint ourselves with the 
properties of the identity and diversity of material bodies 'at a given time'; for 
while neither experience nor measurement may reveal to us the non-extended 
instant and the non-extended point, these ideas nonetheless play an important 
role (at least historically) in our understanding of identity. 
Two seemingly intuitive principles, both found in Locke's treatment of "Identity 
and DivershY', underlie our counting of material objects. The first is the 
principle that two objects 'of the same kind' cannot be at the same place at the 
same time: "For we never finding, nor conceiving itpossible, that two things of 
the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly 
conclude that whatever exists anywhere at any time, excludes all of the same 
kind, and is there itseýfalone" [Locke (1690) XXVII, Pringle-Patterson (1934)]. 
In the "Identity of Substances" (XXVII 2) Locke informs us that we have "but 
three sorts of substance: I God. 2. Finite intelligences. 3. Bodies" and that 
"though these three sorts of substances, as we lerin them, do not exclude one 
another out of the same place, yet we cannot conceive but that they necessarily 
each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place". Here then, 
Locke seems to be using the expression "of the saine kind" to mean either of the 
tAx "God', "Finite intelligences", or "Bodies"16. It is in this sense, or in the 
16 He does not therefore use the term "kind' in the sense of the contemporary expression "so" predicate' 
(Wiggins 1980 ch 3), or as a concept by which we may count the number Fs (e. g. donkeys, cats, chairs, or 
tables) within a given region of space at a given time; since if he did, then there is nothing within the first 
principle which excludes a table and a chair being at the same place at the same time. Equally, in claiming 
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sense in which "Bodies" constitute a "kind', that Locke's principle is most 
clearly applicable to the concerns of, say, classical mechanics - for Arithin this 
science we do not distinguish the kinematical or dynamical properties of 
"Bodies" upon the basis of their sortal predicate or the peculiarities of their 
intrinsic properties. There is not, for example, a mechanics of chairs and a 
separate mccbanics of tables; simply a mccbanics of material objects, or 
"Bodies", in general. 
At one level we may consider Locke's first principle to be a practical 
descriptive principle - one applying, in this case, to the simple fact that we may 
identify objects by different methods. For example, when Strawson asks "Hen 
shall we say that a hearer knows what particular is being referred to by a 
speaker? " (Strawson 1959. p17) he suggests that that we may employ linguistic 
means to isolate a particular within a given range of particulars which are 
themselves isolated by a "demonstrative identification" - that the hearer may 
" ick out by sight or hearing or touch, or can otherwise sensibly discriminate, p 
the particulars being referred to" (Strawson 1959. p18). It is therefore 
conceivable that two different speakers may make a hearer know that they each 
refer to the same particular by different demonstrative identifications and by 
different linguistic means (or by the use of different words to isolate the 
particular to which they refer within the range of particulars which they have 
demonstrably identified). In this sense then we may think of Locke's first 
principle as defining a rule regarding different identifications which relate to the 
that material bodies constitute a 'kind', and in relating this kind to his principles of identity and diversity, 
we may consider Locke's principles to constitute a 'criterion of identity' for material objects in general 
(see entry under 'Identity, criterion of' in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Ed Honderich T, 1995). 
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same place and time, i. e. if Nve identify x by one method and y by another, and if 
we should then learn that x and y are at the same place at the same time, then 
Locke's first principle informs us thatwe must claim that 'x is y'. 
Yet the first principle is not without a metaphysical heritage (for we may 
legitimately ask about the origin of this 'rule' within our understanding and it is 
not unreasonable that this 'origin' may lead us into metaphysical matters), nor is 
it treated purely descriptively by Locke. Within the Cartesian tradition, for 
example, it arises from the argument, or 'Law', of contradiction (Smith 1963, 
409). If the essence of matter is spatial extension (if the essence of a material 
thing is to be extended in space), as Descartes had claimed it to be, then it is 
seemingly contradictory to assume that two material bodies may occupy the 
same place at the same time - since they would then be of the same essence and 
thus no longer be distinct. This was, however, unacceptable to both Kant and 
Leibniz; both of whom espoused the view that the characteristics of matter 
cannot be deduced from extension alone and must instead entail a dynamic 
element (or an element which cannot be reduced purely to the description of 
places, times, velocities and accelerations). Most importantly, in order to 
maintain his empirical theory of knowledge, Kant was forced to reject Cartesian 
mathematical extension as the 'essence' of matter (i. e. a mathematical property 
which can be directly grasped by the mind -without recourse to the contribution 
of the senses) and with it, of course, he was forced to reject the application of 
the TaNv of Contradiction' in the fonnulation of what I refer to here as "Locke's 
First Principle". Realising perhaps that the description of motion is itself 
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impossible without this 'first principle' 17 Kant then proposes that we re-institute 
this principle, not from the Law of Contradiction, but from a dynamic 
metaphysics of matter. For Kant, two material bodies cannot be at the same 
place at the same time since matter possesses a dynamic 'force' or 'power' to 
resist penetration (Kant 1786) - thus establishing (together with Leibniz 
perhaps) a philosophical tradition within which the topics of identity, diversity 
and re-identification are forever intimately linked with dynamic (as opposed to 
purely kinematic) issues18. 
Locke is not then alone in supposing a metaphysical intention for his first 
principle rather than a merely descriptive one, or in presenting an intention 
which goes beyond the simple practical interpretation discussed earlier - 
"Another occasion the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of 
things, when, considering anything as existing at any determined time and 
place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the 
ideas of identity and diversiV' [XXVII. I]. In effect, Locke is keen to define for 
us what it is to be a material body, or more accurately perhaps, what it is to be a 
single material body (to be counted only once in any act of counting). This is 
more clearly seen, however,, Mth respect to his second principle. 
Locke's second principle is that one object cannot be at two places at the same 
time: " Wien we see anything to be in anyplace in any instant of time, we are 
17 Kant treats the 'essence of matter' to be movement. Matter is that which moves or can be 
moved. Only via movement, argued Kant, may matter effect the senses and thus be known by us 
as appearances. 
18 The overriding kinematic nature of the analysis presented in Book I of this thesis therefore 
stands in need ofjustification with respect to this Kantian position. 
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sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that 
same time exists in another place, how like and indistinguishable soever it may 
be in all other respects" (XXVII 1). It is in the formulation of this second 
principle that Locke is making a more obviously metaphysical claim - since if 
objects at different places at the same time must be different regardless of j 
whether they are otherwise indistinguishable, then particularity is not to be 
detennined upon the basis of intrinsic properties alone (or that an object, or a 
substance, is to be considered as something more than simply its properties). 
Traditionally, however, this metaphysical position is challenged by Leibniz in 
the principle of the "Identity of Indiscernibles". For Leibniz, diversity goes 
beyond mere spatial and temporal properties and must constitute instead an 
internal principle of distinction ["it is not true t1wt two substances may be 
exactly alike and differ only numerically, solo numero" - Discourse on 
Metaphysics (Hollis 1973 p284)] - and thus while Leibniz does not deny that 
Locke's second principle may be a practical aid to deciding that two objects are 
'different' (or may help us to "distinguish things which are not easily 
distinguished in themselves"), he argues that the diversity of such objects 
actually entails something more than simply simultaneous spatial separation. 
Likewise, Zimmennan describes the idea (which he attributes to Locke) of "a 
mysterious substratum, an unreachable kernel that bears properties but is not 
ilset( a propeny' as "metaphysics at its most gratuitous and pernicious" 
(Zimmerman 1998). 
Whether, in addressing Locke's principles, we should really consider ourselves 
to be addressing a metaphysical problem is, of course, a difficult question to 
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answer. Certainly the idea that spatial and temporal position are alone sufficient 
to characterise the diversity of material bodies goes back as far as St Aquinas. 
However, when treated as a metaphysical problem, Russell has argued that this 
position may be reduced either to 'Identity of Indiscernibles' of Leibniz, or to 
the belief (which Russell assumes to be the view of most modem empiricists "if 
they took the trouble to have a definite view") that nwnerical diversity is 
ultimate and indefinable (Russell 1948). The topic is therefore perhaps more 
naturally epistemological. For example, when Popper asks for "something like a 
sufficient condition, i. e., a criterion of difference or non-identity of material 
bodies, or bits of matter" (Popper 1957), he resorts in the end to the claim 
(equivalent, at least in form, to Locke's 2 nd principle) that "Two qualitatively 
undistinguishable material bodies or bits of matter differ if they occupy at the 
same time different regions of space". Yet even here we are led to propose (as 
does Bobik) that question which most naturally arises in connection with 
Locke's principle (and Popper's epistemological formulation of it); "why are 
different regions of space different? Are different regions of space to be 
distinguished by different individuals; or are different individuals to be 
distinguished by different regions ofspace? " (Bobik 1963) -a questionwhich is 
most naturally pertinent, perhaps, to Kant's treatment of identity and diversity in 
the Analytic ofPrinciples. 
When Kant addresses himself to the question of identity and diversity in the 
Analytic of Principles he informs us that "Mien an object is presented to us 
several times but always with the same internal determinations (qualitas et 
quantitas), it, ifan object ofpure understanding, is always the same, not several 
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things, but only one thing (numerica identitas); but if it is an appearance, it is 
not a matter of comparing concepts, and although everything may be the same 
as far as concepts are concerned, the difference ofplace of appearance at the 
same time is a sufficient groundfor asserting the numerical difference of the 
object (of sense)" (Politis 1997 pp 117-8). But in what sense does Kant claim 
that "difference of place of appearance at the same time" constitutes a 
"sufficient groundfor asserting the numerical difference of the object", or in 
what sense, or upon what basis, does Kant claim that one object may not be at 
two places at the same time? The answer it would seem, or so Kant would have 
us accept, lies in the inherent diversity of places in space: "For one part of 
space, although it may he Perfectly similar and equal to another, is still outside 
it, andfor this reason alone is differentftom the latter, which is added to it to 
make up a greater space. Itfollows that this must hold good of all things that 
are in the different parts of space at the same time, however similar and equal 
one may be to another" (Politis 1997 pp 117). In other words, Kant asks us to 
accept that the origin of numerical diversity of objects (of which we may only 
know via "appearances") lies in the numerical diversity of the places which 
they occupy at the same time. Thus our understanding of the diversity of places 
(at the same time) must in some sense precede, or be more fundamental than, 
our understanding of the diversity of objects themselves - and thus the 
pertinence of Bobik's question of "why are different regions of space 
different? " 
1, 
I shall not, however, treat Locke's principles as metaphysical definitions of the 
identity and -diversity of material objects. Nor do I Nvish to engage in 
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metaphysical speculation as to the question of what it is for two particulars to be 
distinct (and in this much my adoption of the term "Locke's Principles" is 
merely in linewith common convention and does not imply my equal adoption 
of Locke"s conception of material bodies). My own position Nvith regards to 
these principles is (admittedly) somewhat contradictory. For I shall treat them in 
both a relatively pragmatic sense; in claiming that they refer primarily to our 
own psychological inclinations to individuate experience, and a more rigorous 
formal sense; in claiming that they are either the logical pre-requisite for, or the 
logical consequence of (but in either case necessarily associated with), the 
ability to formulate numerical re-identification statements for material bodies. 
Why then should I adopt two so seemingly different positions with respect to 
these principles? 
One need not venture far into the common discussion of Locke's principles to 
be confronted with those questions (or type of questions) which throw doubt, 
not necessarily upon these principles themselves, but upon our ability to apply 
them clearly and unproblematically to all objects and object types. For example, 
can two clouds be at the same place at the same time, or can two waves be at the 
same place at the same time? Similarly, one need not venture too far into the 
technical philosophical literature to discover that the rigorous application of 
these principles may itself seemingly lead to contradiction and absurdity - for 
example in the classical problem of the 'Ship of Theseus' (see Section 6.5). 
Finally, one need not delve too deeply into the theories of modem physics to 
discover that these principles themselves start to fail, or become un-helpful in 
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the description of physical systems, as we move away from the typical 
conditions and physical scales of our everyday experience (as discussed in 
section 2.3 below). 
In short, we need to consistently address Locke's principles in two ways. 
Firstly, in a relatively pragmatic sense, or a sense in which the question of their 
violation is not critical (or where the violation of these principles, as in 
considering it possible for two clouds to be at the same place at the same time, 
is not necessarily detrimental to our understanding of the identity, diversity and 
re-identifi cation of certain objects). Secondly, we require a formal perspective 
upon these principles; a consideration of the rigorous application of these 
principles to a class of objects and problems where their violation would lead us 
to radically re-think our opinions on the identity, diversity and re-identification 
of these objects. 
These two ways of considering Locke's Principles (the 'pragmatic' and the 
'formal') correspond to the cases where we are respectively uncertain and 
certain as to whether we can unproblematically re-identify objects over space 
and time. For example, the claim that the cloud which is currently above my 
head is the same cloud that was just above the Eastern horizon at 10 o'clock 
this morning is likely to be subject to a number of irritating questions which 
may, in extreme cases, lead us to doubt the validity of the claim itself. For 
example, when is a cloud the same cloud despite its change of shape and mass? 
When does a cloud become fog or fog become a cloud? Where does the cloud 
go when it is burnt off by the Sun? We might suspect then that things like 
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clouds wrill not only have a complicated criterion of re-identification but may 
well, in some circumstances, or under some arguments, violate Locke's first 
principle. 
Equally, however, when I claim that the tea-cup which is currently upon nzy 
desk is the same as the tea-cup that was on the draining board in the kitchen 
this morning I feel there to be no ambiguity in what is meant by this claim (even 
if it should turn out to be false). I mean that the same tea-cup has moved 
continuously from the draining board in the kitchen to my desk. In this case, not 
only does a criterion of re-identification clearly present itself, but the claim that 
tNvo tea-cups could actually be at the same place at the same time seems highly 
contradictory to my understanding of the identity, diversity and re-identification 
of such objects. 
We therefore require a 'pragmatic' approach to Locke's principles for things 
like clouds and waves (for sometimes we may like to claim that two clouds or 
two waves may be at the same place at the same time) and a 'formal' approach 
for things like tea-cups (for we may never wish to admit that two tea-cups may 
be at the same place at the same time). 
The first of these (and unavoidably a somewhat weak philosophical position) is 
to reformulate Locke's principles in a somewhat protected form (or in a form 
protected from those occasional questions which at once seem intuitively clear 
but which nonetheless challenge our ability to apply the first principle). For 
example: 
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If there is sufficient reason, or inclination upon our part, to 
individuate those qualities which we observe at the position pi at 
time tl, or to assign to these qualities a single name 'a', and if there 
is sufficient reason, or inclination upon our part, to individuate 
those qualities which we observe at the position p2 at time t2, or to 
assign to these qualities the single name V, then if tI is (or seems 
to us to be) numerically identical to t2 and pl. is (or seems to us to 
be) numerically identical to p2, then we will often, although not 
necessarily universally, be inclined to say that 'a is numerically 
identical to W (Locke's first principle). If, on the other hand, tI is 
(or seems to us to be) numerically identical to Q but pl is not (or 
seems to us not to be) numerically identical to p2, then we Nvill 
often, although not necessarily universally, be inclined to say that 
6a is not numerically identical to W (Locke's second principle). 
These principles arise then (or at least are treated as such above), not as the 
result of a metaphysical principle of identity and diversity, but as a result of 
those 'sufficient reasons', or 'inclinations upon our part, to individuate those 
qualities at a place and time and assign to them a single proper name (that there 
may be reasons well enough for us to have such 'inclinations', and that these 
'inclinations' may themselves be described in scientific, philosophical and 
evolutionary terms will be discussed later). 
With respect to this somewhat convoluted definition the reader might well 
object that it is qualified too strongly, or that it's provisos may eliminate from 
my discussion all violating situations. It does not insist that Locke's principles 
apply to all situations (even those of our most common experience and 
understanding) nor even that there be any more to spatial and temporal 
simultaneity than our own belief in such situations. In short the reader may feel 
that I have been too timid in my definition, or that I have defended it so strongly 
from attack that, in effect, it says nothing of interest. To some extent this is 
indeed the case. For Locke's principles are interesting simply because they 
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describe for us a 'norm' or a typical situation. The idea that two objects cannot 
be at the same place at the same time, or that one object cannot be at two places 
at the same time, is a kind of useful rule of thumb by which we make sense of 
the Nvorld and can successfully interact with it. Of course it is possible to 
question these rules. Can two clouds be at the same place at the same time? Can 
two waves be at the same place at the same time? Equally, of course, it is 
possible to be lead towards absurdity by their strict application - as, for 
example, in the problem of The Ship of Theseus (which I shall consider in 
section 6). But to concentrate upon these exceptions at the expense of the 
4norm' itself, or to develop a philosophy of individuation which insists upon 
accommodating these exceptions with the 'norm', is to mistake the methods of 
philosophy with theory of empirical science. Certainly the need for consistency 
requires us to accommodate exceptions Nvhen they contradict the 'norm' itself - 
just as we must reject an accepted scientific theory (the 'norm' in this case) 
when contrary empirical evidence arises (the 'exception'). But this is only if we 
accept the 'norm' to be incompatible Nvith its exceptions. My somewhat 
pragmatic formulation of Locke's principles above is intended simply to express 
them as a 'norm', or to express them simply as a typical response to more or 
less typical situations. Thus fonnulated they do not deny the possibility of their 
own violation and thus are not incompatible with their own exceptions. The 
philosophy of individuation should (in my opinion) start, not with the 
metaphysical interpretation of Locke's principles and ultimately their rejection 
upon the basis of exceptions and logical absurdity, but with the recognition that 
these principles, first and foremost, serve a purpose; and that purpose is to allow 
us to make sense of the world by separating one thing from another in order that 
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we may interact successfully with it. Locke's principles are not, in this sense, 
immutable truths about the world (truths which must be rejected when found to 
stand in contradiction to certain know facts - 'exceptions') but are instead a 
more or less useful guide to our own inclinations (inclinations which have their 
origin in our evolution); a way of allowing us to arrive at ajudgement and act in 
accordance with it. Locke's principles are neither true nor false. They are either 
useful or un-usefal depending upon the situation in which they are applied (I 
shall discuss later those situations in which Locke's principles become un- 
useful). Locke's principles are applied "often, but not necessarily universalljP, 
and it is to the fact of their being applied "often" rather than "not necessarily 
universalljl" that our attention should be drawn. Likewise any sort of 
metaphysics of identity and diversity (when applied to material bodies) need 
only concern me if it is demonstrably the case that these 'sufficient reasons', or 
'inclinations upon our part', require an explanation in terms of an ontology of 
material objects - and any such ontology of material objects, or any such 
attempt to define their identity independently of our own 'inclinations' to 
individuate them, is to be strongly opposed in this work. 
In addition to this 'pragmatic' and somewhat psychological approach I also 
adopt a more rigorous formal position with respect to Locke's principles. 
Effectively, I would suggest that whenever it is claimed that 'a is b', where a is 
at a different position and time from b, it is necessary, in order that this 
statement be meaningfully formulated, that both a and b are the type of objects 
to which Locke's principles rigorously apply. This is not, of course, in anyway 
contradictory to the pragmatic treatment of these principles outlined above; for 
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it is a position Nvith respect to the formal properties of re-identification 
statements, and is thus pertinent only when those 'inclinations on our part' are 
such as to lead us to formulate such re-identification statements. The exact 
nature of this fonnal position Aith respect to Locke's principles Nvill be covered 
fully in section 2.4 when we come to consider the formal symbolic 
representation of these principles themselves. However, for the sake of 
completeness, I shall brieflY outline this position here. 
In claiming, say, that the tea-cup which is currently upon my desk is the same 
(numerically the same) as the tea-cup that was on the draining board in the 
kitchen this morning, the important point is the use of the word 'same'. In this 
case a numencal identity is implied to exist between the tea-cup which is 
currently upon my desk and the tea-cup that was on the draining board in the 
kitchen this morning. However, numerical identity is not without its own 
identifiable properties, most importantly; its reflectivity (a is a and b is b), its 
symmetry (if a is h then b is a) and its transitivity (if a is b and b is c then a is 
c). Transitivity, in this case, is dependent upon a property of the relationship 
between objects and names. Put simply, if either a, b or c could be the names of 
more than one numerically distinct object, then the transitivity rule would not 
apply. In other words, the name 'a' may refer to one and only one numerically 
distinct object, the name W may refer to one and only one numerically distinct 
object, and the name V may refer to one and only one numerically distinct 
object - otherwise it would be possible that a is b and b is c but a is not c. So 
when I claim that the tea-cup which is currently upon my desk is the same as 
the tea-cup that was on the draining board in the kitchen this morning, and 
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when I intend, by the formulation of this statement to use the word 'same' to 
imply a numerical identity, I must equally imply that the names 'the tea-cup 
which is currently upon my desk' and 'the tea-cup that was on the draining 
board in the kitchen this nzorning' are each names which can be the name of 
only one (numerically distinct) object. In other words, I must imply that there 
may only be one tea-cup where the tea-cup which is currently upon my desk is, 
and only one tea-cup where the tea-cup that was on the draining board in the 
kitchen this morning was - and thus in simply formulating the statement in the 
first place (and regardless of whether the statement is true or false) I must 
implicitly suggest that tea-cups, at least, are the types of things which rigorously 
adhere to Locke's first principle (that two objects, of the same kind, cannot be at 
the same place at the same time). This then is the sense in which I suggest that 
Locke's principles (or more accurately the first principle) is a logical pre- 
requisite for, or a logical consequence of (but in either case necessarily 
associated with), the ability to formulate a numerical re-identification claim for 
material bodies. 
I shall not therefore be concerned with the metaphysics of material objects;, %vith 
the metaphysics of their particularity or diversity, their relationships to qualities 
(whether these qualities be universals or not), nor with whether such objects are 
more than their qualities and relations or nothing more than their qualities and 
relations. In fact I shall admit no individuation to material objects except that 
which we ourselves impose in our 'inclinations' to individuate them - and if, 
like Locke, we equate identity with existence [as is equally a position within 
Logical Metaphysics (Benardete 1989)], then I shall admit no existence to these 
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objects except in relation to our own 'inclinations' to individuate them. I do not, 
however, adopt this as a philosophical position, nor as one arising from an 
analysis of traditional and contemporary metaphysics. For regardless of the 
ontology of reality, or regardless of whether material objects actually exist 
independently of our concept of them, we must still address the question of how 
we come to represent the world in the way that we do (or how we come to 
individuate and characterise it in the way that we do) - and as we shall see in 
the follovring section, this latter question has aspects which are quite 
independent of metaphysical or ontological considerations. 
22 The Epistemological Status of Locke's Principles 
If justification be sought for my current approach to Locke's principles, or if 
justification be required for separating an ontology of identity and diversity 
from the study of our own 'inclinations to individuate' and their formal 
properties (as though we could treat the subject of identity and diversity, at least 
for material objects, not as a topic of metaphysics but as a topic of our own 
psychology), then we might do little better than to inquire as to the empirical, or 
synthetic, nature of Locke's first principle (Popper 1959 p39). 
ZZI The Empirical (or otherwise) Nature ofLocke's First Principle. 
If we take Locke's first principle to be a principle concerning what it is to be a 
material body in the first place, or what it is for such a material body to be 
possessed of a singular identity (to be counted only once in any act of counting), 
then we may certainly question if this principle is synthetic. Whatever the 
numerical identity, or individuality, of a material object may be, or whatever we 
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may imply by the term (metaphysically), Nve are entitled to ask if this 
'individuality' is itself an observable property. In other words, can experience 
reveal to us the individuality of a material body? 
At one level it seems relatively trivial to claim that we cannot observe, or 
measure, or detect, the numerical individuality of a material thing, nor can we 
observe that one material thing has been numerically re-identified as another, 
nor that one material thing is numerically continuous over time. Neither pure 
experience nor pure sensation would seem to reveal to us the identity of external 
material objects19. For example, Zimmerman (1997) claims that "All we observe 
or detect are the properties of things, and a particular substance is nothing 
more than a bundle ofproperties". Personally, I take this to mean that ive may 
observe and detect properties and qualities at places and times, but that our 
inability to observe a "mysterious substratum, an unreachable kernel that bears 
properties but is not itself a properOP is synonymous Mth our inability to 
observe or detect the numerical individuality of a particular. However, we must 
treat such a claim with considerable caution. If individuality were to be 
understood in terms of an 'bundle of properties', and if the diversity of 
individuals is then guaranteed by the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, 
then it may be claimed that this ability to distinguish one individual from 
another (upon the basis of experience) must itself infer the individuality of that 
19 My labouring of the term 'material' is intended to avoid possible philosophical problems with 
claiming that all types of identities are actually non-observable. My claim here is merely that 
the identity of a persistent material object is unobservable. As to whether the identities of such 
things as properties and relations, for example, are observable, I shaH not inquire, Nor shall I 
inquire into what we mean by the term 'observation' (for example, in the question of whether a 
genuine observation must entail the conscious direction of the n-dnd upon a subject within 
experience - and thus, in effect, an individuation). My claim is simply that in its most 
embryonic form, or in the form or pure sensation, experience cannot contain or immediately 
reveal to us the identity of a material object. 
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which is distinguished from something elSe20. My own opinion, however, is that 
we cannot anyway assume that a 'bundle of properties' is itself observable. 
Certainly the properties themselves may be observable (may be revealed to us 
via pure sensation), but their collection into a 'bundle' is not. Of course, 
experience may lead to our attention being drawn to a collection of properties 
(for example if they all seem to occupy an isolated region of space and time) 
and this process of 'being led' to a collection of properties is no doubt important 
to the way in which we represent experience to ourselves. But again this is a 
process of representation. Experience itself does not reveal that these proper-ties 
are in fact a 'bundle'. 
Similarly, in Leibniz' principle of the "Identity of indiscernibles" we are 
presented with the claim that if every intrinsic non-relational property of A is 
also every intrinsic non-relational property of B, then A is the same as B (or 
A=B). In other words, in enumerating every possible observable property of an 
object we exbaust all observable means of determining identity or diversity - 
since identity itself (pure particularity) is not itself observable2 1. Surely, if 
20 However, the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (which, it might be claimed, 
guarantees the diversity of different 'bundles of properties') is not itself an observable property. 
We may observer different 'bundles of properties' perhaps (although I would deny even this) 
but we may not observe that they are therefore distinct individuals. We may go on to represent 
these 'bundles' as distinct individuals if we also, as part of this representation, employ the 
Principle of the Identity of Indiscemibles, but this is representation. It is perception, not 
experience. Equally, if it were the case that the Principle of the identity of Indiscernibles were a 
metaphysical principle, then surely the same is true. If we represent to ourselves two 'bundles of 
properties' as being distinct, then this cannot be upon the basis of experience (pure sensation) 
alone. It must employ a representation which itself employs a principle (not necessarily the 
Principle of the Identify of Indiscernibles). 
21 1 do not mean to directly support Leibniz' principle, nor Zimmerman's 'Bundle Theory', 
merely that the possibility of their formulation is itself sufficient to demonstrate that identity is 
not an observable. Most importantly, Leibniz' 'identity of indiscernibles', or the very possibility 
of this theory as a legitimate philosophical position (one that is not to be immediately 
abandoned upon the grounds of absurdity) must itself be proof that identity is not a directly 
observable property. 
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numerical diversity were observable then there would be no need for 
philosophical debate about the respective merits of Locke's second principle 
and Leibniz' 'Identity of Indiscernibles' - since the matter could be settled on 
purely empirical grounds This, of course, is a point which could equally be 
made about a great deal of contemporary philosophy of identity and 
individuation. For example, could we really accept as genuine the respective 
philosophical positions of Sortal Dependency and Sortal Relativity (Wiggins 
1980), and the philosophical debate between the proponents of each, if it were 
nothing more than a matter of mere observation which could settle this debate? 
Numerical identity is simply not an observable property. 
Even if we were to admit for the moment that qualitative identity, diversity and 
re-identification were observable properties of material bodies (and I would 
deny even this), still we should find it difficult to justify in any strict 
philosophical sense that numerical identity, diversity and re-identification are 
likewise observable. Suppose it were possible that A and B were alike in all 
their observable properties (i. e. they are qualitatively identical) but that at any 
given time A was at an observably different place from B. Of course, given 
these observations, our instinct is to claim that A and B are numerically distinct 
- since one ob ect cannot be at two places at the same time (or so we are j 
inclined to think). But what is it that we have observed which corresponds to 
this numerical diversity? We have observed two qualitatively identical bodies 
and we have observed that they are at different places at the same time. We have 
not observed that one object cannot be at two places at the same tinze since this 
is merely a principle; not something which is itself at a place and a time and 
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which can affect our senses (and I shall shortly argue that it is not an empirical 
principle). If then this principle is required in addition to, or to be applied to the 
interpretation of, these observable properties of A and B in order to arrive at the 
judgement of their numerical diversity (over and above their qualitative 
identity), then in what sense may we claim their numerical diversity to be 
observable? 
Similarly, in the observation of the continuous motion of a material body, can 
this observation reveal anything to us other than the a continuous qualitative re- 
identification? And surely we must admit that the observation of continuous 
qualitative re-identification can reveal nothing more to us about numerical re- 
identification than can the observation of qualitative re-identification over 
periods of non-continuous observation. For example, Strawson would have it (in 
reaction to Hume's claim that all re-identifications over periods of non- 
continuous observation must be treated as essentially qualitative) that a 
condition for our having a conceptual spatio-temporal scheme with respect to 
which numerical re-identifi cations can be described is "the unquestioning 
acceptance of particular-identity in at least some cases of non-continuous 
observation". In other words, even within the anti-revisionary scheme of 
Strawson numerical re-identification (Nvhat Strawson refers to here as 
64 particular-identhy') must reference a non-observable (or non-directly- 
observable) element. 
From a somewhat less philosophical perspective we are perhaps similarly drawn 
to the unobservable nature of individuality by consideration of observable 
properties within empirical science. The physicist, for example, has long since 
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subsumed his or her understanding of 'observables' under the science of 
quantum mechanics and must have long since accepted that there is no 
eigenvalue of identity itself (Cassels 1970, p8); there is no operation (no 
Hermitian Operator 22) which we may perform upon the wave equation to yield 
the measurable result that 'a--b'. Numerical identity, diversity and re- 
identification fall outside of the range of measurable and observable things of 
the physicist 23 . There is nothing whatsoever within traditional quantum 
mechanics, no operation upon the wave equation or superposition of multiple 
wave equations, which corresponds in anyway whatsoever to the intuitive and 
familiar claim that the tea-cup which is currently upon my desk is the saine tea- 
cup that was on the draining board in the kitchen this morning. 
Finally, we must consider that point which stands against the philosophical 
arguments presented in this section, namely; that individuality should be 
considered as a primitive notion - one requiring no 'principle' or further 
analysiS24. In this case, it may be argued that Nve can observe that something is 
an individual because to observe an object is to observe that object-as-an- 
individual. While this is by far the most philosophically complex position to 
address, I cannot (personally) see how it follows from the assumption that the 
notion of numerical diversity is "ultimate and indefinable" (Russell 1948) that 
individuality is itself observable in the sense that I mean here. We certainly 
22 Only a certain kind of linear operator (upon the wave function) is suitable is suitable for 
representing an observablewithin traditional quantum theory. These are known as 'Hermitian 
Operators' (Cassels 1970, p9). 
23 The absence of identity and diversity statements from the expressions of empirical science is 
not necessarily surprising, nor does it stand in immediate contradiction with philosophical 
positions other than the one proposed in this thesis. 
24 This is a position which becomes important, for example, in consideration of how 
indistinguishable points in space are to be considered numerically distinct, 
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perceive material bodies (as the result of a process of representation), and it may 
well be the case that our notion of the individuality of these 'perceived' 
particulars is "ultimate and indefinable", but it does not then follow that these 
particulars are presented directly to us via experience (pure sensation) - and it is 
only the with the denial of this direct presentation of particulars via experience 
that my current arguments are concerned. 
Whatever one's opinion on the arguments of this current section, or whatever 
one's own philosophical position regarding that nature of identity and diversity, 
it seems a relatively unproblematic claim that pure sensation alone cannot reveal 
to us the individuality of material bodies. For I may as easily argue that pure 
sensation may no more reveal to us the identity and diversity of material bodies 
than may the coloured dots on a photograph capture the identity of the objects 
which we ourselves recognise within then (or which are realised through them). 
The individuality of a material body is not then 'given' in experience, and thus 
Locke's first principle is not synthetic; not learnt from experience alone. 
ZZ2 The Empirical (or otherwise) Nature of Locke's Second Principle. 
We may discover an equally non-synthetic character in the second of Locke's 
principles (that one object cannot be at two places at the same time). In this 
case, however, we are immediately drawn, not to its metaphysical implications 
(of, which, as discussed earlier, there are significant aspects), but to the question 
of its empirical justification. For if this were indeed an empirical principle, or 
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one learnt from experience, then we might expect that experience was itself 
sufficient to justify it. Formally, however, this is not the case. 
Firstly, since it is patently obvious that we cannot, under any circumstances, 
observe all places at a given time, then Locke's second principle cannot be 
strictly justified upon the basis of empirical test. In other words, if the claim 
that: "one object cannot be at two places at the same time" is based upon 
observation, then it must involve an unjustified induction, or an induction from 
the observation that this principle applies to a finite range of places to the claim 
that it applies to all possible places. 
Now although the problem of induction [that there is no logical basis by which 
we may proceed from any number of particular statements to a general 
statement - Popper 1959 pp27-9)] may indeed be a legitimate philosophical 
problem, we rarely find it difficult to construct such inductions in practice. As 
such, this particular argument against the empirical nature of Locke's second 
principle is not particularly convincing. Of far greater significance, however, is 
that this principle is not, in practice, a synthetic principle, or would never, in 
practice, be falsified by comparison to experience. If we admit within our 
description of the physical world the possibility of the relationship of 
qualitative identity (Strawson 1959 p34, Baillie 1993 p5), or the relationship of 
two 'different' (not-same) material objects which are at different places at the 
same time but -%vhich are otherwise indistinguishable, then any falsifying event 
of Locke's second principle (one object actually being at two places at the same 
time) could always be explained away by citing this relationship of qualitative 
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identity. In other words, the condition of one object actually being at two places 
at the same time must be empirically indistinguishable from an instance of the 
relationship of qualitative identity (again justifying the non-observable nature of 
identity), and we may well ask ourselves under'what circumstances we would 
be NNrilling to interpret a given experiment in terms of the former rather than the 
latter? Locke's second principle therefore can be neither strictly justified nor 
falsified by comparison to experience, and is thus not strictly an empirical (or 
synthetic) principle. 
We conclude then that neither Locke's first nor second principle is, in any strict 
sense, an empirical principle, and thus are left with the idea that these principles 
arise in those processes by which we ourselves represent our experiences, i. e. 
they are principles pertaining to our own 'inclinations to individuate'. 
23 The Scientific Limitations of Locke's Principles. 
Further support for my approach to these principles, or further support for 
treating them, not as metaphysical principles, but as principles pertaining to our 
own 'inclinations to individuate', is to be found in the observation that they 
may be limited in their application - or that there may be situations (or certain 
interpretations of situations) in which these principles do not seemingly apply. 
In the field of quantum theory, for example, -%ve are presented Nvith numerous 
examples where both the classical conception of the particle and its Lockean 
identity and diversity characteristics may be brought into question. Experiments 
such as the experimental realization of the Bose-Einstein Condensate (Anderson 
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et al 1995 Cornell, Wieman 1998) present us with situations where it is 
theoretically impossible to associate a unique number Nvith each instance of an 
object of a kind - or Nvith "indistinguishable things" (Simons 1997) - and 
experiments such as dual slit electron diffraction (Feymnan 1983 p79) present 
us with situations where it is seemingly possible for a particle to pass through 
more than one place at one time. In quantum theory then, we are presented with 
many situations in which the identity and diversity properties of particles may 
be seen (under certain interpretations) to deviate considerably from the Lockean 
characteristics of classical bodies. However, it would be inaccurate to claim that 
the violation of Locke's principles in quantum systems is either well understood 
or universally accepted. Ever since Bohm's illustration of how nonrelativistic 
Schr6dinger theory can be made compatible with the existence of point particles 
(Bohm 1952) various variants on the 'Real Particle' interpretation of quantum 
mechanics have been proposed. Within these interpretations something like the 
conception of the classical particle survives (albeit often with some 
compromise). Equally, a number of contemporary philosophers [for example 
French (1989,1998), Van Fraassen (1985) and Huggett (1997)] have argued 
that the 'indistinguishable' particles of quantum theory can be treated as 
individuals to which standard identity conditions apply. The important point is 
that while the application of Locke's principles of identity and diversity are 
certainly open to question within many areas of quantum theory, the issue is 
generally not straightfonvard. 
When we come to look at the transitions between classical mecbanics and 
relativity theory we again find problems Nvith sustaining Locke's principles (but 
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in this case in a slightly less obvious fashion). In claiming that one object 
cannot be at two places at the same time Locke imposes a principle upon the 
condition of a finite spatial separation in conjunction with a single 
(instantaneous) time. These are the conditions associated xvith the classical 
concept of temporal simultaneity, and it is the relative nature of this concept, 
with respect to the state of motion of the observer (or the "relativity of temporal 
simultaneilj? ' - Einstein 1920 p25), which forms the basis of the theory of 
special relativity. Although relativity theory deals with the spatial and temporal 
relationships of events (and while events exhibit quite different identity and 
diversity characteristics from material objeCtS25) we may translate the 
conclusions of the special theory in the following terms: What one observer 
sees as two objects at different places at the same time (temporal simultaneity), 
another observer (in a state of relative motion Nvith respect to the first) may see 
as two objects at different places at different times. This does not itself imply a 
violation of Locke's principles (since we may assume that both of these 
observers continue to apply them independently) but does raise the question of 
how it is to be decided that these two objects are distinct. For in the case of the 
first observer we may apply Locke's second principle to determine their 
diversity, but in the case of the second observer we cannot. Thus while we 
cannot claim that the second principle is actually directly violated in such cases, 
we may consider that its application as a descriptive principle upon which to 
base a mechanics must become increasing problematic - since two different 
observers can no longer apply it to the same situation. 
25 For example, Russell argues that events cannot re-occur and thus cannot be re-identified (as 
particulars) with each other over time (Russell 1948). 
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While it is far from straightfonvard to claim that Locke's principles are directly 
violated in quantum and relativistic systems, there is certainly evidence to 
suggest that the application of these principles must become increasingly 
problematic (and in need of considerable compromise) within certain situations. 
24 The Symbolic Formalisation of Locke's Principles. 
Having established, albeit imperfectly, a philosophical position regarding the 
application of Locke's principles to material bodies, or having argued that there 
is sufficient epistemological and scientific evidence for questioning their 
metaphysical status and attributing them instead to the processes of our oxvn 
'inclinations to individuate', I shall now turn to the question of how these 
principles may be expressed symbolically. 
In presenting a symbolic formalisation of Locke's principles I do not claim to be 
able to fully capture these principles in all their philosophical glory. Nor do I 
claim that Locke's principles (as originally formulated and as commonly 
conceived) may be symbolically expressed in a truly non-circular fashion. In 
fact, as we shall see, there are good reasons to assume that these principles must 
forever elude a truly consistent non-circular symbolic formulation. All I shall 
attempt to do here is to develop a symbolic form which is commensurate with, 
or derived from, at least the intentions of these principles, and then claim that 
any consequence arising from an analysis of these symbolic expressions is 
equally a consequence of the adoption of Locke's principles within our 
'inclinations to individuate' material objects Oustification for this latter claim 
will be presented in the following section). The symbolic formulations 
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presented below are therefore largely methodological. The analysis of the 
subsequent sections, and thus the arguments upon which much of this thesis is 
based, could equally be fonnulated with respect to the description of these 
principles as originally presented by Locke; only the reader would soon tire of 
the convoluted arguments and the simplicity of the analysis would be lost. Thus 
while I am readily aware of the limitations of the symbolic approach in this 
case, the advantages of clarity which result from this formalisation must 
outweigh any potential logical objections. Let us turn firstly then to the 
problems which a fon-nalisation of Locke's principles must unavoidably face. 
We note firstly that Locke's principles apply to the identity and diversity of 
particulars (particular material objects), and thus we must firstly consider what 
constitutes a valid identity statement concerning such 'particulars. An identity 
assertion of the form a--b, Nvhen applied to particulars, is essentially the claim 
that the particular object whose name is 'a' is also that particular object whose 
name is V; or that 'a' and V are two names for one and the same particular 
obj eCt26 . The proviso here 
is that the type of names used, or the types of 
26 That this simple definition may itself be inadequate is made clear when we apply it to the 
reflective form 'a is a' (the principle of identity); since here our definition becomes tautologous. 
As Wittgenstein put it ". . to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at 
all. " (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5,5303) [Wittgenstein's actual objection is that we should 
not treat identity as a relationship "Roughly sl)eaking, to say of two things that they are identical 
is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with i1seyis to say nothing at all', or that 
anything useful which can be said using the words 'is the same' can equally be said by a 
sentence using a repeated expression. ]. With respect to our original definition we may be 
tempted to agree with Wittgenstein - as though in recognising some meaning in the claim 'a is 
b' (although Wittgenstein may deny even this) we then go on to recognise that we may equally 
say 'a is a' without realising that these words no longer have meaning. But even this may not 
satisfy us completely. For in Logic at least the locution 'a is a' has some considerable power - 
as is evidenced, for example, in the use of the existential statement 3a(a--a) in logical 
metaphysics (Benardete 1989) and in the implementation of the principle of identitywithin the 
miom of extension in axiomatic set theory [the identity of two sets, or the claim that one set is 
the same as another, is determined by these sets having exactly the same membership. While 
this 'criterion of identity' for sets has many usefiil applications it clearly suffers from the same 
paradox of identity which Wittgenstein claims applies to the simple locution 'a is a']. Thus 
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relationships that these names may bear to particular objects, must be such as to 
ensure the reflectivity [(Va) a--a], the symmetry [(Va, b) a--b -), b=a] and the 
transitivity [(Va, b, c) a--b A b=c -> a--cl of the identity relationship7 . Not all 
name types are therefore suitable for formulating valid identity statements for 
material particulars. Basically, the required condition is satisfied for any class of 
names where one particular object may have many names but where one name 
may be the name of one and only one particular object. lf this condition is not 
satisfied for a given class of names, then such names are not suitable for 
formulating identity statements for particularS28 
Now if Locke's first principle is true (and two material objects of the same kind 
cannot be at the same place at the same time), then this principle itself defines a 
class of names suitable for formulating valid identity statements for particulars. 
Any name type which is fon-nulated with respect to a given position and time 
(what we might call a 'temporary name') will be a valid name for employment 
within identity assertions concerning particular material objects. For example, if 
the material object q moves along the continuous spatial and temporal path 
while the locution 'a is a' may have no meaning and yet have significant ramifications within 
Logic, in those case where we can see clearly that we have named the same thing twice, or 
where there is good reason on our part for having named that same thing twice, then the claim 'a 
is Y is seemingly straight forward. 
27 These being the first three of what are commonly referred to as 'The Axioms of Identity'. It is 
not uncommon, however, to add a fourth axiom concerning the complete community of 
properties, or the "congnience of sameness, affirmed by a principle usually knoivn as Leihnizss 
LaW'(Wiggins 1980 p19), 
28 For example, the name 'man' may be the name of more than one particular object. As such 
the identities a--man and b=man do not imply that a--b; or the application of this name type to 
identity statements does not entail the transitivity of the identity relationship and is thus not 
suitable for formulating identity assertions about material particulars. If however, we were to 
talk about the identity of classes, and insist that 'man' is the name of one and only one class, 
then a--man and b=man would imply a--b. In other words, names like 'man' can be used in 
identity assertions about classes (that one class is the same as another) but not about particular 
material objects. 
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p=f(t), and if (pi, ti) and (p2, t2) are two solutions of p=f(t), then how are we to 
indicate the continuity of q between the locations (pi, ti) and (P2, t2)? SiMPlY 
claiming that q--q tells us no more about q at (pl, tj) and (P2, t2) than it tells us 
about q at (pj, ti) gr (P2, t2). One solution then is to say that q is temporarily 
named 'a' -vvhen it is at (pj, tj) and V when it is at (P2, t2)- We may then express 
the continuity of q in the identity a--b (or that 'a' and V are two names of the 
same particular object). The claim a--b is a valid identity assertion, of course, 
only if it is reflective, symmetric and transitive, but as long as Locke's first 
principle is true, then there cannot be more than one particular object at (pl, ti) or 
more than one particular object at (P2, t2). i. e. 'a' can be the name of one and 
only one particular object, and V can be the name of one and only one 
particular object. 
We might then begin to see the nature of the logical problem facing us in 
attempting to symbolically formulate Locke's first principle, namely; that this 
principle (that two objects cannot be at the same place at the same time) is 
likely to posit some kind of identity assertion about particular objects (namely, 
that what is at one place at one time is one and only one object - or is possessed 
of a singular identity), and yet we already know that we assume Locke's first 
principle in formulating such valid identity assertions about material objects. 
However, this observation need not restrict us from symbolically formalising 
this principle. All Nve need to remember is that any such formalisation Nvill, in 
effect, constitute a rule, or definition, for applying certain types of names where 
the nature of these names themselves assume Locke's first principle to be true. 
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Let us then extend the definition of 'temporary names' in the following fashion: 
If q is named 'a' at (pi, ti), then P(a)=pj and T(a)--tj 
and 
If q is named V at (p2, t2), then P(b)=p2 and T(b)--t2. 
We may then define Locke's first principle (that two objects of the saine kind 
cannot be at the same place at the same time) as the inferential form: 
I 
P(a)--P(b) A T(a)=T(b) --> a=b 
I 
... LP. Ia 
In words, we would say that if that particular object which is temporarily 
named 'a' is at the same position and time as that particular object which is 
temporarily named V, then 'a' and V must be two names of the same 
particular object. In this case then the inference (->) is taken from the 
prescriptive, rather than descriptive, nature of Locke's principles themselves. In 
other words, Locke's principles do not simply claim that it is the case that no 
two objects ever have or never will be found at the same place at the same time 
(descriptive), but that no two objects ever can be found at the same place at the 
same time (prescriptive). It is only in this sense that the inference used in LP. Ia 
should be interpreted. It is not therefore an immediate inference as commonly 
understood (Joseph 1914, pp 23248), but simply a symbol which captures the 
prescriptive nature of Locke's claiMS29. 
29 1 should add, perhaps, that I nave not qualified this expression (neither existentially nor 
universally). Mainly because I do not need to qualify it in order to carry out the analysis I 
intend. Any universal qualification would perhaps be largely circular; since this would require 
the specification of a set of particulars [for example the set P in terms of which the universal 
qualification Vbcp could be made] and any such specification would be likely to imply Locke's 
first principle itself (and thus the circularity). The expression is perhaps more naturally 
existentially qualified (as in 3, b) but since LP. Ia is little more than a rule for applying certain 
types of names (what I have termed 'temporary names') such qualification seems somewhat 
unnecessary. If the reader prefers such statements to be qualified, then I would suggest that they 
be existentially rather than universally qualified, but (as stated above) this makes little 
difference to the following analysis. 
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Having already recognised that the use of such temporary names (in the 
formulation of the identity statements of material particulars) itself assumes 
Locke's first principle, then I shall claim that LP. la is simply a condition 
defining how such names are to be applied to such objects. This is why I do not 
claim to have fully captured Locke's first principle (in all its philosophical 
glory) within a symbolic expression, nor that this symbolic expression is 
necessarily non-circular, but simply to have developed an expression which is 
commensurate with, or derived from, this principle. That I shall go on to claim 
that the consequences arising from the analysis of this symbolic expression are 
equally consequences of our adoption of Locke's principle will be addressed in 
the following section. 
Turning now to the second of Locke's principles (that one object cannot be at 
tvvo places at the same time), we may equally express this second principle as 
the inferential form: 
I 
P(a)#P(b) A T(a)=T(b) -> a#b 
I 
... LP. 2a 
In words, we would say: If that particular object which is named 'a' is at a 
different place but at the same time as that object which is named V, then 'a' 
and Vare not two names ofthe same particular object. 
25 Locke's Principles and Cardinality (a justification of the inferences 
employed in LP. Ia and LP. 2q) 
Given the logical complexities and circularities involved in the derivation of 
LP. Ia and LP. 2a (which I shall address further when I come to consider their 
continuous forms) it may well be asked upon what basis I may maintain that 
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these symbolic expressions are commensurate with Locke's principles, or upon 
what basis I might claim that in analysing these symbolic expressions we might 
learn something about these principles themselves? The answer to this concerns 
our treatment of the identity and diversity of material objects themselves, and 
more specifically, our treatment of the identity and diversity of material objects 
in determinations of their cardinality - the total number of material objects 
within a given region of space at a given time. For I shall argue that LP. Ia and 
LP. 2a apply to the determination of such a cardinality in exactly that same way 
that Locke's principles apply to such a determination. Thus while LP. la and 
LP. 2a may well be little more than definitions of how temporary names are to 
be applied to particular material objects, they play, in certain circumstances, 
exactly the same role as do Locke's principles (and as long as the subsequent 
concerns of this thesis refer solely to these 'certain circumstances' then I am 
justified in addressing the intuitive principles of Locke in terms of the symbolic 
fori-ris LP. Ia and LP. 2a). 
Firstly, however, we should understand that when we claim that there are n 
material objects within a given region of space at a given time, we are making a 
somewhat specific claim about the identity and diversity relationships which 
exist between these objects. In effect we are claiming that there are n distinct 
objects where no one object is being counted twice. Formally, this requires n 
instances of the identity relationship (one for each object) and 1/2(n 2 -n) instances 
of the symmetric but non-transitive relationship of 'difference' (see Section 1). 
To claim that there are three (n=3) such objects, A, B and C, therefore requires 
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three instance of identity: A=A, B=B and C=C, and three [1/2(n 2 -n)= 1/2(3 
2 
-3)=3] 
instances of distinction: AAB, A#C and B#C. 
Intuitively (for material objects) we arrive at these relationships by the 
application of Locke's principles. We know, for example, that A and B are at 
different places at the same time and must therefore be different ob ects j 
(Locke's second principle), that A and C are at different places at the same time 
and must therefore be different objects, and that B and C are at different places 
at the same time and must therefore be different objects. So far then we seem to 
have decided that there are three objects. However, we only know that there are 
three objects because we also know that two objects cannot be at the saine place 
at the same time (Locke's first principle). In other words, only A can be where 
A is (there is not another object there as well - adding to our total), only B can 
be where B is, and only C can be where C is. 
My justification for LP. Ia and LP. 2a (that they are commensurate with Locke's 
principles and that their analysis Nvill tell us something about these principles) is 
based upon the fact that they apply to a determination of cardinality in an 
identical fashion. For example, in claiming that there are three tea cups A, B and 
C, upon a particular table at given time, we may formulate three (n=3) instances 
of LP. I a: 
P(A)=P(A) /\ T(A)=T(A) A=A 
P(B)=P(B) A T(B)=T(B) B=B 
P(C)=P(C) /\ T(C)=T(C) C=C 
and three [1/2(n2-n) ý 1/2(3 2 -3) = 3] instances of LP-2a: 
P(A):?, -P(B) A T(A)=T(B) -> A#B 
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M P(A)#P(C) A T(A)=T(C) A:? A-C 
(VI) P(B)#P(C) A T(B)=T(C) B#C 
We note that neither (1), (11) and (111) in isolation, nor (IV), (V) and (VI) in 
isolation, are sufficient in themselves to claim that the cardinality of this set is 3. 
For example, given A=A and B=B we do not know that A:? -, B unless we stipulate 
this condition via (IV). Equally, given A#B we do not know whether there may 
be many tea cups at both P(A) and P(B) unless we restrict this possibility by (1) 
and (11). Thus while in practice we might intuitively feel that we need refer 
simply to LP. 2a to determine the cardinality of a collection of objects at a given 
time, this is simply due to our familiarity with LP. I a, or our "never finding, nor 
conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind should exist in the same 
place at the same time". Fort-nally, however, we require both n instances of 
LP. la and V2(n 2 -n) instances of LP. 2a to claim that there are n objects of a kind 
within a given region of space at a given time. 
So despite the logical complexities and circularities of LP. Ia and LP. 2a, they 
seem to apply in an identical fashion to the description of cardinality as do 
Locke's principles (as we intuitively understand and apply them), and thus are 
at least commensurate with them. And as long as I restrict myself purely to 
considerations of cardinality (as I shall in section 4), 1 may therefore continue to 
apply LP. Ia and LP. 2a in the place of Locke's first and second principles. 
We may note one further important point. Lockean Cardinality, as described 
above in (1) to (VI), is concerned with those relationships of identity and 
diversity required to claim that there are n material objects within a given region 
of space at a given time; and this may seem somewhat arbitrary. What is so 
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special about counting objects within a given region of space at a given time? 
Why not, for example, count the number of objects within a given region of 
time at a given place? The answer to this, however, is relatively straight 
forward; for we simply do not possess the principles necessary to determine 
such a number. 
Suppose, for example, we wanted to know how many objects there were at the 
place pI over the temporal period tI to Q. We could, of course, still apply 
Locke's first principle to this problem. For example, if the object x were at the 
place pl. at time t' (where tI (t' (Q) we could claim that no other objects may be 
at pI at t' and thus would count only one object. The problem arises, however, 
when we come to distinguish objects. For if we restrict our consideration to one 
place over an extended period of time then we can no longer apply Locke's 
second principle. For example, suppose the object at pI at t' was a red tea cup 
and that an indistinguishable red tea cup was at this same place (pl) at t" 
(where t" :; 6 t'). Could we say whether this %vas numerically the same tea cup 
(and thus count both instances as only one object) or qualitatively the same tea 
cup (and thus count each instance as distinct objects)? The simple answer is that 
without the application of Locke's second principle we have no way of 
distinguishing between numerical and qualitative identity, and thus have no 
means of counting the number of distinct objects at a given place over a given 
interval of time. 
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26. Summary 
We have seen then, that far from being necessarily metaphysical principles, 
Locke's principles may (depending on one's interpretation of physical theory) 
exhibit transient applicability across physical scales. Equally, they have about 
their nature nothing which must force us to assume that they are essentially 
empirical, or that they are learnt from experience. These are not, then, or not 
necessarily, metaphysical truths about the Nvorld; not immutable principles 
applying to a class of ontologically real bodies, but principles which we are at 
least entitled to suggest are imposed by ourselves in our own 'inclinations to 
individuate'. 
Having said this, however, we have also equally seen something of the 
fundamental nature of these principles in our attempts to symbolically represent 
them - or the problem that such a representation is not free from the claims of 
circularity and must be considered as essentially a definition. 
The Lockean Identity and Diversity of Material Bodies 
Locke's Principles lead to a naming convention (based upon position and time) 
which ensures the transitivity of identity relationships for particular material bodies, 
i. e. P(a), T(a), where P(a) is the position of that object which is temporarily named 'a' 
at the time T(a), and where Locke's principles themselves become: 
P(a)=P(b) A T(a)=T(b) -)ý a=b ... LP. 1a 
P(a)#P(b) A T(a)=T(b) -> a#b ... 
LP. 2a 
Nonetheless, these symbolic representations (although far from perfect perhaps) 
have proved sufficient at least to describe the concept of Lockean cardinality - 
and as long as I restrict my analysis of these principles to the description of 
Lockean cardinality I may continue to assume that this analysis may reveal to us 
something about the nature of Locke's principles themselves. 
76 
3. Identity, Re-identification and the Infinitesimal 
3.1 Introduction. 
Having considered something of the nature of Locke's principles of identity and 
diversity, and having started to lay upon these principles the rudiments of a 
symbolic expression, I now wish to turn to the important technical question of 
the relationship behveen. these principles and our understanding of what it is to 
re-identify a material body over space and time. More specifically, I intend to 
ask how these two aspects of our understanding (our understanding of the 
identity and diversity of material bodies 'at a given time' and our understanding 
that material bodies may be numerically re-identified over finite regions of 
space and time) are related. May we, for example, treat Locke's principles as 
some kind of limiting case of our understanding of re-identification, or are these 
conceptually distinct understandings of identity and diversity? 
Intuitively, we might suppose that some kind of continuity must exit. Suppose, 
for example, I Nvere to observe two tea-cups upon my desk. In this case I may 
apply Locke's first principle (that two objects, of the same kind, cannot be at the 
same place at the same time) to conclude that wherever one of these tea-cups 
may be there may be only one tea-cup at this place. Equally, I may apply 
Locke's second principle (that one object cannot be at two places at the same 
time) to conclude that these tea-cups (in being at two places at the same time) 
must be numerically distinct. Thus, upon the basis of these principles I may 
understand something of the identity and diversity of tea-cups at a given time. 
However, if I am reliably informed that one of the tea-cups which is currently 
upon my desk is the same tea-cup that was on the draining board in the kitchen 
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this morning, then I am no longer dealing with the identity and diversity of tea- 
cups 'at a given time', but with the identity and diversity of tea-cups at two 
different times ('now' and 'this morning'). Intuitively, we might assume that as 
these 'different times' become closer together (as when, for example, I might 
claim that the tea-cup which is currently upon my desk is the same tea-cup that 
was at this same position upon my desk one second ago) and as these 'times' 
ultimately become the same time, our ideas of re-identification must somehow 
converge with Locke's principles, i. e. that our understanding of re-identification 
over space and time must somehow become our understanding that two objects 
cannot be at the same place at the same time. 
Thus we may feel that some continuity is inevitable, but still we must 
understand what it is we mean by 'continuity' in the first place. More 
specifically, 1 wish to consider the relationship between re-identification and 
Locke's principles in relation to two important but significantly distinct ideas 
about the nature of motion itself. firstly, in relation to the idea that movement 
can be reduced to a description in terms of distinct places and times (an idea 
seemingly adopted, for example. - by Strawson in his treatment of re- 
identification), and secondly, in relation to Bergson's denial of such a 
reducibility, i. e. his "metaphysical individuality of every movement" (Mullarkey 
1999, P 15)10. 
30 Bergson makes a number of claims as to the "metaphysical individuality of every nzovenzenf' 
which I shall neither adopt nor attempt to support here. I merely adopt Bergson's stance (itself 
fully commensurate, I believe, with at least the formalism of classical mechanics if not its 
implied metaphysics) that movement (as a concept) cannot be reduced to a description in terms 
of distinct points in space and instants in time. 
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Let me firstly. however, address the nature of this continuity (between re- 
identification and Locke's first principle) in straight fonvard analytical terms. 
3.2 Re-Identification and Locke's First Principle 
In the previous section I have claimed that we may express Locke's first 
principle in the forra: 
P(a)=P(b) A T(a)=T(b) -> a--b ... LP. la 
where the inference (-->) captures the prescriptive, as opposed to descriptive, 
nature of Locke's first principle (or in the sense that LP. Ia is a definition - in 
this case, a definition of how the temporary names 'a' and V are to be applied). 
In other words, if we replace this inference with a conjunction (A) then we can 
no longer claim to have captured Locke's principle - even though, in any given 
instance, this conjunction might be true. This observation is important because 
in claiming that the material body 'a' is re-identified as the material body V 
over the small but finite spatial and temporal intervals 8P,,, b and 8T,,, b we 
effectively form the conjunction of three tennS31: 
P(a)=P(b)+8P,,, b A T(a)=T(b)+8T,,, b A a--b ... RI 
At first sight then, our ideas of re-identification and our appreciation of Locke's 
principles seem to refer to two different aspects of our understanding of material 
bodies. Most importantly, if we substitute 8Pab ý0 and 8Tab =0 in RI we obtain 
an expression which is not Locke's first principle (in as much as it does not 
capture its prescriptive nature): 
31 This being a slightly modified form of the general claim of a re-identification over finite 
regions of space and time: P(a)#P(b) A T(a)#T(b) Aa--b. 
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P(a)=P(b) A T(a)=T(b) A a--b' 
Now obviously we cannot simply take RI and replace its second conjunction 
with an inference (since this would mean that any two material bodies which are 
spatially and temporally separated would be the same). However, intuition 
would seem to suggest that as long as 8Pab and 8Tab are very small, then it is 
often reasonable to directly assume that a--b. For example, if there were a red 
ball on a particular table at three o'clock and an indistinguishable red ball upon 
this same table at half past three, then we cannot detennine (upon the basis of 
this information alone) whether that ball has simply remained (implying and 
identity) or has been replaced by an indistinguishable but different red ball 
(denying an identity). If, however, we were to make our second observation at 
one second past three o'clock, and were to discover that there was still a red ball 
upon the table, then Nve might feel more confident that the ball has simply 
remained (or would feel there has probably not been sufficient time for someone 
to exchange the ball) -a confidence which approaches certainty, or so we might 
assume, as the time between these observations becomes infinitesimal (or as our 
observations, in effect, become continUOUS32 ). Thus while we cannot simply 
replace the second conjunction in RI with an inference, common sense might 
lead us to believe that if we replace 8Pab and 8Ta, b Nvith dPab and dTLb (where 
AD %. a, ddT,,, b is the ratio 8P,,, b/8T,,, b in the limit as 8Tab 'tends towards zero' - see 
Appendix 1) then Nve may indeed replace this second con unction with an j 
inference to obtain: 
P(a)--P(b)+dPa, b A T(a)=T(b)+dT,,, b -> a=b ... LP. lb 
32 This fink between our observations becoming continuous and the infinitesimal is important 
since, as discussed in section 1, the infinitesimal is essentially a formal construct which allows 
us to maintain our concept of continuity in the face of unremitting regression in logical analysis. 
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This being an expression which is directly continuous with Locke's first 
principle (or an expression which immediately becomes Locke's first principle 
as its infinitesimal terms become Zero). 
Here then, Nve employ the derivative dP,,, b /dT,,, b to capture our intuitive 
understanding of the connection between numerical re-identification and spatial 
and temporal continuity (i. e. motion), and we can easily see that this is fully in 
line Nvith common sense. Suppose, for example, that having claimed that the tea- 
cup which is currently upon my desk is the same tea-cup that was on the 
draining board in the kitchen this morning [a claim of the form P(a)#P(b) A 
T(a):;, -T(b) Aa--b] I subsequently learn that this is not in fact the case. I do not, of 
course, need to greatly reconstruct my view of the world in order to 
accommodate this news. A fact which I assume to be true has simply turned out 
to be false. It is simply the case (I assume) that the tea-cup, %vhich is currently 
upon my desk is qualitatively identical to, but numerically distinct from, the tea- 
cup which was on the draining board in the kitchen this morning. I have simply 
made a mistake. My original claim had been nothing more than a three part 
conjunction of different conditions; one of which (a--b) has turned out to be 
false. In claiming that the tea-cup which is currently upon my desk is the same 
tea-cup that was on the draining board in the kitchen this morning I am not 
claiming some principle of the world whose violation would astound me or 
would force me to radically re-think- my understanding of the identity and 
diversity of material bodies. However, had I continually observed the tea-cup, 
from its being on the draining board in the kitchen this morning, to its moving 
continuously from the kitchen to my study, to its finally arriving upon my desk 
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and not moving again till now, then I might well feel there to be some greater 
degree of certainty in my original claim, or some greater degree of certainty 
than can be captured merely by the claimed conjunction of these conditions. 
Indeed, were I to be reliably informed in this case that the tea-cup which is upon 
my desk is not in fact the same tea-cup that was in the kitchen this morning, 
then I may well feel that I have somehow misunderstood the nature of material 
bodies and may well feel that some more definite principle of this understanding 
has been violated. This then is our understanding of the intimate relationship 
between spatial and temporal continuity and numerical re-identification (our 
concept of motion) - that while we may well accept that we are wrong in 
reidentifying a body which we have not seen move from one place to another, 
we would vigorously defend any reidentification where such a motion was 
observed, and this is Nvhy LP. lb contains an inference (-->) and not a second 
conjunction. For if LP. lb is true of any part of the continuous observation of the 
passage of the tea-cup from the kitchen to my desk, then its inference will 
survive the integration of its infinitesimal terms over finite spatial and temporal 
regions and we shall arrive at a conviction whose violation is equally a violation 
of a principle of our understanding (a principle of our understanding of material 
bodies). 
Thus LP. lb is not only a valid analytical solution to our question of the 
relationship between re-identification and Locke's first principle, but it is one 
fully in tune with the intuition. 
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Now this expression (as thus derived) is simply an intuitive extension of 
Locke's first principle (if indeed we can accept that there is any such thing as an 
intuitive interpretation of the derivative dPab/dT,,, b) and thus suffers from the 
same limitations as Locke's first principle itself, namely (as we shall see); that it 
does not apply to all of those classes of bodies which we may wish to refer to as 
'physical', nor to all philosophical theories and interpretations of re- 
identification (see Chapter 6). What is important about this expression (LP. 1b) 
is its formal relationship, firstly to temporality (as described in Chapter 4), and 
secondly, to our conscious movements and actions (as described in Chapter 6). 
For now, however, it is the intention of the remainder of this section to derive 
and consider this expression (LP. 1b) in more detail and to consider its relation 
to Bergson's claim of the irreducibility of movement to a description in terms of 
points in space and time. 
3.3 Re-identification and Movement. 
That the topic of re-identification should be closely related to the idea of 
movement is perhaps obvious. For example, Strawson clams that ". for many 
kinds of thing, it counts against saying that a thing, x, at one place at one time is 
the same as the thing, y, at anotherplace at another time, ifwe think there is not 
some continuous set ofp1aces between these two places such that x was at each 
successive member of this set ofplaces at successive times between these two 
times andy was at the same place member of the set ofplaces at the same time" 
(Strawson 1959 p37). Equally, when Wiggins asks: "Is a, the man sitting on the 
left at the back of the restaurant, the same person as b, the boy who won the 
drawing prize at the school I was a pupil at in 1951? " he admits that; ". . what 
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organizes our actual inethod is the idea of a particular kind of continuous path 
in space and time which the man would have had to have followed in order to 
end tip here in the restaurant . ." (Wiggins 1980, p49). Thus while both 
Strawson and Wiggins go on to address this topic of re-identification in their 
own respective terms, they both agree that, in principle at least, what Nve mean 
(or what we imply) when we claim that a material body is re-identified over 
space and time is that a single (numerically identical) body has moved 
continuously from one place and time to anothe ? 3. 
While Wiggins' seemingly remains non-committal on the subject of the 
reducibility of movement to places and times (at least in this single quotation) 
Strawson gives a far clearer indication of his belief in such a reducibility, 
specifically; in his "some continuous set ofplaces between these twoplaces" but 
does not perhaps define his use of the term "continuous" so explicitly that we 
may be sure of his beliefs from this single quotation alone. For Bergson, 
however, movement is irreducible, or more accurately, movement cannot be 
reduced to locations in space and time; "Bergsons solution [to Zeno's paradox 
of the affow] is that the arrow is only at a point if it stops there; any other point 
that we might pick along its course will only represent a possible co-ordinate 
rather than a real resting place. Like the overtaking steps ofAchilles [in Zeno's 
paradox of Achilles and the tortoise], the course of the arrow is a single unique 
33 We may, of course, make an objection to this claim and argue that motion must itself entail 
re-identification (thus reducing a description of re-identification in terms of motion to a 
circularity). However, we might then simply argue that all Wiggins and Strawson are proposing 
above is that there is, deep within our understanding of the world of material bodies, an 
inseparable intimacy between numerical continuity (re-identification) on the one hand, and 
spatial and temporal continuity on the other, and that this 'inseparable intimacy' is what we call 
movement. 
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bound' (Mullarkey 1999, p15). Thus if, according to Bergson, movement is 
irreducible (if the course of each movement is "a single unique bound'), and if, 
according to both Strawson and Wiggins, our understanding of re-identification 
is based upon our understanding that a "solid thing" has moved, then there is 
some element of our understanding of re-identifi cation which is likewise 
irreducible. Effectively then, Bergsonian philosophy insists upon the existence 
of essentially irreducible re-identifications (and these 'essentially irreducible re- 
identifications' will play a significant role in the more formal aspects of the 
analysis which I shall present in this thesiS)34. 
Put simply, or so I shall shortly demonstrate, if movement can be reduced to 
distinct places and times, then we cannot claim a continuity between Locke's 
principles and our understanding of re-identification. If, on the other hand, 
movement cannot be reduced to distinct places and times (if there exist 
irreducible re-identifications as Bergsonian philosophy implies) then we find a 
continuity between these principles and our ideas of re-identifi cation which is 
both intuitive and logically compelling. I therefore intend to argue that given 
our intuitive inclination towards such a continuity (as discussed earlier) we must 
equally be intuitively inclined towards a view of movement which cannot be 
reduced to a description in terms of 'points' in space and 'instants" in time. 
Firstly, however, we must consider the important role of transitivity within the 
formulation of our everyday re-identification statements. 
34 Bergson presents a number of arguments for the metaphysical irreducibility of every 
movement which I personally find unsatisfactory and which are not directly supported here. In 
this work I adopt a Bergsonian view only in as much as it is claimed that movement cannot be 
reduced to a description in terms of non-extended 'points' in space and 'instants' in time. 
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3.4 Re-idenifflFcation and the Infinitesimal Interval of a Path. 
When I claim that the tea-cup which is cuffently upon my desk is the same tea- 
cup that was on the draining board in the kitchen this morning, I make a re- 
identification claim, i. e. a claim that a material body that Nvas at one place and 
time is numerically identical with (is 'the same as') a body that is at a different 
place and time. Suppose, however, that I was leam later that at three o'clock this 
afternoon there Nvas a tea-cup on the table in the breakfast room and that my 
wife claims that this was the very same tea-cup that was on the draining board 
in the kitchen this morning. 
There seems to be no conceptual difficulty in accommodating this new fact. The 
tea-cup has simply moved from the draining board in the kitchen to the table in 
the breakfast room and, at some stage, moved again from the table in the 
breakfast room to my desk - and has not moved since. If, as Strawson and 
Wiggins agree, each re-identification is effectively the belief that the same tea- 
cup has moved, then I can recover my original claim by exploiting the 
transitivity of the identity relationship. 
Firstly, the tea-cup on the draining board in the kitchen this 
morning (A) is the same as the tea-cup on the table in the breakfast 
room this afternoon (B) because, at some stage, the tea-cup on the 
draining board moved to the table in the breakfast room (A=B). 
The tea-cup on the table in the breakfast room this afternoon (B) is 
the same as the tea-cup which is currently upon my desk (C) 
because, at some stage, it moved from the table in the breakfast 
room to my desk and has not moved since (B=C). 
Finally then, from the transitivity of the identity relationship, if 
A=B and B=C then A=C, i. e. the tea-cup which is currently upon 
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my desk is the same tea-cup that was on the draining board in the 
kitchen this morning. 
These transitive arguments apply then to the case where the tea-cup is known to 
have moved in a series of distinct movements (firstly in the movement from the 
draining board to the table in the breakfast room and then from the table in the 
breakfast room to my desk). Each of these 'distinct movements' are separated 
by an instance of stopping (or of ceasing to move) and thus the transitive 
arguments above are equally applicable to Bergson's claim that these individual 
movements are "distinct boundV'. However, even if its movement had not been 
punctuated by these instances of stopping, Nve still find little difficulty in 
applying some kind of reduction to its movement. For example, if I were to 
observe the motion of the tea-cup in moving from the draining board, first to the 
table in the breakfast room and then on to the desk in my study, I would 
certainly be able to observe different phases and formulate different elements of 
description for this movement. For example, I would see it being lifled off the 
draining board and carried through the doonvay to the breakfast room. Equally, 
I would see it moving towards the table in the breakfast room and then arriving 
at the table and being put down. I would then, at some stage, see it being picked 
up from the table in the breakfast room and carried to the door of my study, and 
finally, I would see it approaching the desk in my study and being put down 
there. Indeed, the transitivity employed in the argument above could still be 
employed in relation to these 'phases' and 'elements of description' and could 
therefore account fully for my original claim that the tea-cup on my desk is the 
same as the one thatwas in the kitchen this morning (i. e. the use of a transitive 
argument in the formulation of a re-identification statement does not require that 
the movement of the object concerned must have at some stage stopped). 
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Further, these 'phases' or 'elements of description' are themselves 
distinguishable, or are distinguishable descriptions of the various stages of the 
movement of the tea-cup, so how can Bergson still maintain that movement is 
irreducible; for it is patently obvious to everyone that it is reducible to these 
identifiable and distinguishable 'phases' and 'elements of description'? 
Now Bergson does not, of course, deny that we may make this kind of reduction 
to a movement in terms of such 'phases' or 'stages' or 'elements of 
description'. What he denies (or what is ultimately of significance within his 
arguments) is that we can reduce movement to a description of points in space 
associated with instants in time; and in terms of re-identification we can see 
why this may be so. There are an infinite number of points on the path of the 
tea-cup in moving from the draining board to my desk. Thus if its motion were 
reducible to some idea of its 'being at' each of these points at certain times (as 
Strawson seems to imply) then I should need to construct an infinite number of 
transitive arguments to explain what I mean in claiming that the tea-cup which 
is currently upon my desk is the same tea-cup that was on the draining board in 
the kitchen this morning. In fact, we could never reach a justification of the 
claim that the tea-cup is re-identified over any finite interval, no matter how 
small, upon the basis of transitive arguments alone. 
Thus -%vhile the scientist may translate the common reduction of a movement to 
'phases' and 'elements of description' into the measurements of position and 
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time 35, this process must stop some-where. As we divide the path of a movement 
into ever smaller intervals we require ever more steps in the sequence of 
transitive arguments by which we may claim that what started moving is also 
what stopped moving. Finally, either our measuring instruments or our patience 
will fail us and we Nvill have to accept that there are very small intervals within 
the path of a movement over which re-identification is just accepted (or else 
descend into Zeno-like paradoxes); and it is the sense in which these re- 
identifications are 'just accepted' which distinguishes a Bergsonian conception 
of re-identification from that which I have ascribed (hopefully not incorrectly) 
to Strawson. 
Formally, the physicist terminates the infinitely regressive sequence of transitive 
arguments employed in a re-identification claim at the point of 'the 
infinitesimal' (see Appendix 1). For example, in defining the instantaneous 
velocity of a body as the ratio dx/dt = 8x/8t in the limit as 8t 'tends towards 
zero', dx and dt are infinitesimal intervals of distance and time, i. e. intervals 
which are neither finite nor zero but which 'tend towards zero', or "quantities 
infinitely small such that when their ratio is sought, they may not be considered 
zero but which are rejected as often as they occur with quantities incomparably 
greatei"' (Kline 1980. p 137). For the scientist, the infinitesimal is largely a 
practical device (albeit a remarkably fruitful one). It is an admission that a 
problem involves an infinite regress and that to get an answer you will have to 
35 Physicists do not actually perform such a reduction, or do not conceptually reduce movement 
to places and time. Their use of 'functions' of position and time is not to be mistaken for a 
conceptual description of movement itself but as a formal definition of certain forms of co- 
ordinate systems - as for example in the definition of the inertial reference system as a system of 
co-ordinates with respect to which the spatial positions of a "freely moving" particle are a 
simple linear function of time. 
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stop somewhere. The infinitesimal interval is where scientists from the 
Seventeenth Century to today have decided that infinite regress will stop; for 
they have so contrived the infinitesimal that when one is divided by another a 
finite number results, but when one is divided by a finite number it exhibits the 
properties of zero and is equal once again to itself In other words, you cannot 
chop up the isolated infinitesimal into bits and so you cannot carry on a 
regressive transitive argument over it. The re-identifi cation of a body over an 
infinitesimal interval of its path is an irreducible claim. 
It is relatively easy to see why this should be so. An infinitesimal interval is one 
which is neither zero nor finite but which 'tends towards zero', or may be 'as 
small as we like'. Suppose then that it is claimed that a is b but that a and b are 
separated only by an infinitesimal interval. To apply the transitivity of identity 
to explain a--b would, in this case, require us to posit the existence of an object, 
y say, which lays somewhere in the interval between a and b, i. e. somewhere 
which is closer to a than is b and closer to b than is a. But bow could we 
possibly describe the location of this object y? If the interval between a and b 
already 'tends towards zero' then we would need to locate y at an interval which 
tends more closely towards zero than an interval which already 'tends towards 
zero'. Even more ridiculous perhaps, if the interval between a and b is already 
cas small as we like', then y would have to be located at an interval which is 
smaller than an interval which is already 'as small as we like'. In other words, 
transitive arguments cannot sensibly apply across an infinitesimal interval (this 
property of the infinitesimal is described more fully in Appendix 1). 
90 
We can see this property of the infinitesimal clearly from a simple example of 
the derivative of the continuous and differentiable function y=f(x) at the value 
of the free variable x--a: 
f (a) = Lim (F(a+h) -F(a))/h h-0 
2 For example, if our function were y=x , then ive may 
define the derivative at the 
value of the free variable x--a in the following fashion. 
f (a) Lim ((a+h)2 -a 
2) /h (a) 
h-+O 
Lim (a 2+ 2ah +h2_a2 )/h (b) h-->O 
=Lim2a+h (C) h--->O 
=2a 
In this simple example we may clearly see Leibniz' methodological claims in 
action. Step (a) to (b) is simply the expansion of (a+h)2. In moving between step 
(b) and (c), however, we not only remove a2-a 2 to leave (2ah +h2 )/h, but we 
divide 2ah + h2 by h to leave 2a + h. However, this process requires that we 
divide h2 by h to obtain h and divide h by h to obtain 1. Here then we encounter 
our "quantities infinitely small such that when their ratio is sought, they may not 
be considered zero", which may more accurately be expressed: 
Lim h2/h = Lim h h->O h-+O 
Lim hfh =I h--*O 
In the step between (c) and (d) however, h has somehow vanished - it has been 
replaced by zero, i. e. it has become one of those values which can be "rejected 
as often as they occur with quantities incomparably greater". More accurately 
we may express the step (c) to (d) as 
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2a + Lim h= 2a 
h-40 
In other words, h (as it tends towards zero) exhibits the properties of ratio 
(h2lh=h and h/h=l) but not the properties of magnitude with respect to finite 
values (2a+h = 2a). 
We may use this latter property of the infinitesimal to demonstrate its 
indivisibility with respect to finite terms. Consider the two limits: 
and 
(2a+h) = 2a 
Lim (4a+h)/2 = Lim (2a+h/2) = 2a h-40 h-->O 
In the first case Nve have the expansion 
Lim (2a+h) = 2a + Lim h= 2a h--A h--*O 
In the second we have 
(e) 
Lim (4a+h)/2 = 2a + Lim h/2 = 2a + 
1/2 h=2a (f) 
h-40 h-+O 
YMo 
Thus from (e) and (f) 
Lim h =! /2Lim h h->O h-*O 
In other words, the infinitesimal: 
Lim h 
h-+O 
cannot be divided by a finite term; or in as much as we try to divide it it exhibits 
the properties of zero - and thus, in all interpretations to which we are sensible, 
is not divisible at all. As such we cannot distinguish (for a single differential 
coefficient) the case where AT 'tends towards zero' from the case where 1/2AT 
'tends towards zero'. We cannot distinguish between a single value 'tending 
towards zero' and half of this single value 'tending towards zero' - and thus the 
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role of the infinitesimal in terminating infinitely regressive arguments (such as 
those of Zeno) is evident. 
3.5 Re-identififcation and its Continuity with Locke's Principles. 
The derivative is therefore employed in the termination of infinitely regressive 
arguments. However, the two 'ideas' of motion discussed above (the first being 
that motion is reducible to a description in terms of points in space and time and 
the second denying this) will result in our placing different interpretations upon 
the significance of the derivative itself. Consider, for example the claim that an 
object is re-identified over small but finite spatial and temporal intervals 5Pa, b 
and 5T,,, b- In terms of my earlier terminology of 'temporary names' we may 
easily express this claim as the three part conjunction (as discussed above): 
P(a)=P(b)+ 8P., b A T(a)=T(b)+8T., b /\ a--b 
If we now allow these 'small but finite' terms to become infinitesimal, or define 
the ratio dPab/dT,,, b as the ratio of 8P,,, t, /8Tab in the limit as BT,,, b 'tends towards 
zero', then Nve may express this as: 
P(a)=P(b)+ dPab A T(a)--T(b)+dLb A a--b 
If Nve believe that the motion dPa, b/dT,,, b can ultimately be reduced to a 
description in terms of points in space and time, then Nve must treat the 
employment of the derivative simply as an admission of our own limitation 
(either of our patience or our measuring devices) and can make no further 
reduction to the description of this re-identification. The re-identification a--b 
must for ever remain simply conjoined Nvith the conditions P(a)=P(b)+ dP,,, b A 
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T(a)=T(b)+dTa, b. If, however, we believe that that motion cannot ultimately be 
reduced to a description in terms of points in space and time, then the derivative 
dP,,, b/dT,,, b becomes intimately related with the re-identification a--b itself Put 
simply, Nve may claim that the re-identification a--b is, in this case, an 
irreducible re-identification. The nature of this intimate relationship can, 
however, be simply derived (as described earlier) from our knowledge of the 
prescriptive, as opposed to descriptive, nature of Locke's first principle (which I 
have previously formulated as the expression LP. I a). 
If we allow the infinitesimal terms dP,,, b and dT,,, b in the above description of re- 
identification to actually become zero, then we arrive at the expression: 
P(a)=P(b) A T(a)=T(b) A a7-b 
But we already know that Locke's first principle insists that: 
P(a)=P(b) /\ T(a)=T(b) -> a--b ... LP. Ia 
Where (as described in section 2) the inference '-->' captures the prescriptive, as 
opposed to the descriptive, nature of Locke's principles. We may therefore 
express our description of re-identification in a forrnwhich we know is logically 
continuous with Locke's first principle (or which becomes Locke's first 
principle as its infinitesimal terms actually become Zero): 
P(a)=P(b)+ dPa, b A T(a)=T(b)+dTab -> a--b ... LP. lb 
My argument, of course, is that this expression (LP. lb) cannot be derived if it is 
believed that motion can be reduced to points in space and time - since, as 
discussed above, under this interpretation of motion the derivative is merely an 
admission of our own limitation in patience and measurement. The claim that 
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motion can be reduced to points in space and time must force us to no more than 
conjunct a re-identification a--b with conditions of spatial and temporal 
separation. We may therefore conclude that this interpretation of motion (that it 
may be reduced to points in space and time) must lead us to an understanding of 
re-identification which is forever separated ftom Locke's principles, or where 
Locke's principles cannot be a limiting case of our conception of motion - for in 
simply allowing infinitesimal terms to become zero we may never miraculously 
transcend from a conjunction (A) to an inference (->). If our ideas of re- 
identification and Locke's principles are to be logically continuous, as intuition 
might suggest, then our description of re-identification must contain an 
inference (like that employed in Locke's first principle) even before we allow 
infinitesimal terms to vanish. But in what sense can we assume this inference to 
exist within our understanding of re-identification unless we assume that such 
re-identifi cation is intrinsically irreducible across the infinitesimal interval; 
where the derivative dP,,, b/dTa, b iS intimately related to the re-identification a7-b 
itself? The answer, of course, is in the sense that movement cannot be reduced 
to a description in terms of points in space and time (as Bergson claims). 
Bergson's claim as to the irreducibility of movement to points in space and time 
is therefore of special significance to our understanding of re-identification. Re- 
identification is not simply conjoined with the infinitesimal interval of a 
movement's path - it is not simply that we have an infinitesimal interval AND a 
re-identification, but that the interval and the re-identification are intimately 
wound up in each other - or that this is our understanding of movement; the 
inseparable combination of numerical continuity with spatial and temporal 
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continuity. The derivative is not a limitation of either our patience or our 
measurements. It is the irreducible association between movement and re- 
identification - movement which cannot ultimately be reduced to a description 
in terms of points in space and time. 
Of course it is somewhat abstract to attach such significance to the use of an 
inference rather than a conjunction (since both LP. lb and the conjunctive fonn 
discussed above are equally commensurate with Locke's principles). However, 
we must none the less differentiate between the claim that two objects cannot be 
at the same place at the same time (Locke's principle), and the far weaker claim 
that no two objects (anywhere within the physical universe over all time) 
happen to be at the same place at the same time. The fonner is a prescriptive 
principle whereas the latter is merely a descriptive statement (possibly of fact). 
My argument is therefore that a consolidation of our understanding of re- 
identification with Locke's principles, or the claim that the latter is a limiting 
case of the former, requires a principle of continuity as expressed in LP. lb. 
3.6 The Symbolic Expression of the Continuous Form of Locke's Principles 
I have therefore argued that, Nvith respect to the Bergsonian claim of the 
irreducibility of movement, our citing of continuous motion as an 'explanation' 
for the re-identification statement: 
P(a)=P(b)+5Pa, b A T(a)=T(b)+8T,,, b A a=b 
is based upon the principle: 
P(a)--P(b)+dPii, b A T(a)=T(b)+dT,,, b -> a--b ... LP. 
lb 
where Lim 5P,,, b/8T,,, b = dP,,, b/dT,,, b BT, b---)'O 
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and which is logically continuous Nvith Locke's first principle: 
P(a)=P(b) A T(a)=T(b) -> x=y ... LP. la 
This continuity between LP. 1b and LP. Ia is, however of a specific nature. If we 
allow both dP,,, b and dT,,, b to become zero in LP. Ib then we simply obtain LP. Ia. 
Likewise, if we allowjust dPab to become zero, then we obtain: 
P(a)=P(b) A T(a)=T(b)+ dTa, b -> a--b 
which, on the face of it, seems to claim little more than the continuous identity 
of an object through continuous displacements in time with no associated spatial 
displacement (the persistent identity of a 'stationary object'). However, if we 
start with LP. 1b and allow dT,,, b to become zero, then we obtain: 
P(a)=P(b)+ dP,,, b /\ T(a)=T(b) -> a--b 
which corresponds to nothing in our experience and which is seemingly in 
contradiction to the inference in LP. 2a [or at least would force us to assume 
some radical alteration - some logical discontinuity - in the persistent qualities 
of an object as its simultaneous displacements pass from infinitesimal to finite 
values]. We cannot therefore allow that dTa, b may become zero unless dP,,, b also 
becomes zero. 
That we should find such a restriction, and that this restriction should apply to 
the relationship between the first and second of Locke's principles, is to be 
expected. For if dLb may become zero while dPab remains vanishing, then the 
instantaneous velocity of the object would tend towards infinity. In other words, 
we would 'tend towards' the case where one object can be at two places at the 
same time (a violation of LP. 2a). 
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We must, however, be careful of this intuitive amendment to LP. I a. For we may 
readily conceive of situations in which LP. Ib can be violated. I refer here to the 
case of vanishing or 'point-like' particles - of the type often presented in the 
simplified explanation of classical mechanical descriptions (for example, Nvhen 
Nve describe a mechanical system in terms of the motion of a single 'point-like' 
particle at its centre of gravity). In being themselves non-extended, it is evident 
that two such imaginary objects may interact over vanishing spatial and 
temporal intervals and thus: P(a)=P(b)+ClPab A T(a)=T(b)+dT., b A a; 6b. It is 
therefore implicit in the following work that I am concerned with the identity, 
diversity and cardinality of extended ob ects, or that the principles which I shall j 
address are concerned, not with spatial and temporal objects in general, but with 
a particular sub-class of such objects. In fact, the application of LP. lb will 
require us to be somewhat more selective even than this (as described in section 
6), but in this section I am concemed simply vAth giving some justification 
(regardless of how philosophically tenuous) for my adoption of it. 
Having addressed the continuous expression of LP. lb with respect to the 
properties of vanishing terms, we may now perform a similar operation upon 
LP. 2a (the principle that one object cannot be at two places at the same time). 
However, in this case we must be somewhat more careful. Suppose, for 
example, we were to formulate (in the terminology of 'temporary names') the 
statement that a and b are finitely spatially separated over a small interval of 
time and that a is not the same as b, i. e. 
P(a)#P(b) A T(a)--T(b)+8T,, b A w6b 
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and that that this statement becomes the principle (continuous with LP. 2): 
P(a)#P(b) A T(a)=T(b)+dT,,, b -> a#b ... 
LP. 2a 
where Lim 8T,,, bý= dT,,, b ST, b---), O 
This method does indeed seem to be equivalent to our derivation LP. lb and 
provides us with a principle (LP. 2b) which is obviously continuous with LP. 2a. 
In other words, if we allow dTab to become zero in LP. 2b, then we obtain 
LP. 2a. The difference, however, is that whereas the limit we employed to derive 
LP. Ib actually means something (the instantaneous velocity of a material body), 
the limit employed to obtain LP. 2b does not seem to refer to anything tangible. 
In the form derived above it does not, for example, appear within a finite ratio 
of two infinitesimals. In other words, it is simply a mathematical operation upon 
the small but finite temporal interval 5T,,, b (some abstract process of 'tending 
towards zero') which may or may not mean anything in reality. 
Fortunately, however, this particular point need not concern us greatly; for what 
is important is the way in which LP. 2b is applied rather than the way that it is 
derived (and, as we shall see, this makes any doubt over the validity of the 
infinitesimal used in LP. 2b redundant). When we move from the application of 
Locke's principles 'at a given time' to their application over a vanishing 
temporal interval, it is only with some degree of construction that we may apply 
a single principle of diversity in the first place. More specifically, this 'single 
principle of diversity' now applies to the diversity of continuants themselves, 
i. e. to the diversity of objects which are themselves continuous in time. 
Consider, for example, two instances of the continuous form of Locke's first 
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principle (LP. 1b) applied to the re-identification of tNvo continuants a--a' and 
b=b' 
P(aý--P(a')+ClPa, a, A T(a)=T(a)+dT,,, a, -> a7-a' 
P(b)=P(b')+dPb, b'A T(b)=T(b)+dTbb, -> b=b' 
The claim that these are indeed two different, or 'distinct', continuants seems to 
require, not one, but four statements of diversity, i. e. 
(1) a#b 
(2) at-b', 
(3) a':;, -Lb 
(4) a': F, -b', 
and the violation of any of these statements would be sufficient to disrupt our 
intuitive comprehension of the diversity of moving objects - and thus all four 
are necessaly for this 'intuitive comprehension'. 
However, if we assume that we already know that a--a' and b=b' (i. e. if we 
assume that we already know the two instances of LP. Ib above), then given any 
one of these four statements we may derive the remaining three, i. e. we only 
need to argue that one of these is true in order to claim that all are true. For 
example: 
Given a# b' (2) 
From (2) and (i) a'# b' (4) 
From (4) and (ii) a'# b (3) 
From (3) and (i) a #b (1) 
In other words, all we need is one principle which will tell us that a#b', and this 
principle is LP. 2b as defined above, i. e. 
P(a)#P(b') A T(a)=T(b')+dT,, b, -> a#b' ... LP. 
2a 
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However, since this single application of LP. 2b only works if we already have 
access to t-%vo instances of LP. lb, then we no longer need to rely upon an 
abstract definition of the infinitesimal term dT,,, b'. In this case we can merely 
substitute the meaningful temporal infinitesimal from the instances of LP. lb, 
i. e. dT,,, b' = dT,,,,,. = dTb, b'. Put simply, in applying a single instance of LP. 2b to 
determine the diversity of two continuants, the infinitesimal term employed 
within this instance of LP. 2a is not a primitive temporal interval but a temporal 
interval 'borrowed' from the infinitesimal temporal intervals employed in the 
instances of LP. Ib to which it relates. 
In summary then, we have a continuous expression of Locke's principles 
contained within the expressions LP. lb and LP. 2b, but where LP. 2b can only be 
applied (as a single principle) in conjunction with at least two instances of 
LP. lb, or else its infinitesimal term is not defined (i. e. not defined as an 
infinitesimal, or not defined as a term which is resistant to finite division). This 
is not to suggest that Locke's second principle is in some sense dependent upon 
the first. It is simply that we have chosen to express the diversity of continuants 
in tenns of a single principle. 
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17Summary. 
We have seen then that Locke's principles apply not simply to the identity and 
diversity properties of material bodies at a given time, but also determine the 
nature of (or our understanding of) the re-identification of material bodies over 
space and time. We may summarise this conclusion as follows: 
The Lockean Identity and Diversity Material Bodies 
Locke's Principles lead to a naming convention (based upon position and time) 
which ensures the transitivity of identity relationships for particular material bodies, 
i. e. P(a), T(a), where P(a) is the position of that objects which is temporarily named 
'a' at the time T(a), and where Locke's principles themselves become: 
P(a)=P(b) A T(a)=T(b) a=b ... LP. 
1a 
P(a); -P(b) A T(a)=T(b) a;, -b ... LP. 
2a 
The Lockean Continuity of Material Bodies 
With respect to this terminology, the re-identification claim over a small but finite 
spatial and temporal interval: 
P(a)=P(b)+8Pa, b A T(a)=T(b)+6T., b A a=b 
is based upon the principle: 
P(a)=P(b)+dPa, b A T(a)=T(b)+dT,,, b -> a=b ... LP. Ib 
where dPa, b / dT,, b is 8Pa, b /6T,, b as BT,, b 'tends towards zero', and where LP. 1b is 
continuous with LP. 1 a. With respect to two instances of LP. Ib we may construct the 
diversity of a=a' and b=b' by a single instance of the principle: 
P(a); eP(b') A T(a)=T(b')+dT,, v --> a#b ... LP. 2b Where dT,, b, is a substitution from the related instances of LP. 1 b, and where LP. 2b is 
continuous with LP. 2a. 
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4. Temporality and Lockean Cardinality 
4.1 Introduction. 
In concluding the topic of the previous section we now have two important 
expressions at our disposal: firstly, an expression referring to the identity of 
material bodies over infinitesimal temporal intervals (LP. 1b), and secondly, an 
expression referring to the diversity of material bodies over infinitesimal 
temporal intervals (LP. 2b). As such we have to hand those expressions required 
for describing cardinality statements over infinitesimal intervals of time - for a 
Tardinality Statement' is composed of nothing more than n statements of 
identity and 1/2(n 2 -n) statements of diversity (as already discussed in section 2.5). 
In this section I therefore intend to examine the logical nature of Locke's 
principles as they are applied to the problem of cardinality, i. e. the claim that 
there are n distinct objects within a given region of space over an infinitesimal 
interval of time. As such it is the intention of this section to finally submit to 
analysis that statement formulated by S (see Section 1) which I take within this 
work to be indicative of S's ability to 'see' the world in terms of distinct material 
bodies moving about in space and time. 
In presenting more fully that analysis which has already been outlined in the 
introduction to this work, my intention is merely to convince the reader that 
isolated (non-quotiented) infinitesimal temporal terms arise naturally within the 
analysis of cardinality statements, and thus arise naturally within our common 
understanding of the world of material bodies. 
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Of course, analysis may often be a somewhat arbitrary process. One may choose 
to follow one route rather than another, or to highlight one logical property at the 
expense of others. The only advantage being that, once presented, the steps in 
any such analysis are open to the scrutiny of the reader and they may decide for 
themselves whether the methods employed have lead us naturally to the 
conclusion, or whether the conclusion has itself been artificially coaxed out of 
the analysis by some selective process. 
4.2 An Analysis of Lockean Cardinality (a necessary and sufficient 
formulation). 
In section 21 discussed those relationships necessary in order to claim that there 
exists three material objects within a given region of space at a given time -a 
description in terms of three (n--3) instances of Locke's first principle (LP. I a) 
and three [ 1/2(n 2 -n) =3] instances of Locke"s second principle (LP. 2a): 
P(A)=P(A) A T(A) =T(A) A=A 
P(B)=P(B) A T(B)= T(B) B=B 
P(C)=P(C) A T(C)= T(C) C=C 
(IV) P(A)#P(B) A T(A)=T(B) A#B 
(V) P(A)#P(C) A T(A) =T(C) A#C 
(VI) P(B)#P(C) A T(B)= T(C) -> Bql-C 
By extension therefore, those relationships necessary in order to claim that there 
are n continuant objects (al=al', a2=a2', ..., an=an') within a given region of 
space over a given infinitesimal temporal interval may be constructed by n 
instances of Locke's first principle as captured in LP. 1b and '/2(n 2 -n) instances 
of Locke's second principle as captured in LP. 2b - where LP. lb and LP. 2b (as 
described in section 3) are the continuous forms of Locke's principles: 
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P(a)=P(b)+dPa, b AT(a)=T(b)+dT,,, b --> a=b ... 
LP. lb 
P(a)#P(b) AT(a)=T(b)+dTab -+ a#b ... LP. 
2b 
and where the isolated infinitesimal term in LP. 2b requires that LP. 2b be 
formulated in relation to at least two instances of LP. lb. 
i. e. 
a/ P(al)=P(al')+dPal, al'AT(al)=T(al')+dT, ýl, al'-> al=al' n b/ P(a2)=P(a2')+dPa2, a2'AT(a2)=T(a2')+dTi2, a2'-> a2=a2zýl- instances 
ofLP. lb 
-> an--an' C/ P(an)=P(an')+d*Parian'AT(an)=T(an')+dLr,,.,, Iil 
d/ P(al)--#P(a2') AT(al)=T(a2')+dT,, ],, 2'-> al#a2' 1/2(n 2 -n) e/ P(al)#P(a3') AT(al)=T(a3')+dT,, I, a3'-> al#a3' - instances 
fl, P(an-l)#P(an')'AT(an'l)=T(an")+dT,,, -,,., -> an. -l: r-, anCJ' 
of LP. 2b 
The first thing we notice about this formulation of a cardinality statement is that 
all temporal terms must be equal. This is because of the way in which I have 
defined LP. 2b (or the decision on my part to express the diversity of two 
material bodies in terms of a single diversity statement). For any two 
continuants, ax = ax' and ay = ay', their diversity is contained within the 
expression 
P(ax)#P(ay') AT(ax)=T(ay')+dTa,,, ay, -> ax#ay' 
but this expression requires: 
P(ax)=P(ax')+dP,,,, a,,, AT(ax)=T(ax)+dT,,,,,,,,, ax=ax' 
P(aY)=P(aY')+dPay. ay'AT(ay)=T(ay')+dTay, ay, ay=ay' 
. "'Y' . where 
dT,,,,,,. = dT,, y,,, y, = dT,,, 
Therefore, because there must exist at least one diversity statement for each pair 
of distinct continuants within the set of counted continuants, all infinitesimal 
terms in a/ to f/ must be equal. 
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Given the equality of infinitesimal temporal terms in a/-f/ the following 
condition is true of a/-f/: 
S: 3m,,,,, P(m)=P(m)+dPmm, A T(m)=T(m')+dTmm, -> m=m' 
and T(ax)=T(M) A T(ax')=T(m') for all x in 1,2,3,. . ., n. 
Which claims that the objects m, and m' exist and are re-identified over 
infinitesimal intervals of space and time, and that the temporal locations of al, 
a2, a3, ..., an are equal to the temporal 
location of m, and that the temporal 
locations of al', a2', aY, ..., an' are equal to the temporal 
location of m". This 
condition (which may equally be interpreted as having the form of a 
substitution) contains the case where the pair (m. m') may be any of the pairs 
(al, al'), (a2, a2'), ..., (an, an'), 
i. e. that we may take the temporal interval of 
any of the re-identification statements in a/-f/ and substitute it Arithin the 
temporal term of all other re-identification statements in a/-f/, For example, if 
x=l, i. e. m= al and m'=al', then we may construct S as: 
P(al)=P(al)+dPal, al'/\T(al)=T(al')+dTI,,,. -> al=al' 
Substitute T(ax)=T(al) and T(ax') = T(al') 
For all x in 1,2,3, ..., n 
The substitution S is not, however, restricted to this interpretation alone and 
may apply an interpretation of m and m' in terms of any material body 
(contained within the counted set or otherwise) whose re-identification is 
subject to LP. Ib 
Thus with respect to the substitution S: Nve may formulate a more generalized 
form of a Lockean cardinality claim over an infinitesimal temporal interval 
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which is itself defined by the first order derivative of position with respect to 
time of the material body m at the time T(m): 
0/ P(m)=P(m')+dP A T(m)=T(m)+dT. , m=m' 
al/ P(al)=P(al')+dP,,,,,,,, A [T(al)= T(M) A T(al')=T(m')]-> al=al' 
bl/ P(a2)=P(a2')+dPa2, a2'A [T(a2)= T(m) A T(a2')=T(m')]-> a2=a2' 
cl/ P(an)=P(an')+dPnan, A [T(an)= T(m) A T(an')=T(m')]-> an=an' 
dl/ P(al)--PW(a2) A [T(al)--T(M) A T(a2')=T(m')]--> al#a2' 
el/ P(al): t-P(a3') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a3)=T(m')]--> al; 4a3' 
P(an-l)#P(an') [T(an)=T(m) A T(an')=T(m')]-> an-1--,, an' 
Having therefore constructed this expression of those relationships (of identity 
and diversity) required in order to claim that there are n material bodies vAthin a 
given region of space over the infinitesimal interval dT.,,., (where dTn,,., is 
itself defined in ternis of the first order derivative of position with respect to 
time of the material body m) we may now 'stand back', as it were, and address 
ourselves purely to its logical structure - forgetting (or ignoring) for the moment 
that these symbols are intended to mean anything in particular. 
We note firstly that the n statements of identity and 1/2(n2_n) statements of 
diversity necessary to justify a cardinality claim are held in al/ to fl/ (which are 
merely the expressions a/ to U under the substitution S). The additional 
expression 0/ is included merely to provide an infinitesimal temporal interval 
(ffý,,, m, ) which is substituted within a/ to F. In this case the expression 0/ merely 
guarantees that dTm, - is a valid infinitesimal term (i. e. cannot be subjected to 
finite division) and is thus suitable for forming the infinitesimal terms in al/ to 
fit 
107 
However, upon examination, it is obvious that the spatial term in 0/ 
(P(m)=P(m')+dPm, m, ) plays no role in the definition of a cardinality statement 
other than (in combination with the temporal term in 00 guaranteeing this 
property of dT,,,, m-. For example: 
The spatial terms in a/-c/ are vanishing (infinitesimal) and 
the meaning of a/-c/ is dependent upon these terms being 
vanishing. 
The spatial terms in d/-f/ are finite and the meaning of d/-f/ 
is dependent upon these terms being finite. 
Thus while we may make a common temporal substitution in a/-F (as in 0/-fl/) 
we cannot make a common spatial substitution within a/-f/ since: 
We cannot substitute a finite, or non-vanishing, spatial term 
[P(m): #P(m)] for a vanishing one [P(m)=P(m')+dP,, W], nor 
a vanishing spatial term for a finite one, without loosing the 
meaning of either a/-c/ or (1/_fý6. 
The condition P(m)=P(m')+dP,,,,, n, (in 0/) therefore plays no role in the 
construction of al/-fl/. It is not substituted within al/-fl/, and could not be 
alternatively employed as a substitute within a/-f/ (because a/-f/ will not submit 
to a common spatial substitution). In other words, the expression of cardindjjy 
captured in al/-fl/ is totally indepgndent of the spatial nature of that reference 
continuant (m=m') with resWct to which the common tempL)ral interval is 
determined 37 
. The only role played by the spatial condition P(m)=P(m')+dP.,,. 
36 Here we see the significance of formulating the "continuous form of Locke's principIesý' in 
terms of formally vanishing, of 'infinitesimal', terms. Since if we had not made this move, or if 
we have formulated these 'continuous forms' in terms of small but finite spatial and temporal 
intervals, then the inability to substitute the spatial terms of a/-c/ for the spatial terms of d/-9 (or 
visa versa) would not be a formal condition. 
37 This point is of some importance. Although the spatial term P(m)=P(m')+dP,. is not 
substituted in the formulation of 0/-fl/, if it were the case that an alternative substitution of this 
spatial term were possible for a/-f/, and if this alternative substitution were in some determinable 
way related to 0/-fl/, then we would have to claim that the spatial term in 0/, whilst not 
substituted within 01/-fl/, is still necessary in the formulation of 0/-fl/. 
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(in 0/) is in contributing, together Nvith the condition T(m)=T(m')+dTm,, n,, to the 
identity of m and m' in a manner commensurate Nvith Locke's first principle. 
What consequences will arise then if ive omit the spatial term of 0/ from my 
formulation of the cardinality statcment Ol/ to fl/? 
The most obvious result is that if we omit the condition P(m)=P(m)+dPmm, 
from 0/ Nve can no longer maintain the inference (->) to the identity of m and m' 
- since Nve may no longer employ Locke's first principle to arrive at this 
identity. We therefore have a choice (one of those arbitrary choices of analysis 
discussed earlier perhaps? ); either we replace the inference (->) in 0/ with a 
conjunction (A), thus claiming that the temporal term T(m)=T(m')+dTm,, n, is 
merely conjoined with the identity m=m', or else we drop this identity 
altogether (along with the spatial term P(m)=P(m')+dP,,,, m, ). 
In other words, as long as we continue to assume that dT,,,,,, is in some way 
well defined as an infinitesimal (or exhibits resistance to finite division) we may 
replace 0/ with either 
or 
Ol/ T(m)=T(m')+dTm,,,,, A M=M' 
02/ T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,,., 
As it turns out, however, and as I shall demonstrate below, there is in fact no 
arbitrary choice to be made between these options. The logic of our system Nvill 
insist that we choose 01/ and thus formulate our cardinality statement as: 
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Ol/ T(m)=T(m')+dT ....... A m=m' 
al/ P(al)=P(al')+dPal, al'A [T(al)= T(m) A T(al)=T(m')]--> al=al' 
bl/ P(a2)=P(a2')+dPa2, a2'A 
[T(a2)-- T(m) A T(a2')=T(m')]--> a2=a2' 
cl/ P(an)=P(an')+dPman'A [T(an)-- T(M) A T(an')=T(m')]-> an--an' 
dl/ P(al): i, -LP(a2') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a2')=T(m')]-> al#a2' 
el/ P(al)3, -P(a3') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a3')=T(m')]-> al#a3' 
fl/ P(an-l)#P(an) A [T(an-l)=T(M) A T(an)=T(m')]--> an-l#an' 
Here then we have no change in the expressions al/-fl/ (since they are totally 
independent of the spatial properties of the reference continuant) but have 
replaced the instance of Locke's first principle in 0/ with a conjunction between 
a temporal interval [T(m)=T(m')+dT.,,,, ] and an identity [m=m]. This, I intend 
to claim, is: 
The necessary and sufficient formulation of those relationships 
needed to claim that there are n distinct continuants vvithin a given 
region of space over a vanishing temporal interval dT.,,,,,. 
But in what sense may it be claimed that this expression is both necessary and 
sufficient? It is obviously sufficient in as much as it fully captures an expression 
of those relationships needed to claim that there are n continuants within a given 
region of space over a vanishing temporal interval. But why is it necessary? 
Why, specifically, should it involve the conjunction T(m)=T(m')+dT,, Vn, A 
m=m" (01/) and not just the simple temporal condition T(m)=T(m')+dT, 
(02/)? 
If the necessary and sufficient fonnulation of Lockean cardinality over a 
vanishing temporal interval were formulated simply Nvith respect to the 
condition T(m)=T(m')+dT ....... (i. e. without being conjoined with m=m' in 0/), 
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then it would submit to an interpretation in terms of an instance of Locke's 
second principle: 
ON P(m)#P(m') A T(m)=T(m')+dTmm, -> m: #m' 
However, we know that this principle (LP. 2b) contains an infinitesimal temporal 
term which is not primitive - since LP. 2b cannot be applied (as a single 
principle) independently of at least two instances of LP. 1b with respect to which 
its infinitesimal temporal interval is defined. As such we cannot use an instance 
of LP. 2b to supply the temporal term T(m)=T(m)+dT.,,., for substitution 
within a/-f/ (since this would be the substitution of a term which itself requires 
definition in terms of other expressions) i. e. we cannot use an instance of LP. 2b 
in place of an instance of LP. lb in expression 0/. Therefore, in requiring us to 
rule out any such a possibility, the conjunction T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,,. - A M=M" in 
0/ is required (i. e. is necessary). Alternatively, we might claim that in attempting 
to apply ON to the definition of a cardinality statement as the source of the 
substituted infinitesimal temporal term dT,,,,., we would be forced to revert to 
two additional instances of LP. Ib which might equally, and more suitably, be 
used to define this temporal interval and thus we would be forced to revert to 
01/. 
So finally then, we see that 01/41 is a necessary and sufficient form in which 
the conjunction between T(m)=T(m)+dT.,,,,,, and m=m' must be maintained in 
order to obviate interpretations (in terms of material bodies) which would be 
invalid. 
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It is to be admitted, perhaps, that this analysis has revealed to us little more than 
the not altogether surprising fact that in order to claim that there are n material 
bodies within a given region of space over a given infinitesimal interval of time 
you have to say what this 'given infinitesimal interval of time' is. The proviso 
being, however, that this 'given infinitesimal interval of time' must be defined 
as a valid infinitesimal term (one resistant to finite division) and thus we must 
resist its definition via a single instance of LP. 2b (which we do by the 
conjunction of the temporal term T(m)=T(in')+dT. ý, n, with the identity m=m'). 
Now, of course, the simple statement T(m)=T(m)+dT., m, A m#m' (the 
statement 01/) does not itself guarantee that dTm,, is well defined as an 
infinitesimal. It merely rules out an interpretation in terms of that one principle 
currently within our system which is unacceptable for the definition of dTm,, 
(i. e. LP. 2b). The statement Ol/ will always stand in need of interpretation to 
ensure the resistance to finite division of its infinitesimal temporal term dTnm.. 
The aim of this analysis has been to demonstrate that there is nothing in the 
formal analysis of a material cardinality statement which insists that this 
infinitesimal term has to be defined in terms of the first order derivative of 
position with respect to time of a material body. Any alternative definition of 
the isolated infinitesimal dT.,,, (such as that presented in the introduction to 
this work) may equally be employed (even if only as a valid logical exercise) in 
the formulation of a material cardinality statement. 
112 
4.3 Summary of the Analysi& 
Lockean Identity and Diversity of Continuants. 
The re-identification claim P(a)=P(a')+5P,,,, e A T(a)=T(a')+5T,,, a, A a=a' is based 
upon the principle: 
P(a)=P(a')+dP,,,, A T(a)=T(a')+dT,,,, -> a=a' LP. 1b 
Where dP,, a, /dTa, a, `2 6Pa, a-/6Ta, a, in the limit as 5Ta, a, 'tends towards zero'. For two 
such re-identifications a=a' and b=b', the diversity of these continuants is based 
upon the principle: 
P(a)#P(b') A T(a)=T(b')+dT,,, u -> aý, -U ... LP. 2b 
where dT,,, w is defined in terms of dT,,,. and dTb, u and is thus not primitive. 
Lockean Cardinality of Continuants. 
Given n instances of LP. 1b and 1/2(ný-n) instances of LP. 2b applied to the 
continuants al=al', a2=a2 ...... an=an', we may capture an expression of 
Lockean cardinality over a vanishing temporal interval (dT ..... ) by the 
substitution S: 
. T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,. 
and T(ax)=T(m), T(ax')=T(m) for all x in 1,2,3, n. 
and thus arrive at the necessary and sufficient form 
(one in which T(m)=T(m')+dT,,, f cannot be obtained from an instance of LP. 2b): 
Ol/ T(m)=T(m')+dTm. m. A 
m=m' 
al/ P(al)=P(al')+dP.,,.,, A [T(al)= T(m) A T(al')=T(m')]->al =al' 
bl/ P(a2)=P(a2')+dP, 2,12, A [T(a2)= T(M) A T(a2')=T(m')]->a2=a2' 
cl/ P(an)=P(an')+dPan, an- A [T(an)= T(m) /\ T(an')=T(m')]->an=an' 
dl/ P(al)#P(a2') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a2')=T(m')]-> al#a2' 
ell P(al)#P(a3') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a3')=T(m')]-> al;, -a3' 
fl/ P(an-1); 6P(an') A [T(an-l)=T(m) A T(an')=T(m')]-). an-l #an' 
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5. Summary of Book 1. 
In the introduction to this thesis I proposed that question which, while not 
equivalent to the question: "How does S know the world to be one of material 
bodies moving around in space and time? " (Ql) is more well suited to the 
fonnulation of such questions when one adopts a certain position with respect to 
the epistemological description of variables such as 'S' (Section 1.1): 
Q4a. How does S (or T) know that there are n (rather than n+1 or 
n-1) material bodies moving about within a given region of space 
over some given infinitesimal interval oftime? 
The first Book of this thesis has therefore been dedicated to an analysis of that 
statement which Nve may consider to be formulated by S: 
There are n (rather than n+1 or n-1) material bodies moving about 
within a given region of space over some given infinitesimal 
interval of time. 
I have firstly argued that we must construct this statement from n instances of a 
continuity condition (what I have called the "continuous fonn of Locke's first 
principle", LP. I b) and V2(n 2 -n) instances of a diversity condition (what I have 
called the "continuous form of Locke's second principle", LP. 2b); both of which 
arise from a consolidation of Locke's principles of the identity and diversity of 
material bodies Nvith our common understanding that such bodies may be 
numerically re-identified over finite intervals of space and time. 
The result of this analysis was to arrive at a necessary and sufficient formulation 
of this statement which employs reference to an isolated infinitesimal temporal 
term: T(m. )--T(m. ')+dTMnjý A m=rn', or an infinitesimal temporal term (dT,,,, f) 
which, while necessarily maintaining the properties of a legitimate infinitesimal 
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(most importantly a resistance to finite division) does not have its own 
definition specified within this necessary and sufficient formulation. 
The question which naturally arises is: must such an infinitesimal term be 
invariably defined from the first order derivative of position with respect to time 
('instantaneous velocity') of a material body (in which case my analysis is 
trivial and tells us nothing new about Q4a), or is there perhaps some other sense 
in which such a term may be defined? As I have already argued in Section 1.4 
(and upon which I shall expand in Section 7) it is perfectly possible (as an 
exercise in logic alone perhaps) to define an isolated, non-quotiented, 
infinitesimal term from the analysis of purely temporal re-identification 
statements, or from continuity statements of the form T(m)=T(m')+dT,,, jn, -+ 
m=m'. Thus not only is the analysis of Book I non-trivial (or tells us something 
new about the question Q4a) but we have before us a means of progressing from 
purely analytical concerns, or concerns arising purely from the analysis of 
statements, to the philosophical concerns of the possibility of purely temporal 
re-identifi cation and continuity and the systems within which such re- 
identification and continuity may be manifested. 
But even if the reader is indisposed to progressing from analysis to philosophy 
in this fashion (and it is an indisposition with which I have some sympathy) 
something has nonetheless been gained from the arguments of Book 1. For it 
has been demonstrated that the analysis of spatio-temporal continuity and the 
analysis of purely temporal continuity coincide at the issue of isolated (or non- 
quotiented) infinitesimal temporal terms; the first revealing such terms in the 
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analysis of material cardinality statements, and the second in the direct analysis 
of purely temporal re-identification statements. And should not our curiosity be 
aroused by this 'coincidence' when we remember that this distinction, between 
spatio-temporal description on the one hand, and purely temporal description on 
the other, has strong historical echoes in the philosophy of mind (e. g Descartes). 
And should ive not be forgiven (by everyone except the philosopher perhaps) 
for then preceding from these analytical 'facts' to the philosophy of mind itself 
- carrying with us, as it were, at least the certainty of this logical framework 
withinwhich any future philosophical speculations may be both formulated and 
bound? 
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Book 2-A Philosophical Speculation Upon 
the Nature and Origin of the Individuation 
of Material Bodies. 
An Interpretation of the Isolated Infinitesimal Term. 
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6. Locke's Principles and Our Movement and Actions. 
6.1 Introductiom 
In moving from the analytical concerns of Book I of this thesis to the 
philosophical concerns of Book 2,1 have already stated that it is my intention to 
place an interpretation upon the isolated infinitesimal temporal term 
T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,,,, which, I have claimed, arises within the necessary and 
sufficient expression of a Lockean Cardinality statement (that statement 
formulated by S). However, even before we can reach the stage of constructing 
such an interpretation we must be drawn unavoidably towards those 
philosophical issues surrounding the terms and expressions of my previous 
analysis itself More specifically, I have until now employed Locke's principles 
within this analysis without any great regard to those purely philosophical 
objections which may, and have, been made against then. In this section then, 1 
wish to address at least two existing philosophical objections which might 
naturally arise in connection with my treatment of Locke's principles. This is 
not, however, a deviation from the stated aims of Book 2 of this thesis, but is 
instead a natural way to firstly ease the transition from analytical to 
philosophical concerns (or to argue that such a transition is itself natural in this 
context), and secondly, to start to pave the way to that interpretation which I 
shall finally place upon the isolated infinitesimal temporal term of the analysis 
of Book 1. 
6.2 An Outline ofMethod. 
The Lockean conditions of identity and diversity which have primarily 
concerned me in this thesis refer to the inferred continuity (or persistent 
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numerical identity) of objects upon the basis of their spatial and temporal 
continuity alone, i. e. what I have previously referred to as "the continuous form 
of Locke's principles": 
P(a)=P(b)+dPa, b AT(a)=T(b)+dT,,, b -> a--b ... LP. lb P(a)-#P(b) AT(a)=T(b)+dT,, b -> a#b ... LP. 2b 
I have already noted, however, that there are cases in which these principles 
simply fail to apply, or where they do not apply equally to all object classes that 
we might wish to refer to as 'physical' or 'material'. For example, I have already 
considered (Sections 2 and 3) how LP. lb is inapplicable to the interactions of 
imaginary 'point-like' classical particles, and equally, that the 'objects' of 
quantum theory (if it is sensible to refer to them as such) may seemingly violate 
both LP. Ib [as in the Bose-Einstein Condensate] and LP. 2b [as in electron 
diffiraction experiments]. Not all object classes which we might wish to refer to 
as 'physical', or 'material', therefore have identity and diversity characteristics 
which are compatible with LP. Ib and LP. 2b. 
But even for the objects of our common experience (those "inaterial bodies" to 
which we may assume Locke's principles refer unproblematically - such things 
as tea cups, tables, chairs, cats, dogs, trees, and mountains), or those objects 
with whose spatial and temporal continuity we are seemingly familiar, there is 
considerable philosophical doubt as to whether LP. lb and LP. 2b can be 
universally (and unproblematically) applied. More accurately, there are at least 
two philosophical problems where LP. lb would seem to be directly violated or 
where it is seemingly denied that we may infer the continuity of a material 
object purely upon the basis of spatial and temporal continuity alone. I shall 
119 
refer to these problems respectively as: A. The Problem ofLot's wife, following 
Wiggins (1980 pp 60-1), and R. The problem of the Ship of Theseus, following 
Hobbes [De Corpore (11,7,2)] and Hughes (1 997a). 
In part, my approach to these problems, A and B, Nvill be critical (in as much as 
I shall present limited arguments against them) but it is not my intention, nor is 
it within my limited powers of philosophical argument, to dismiss them. 
Instead, I shall argue that there is one sense in which they are irrelevant to the 
topic of the continuity of material bodies, or one sense in which we may discuss 
the topic of continuity 'without reference to the tenns and concepts around which 
these problems centre. This section will therefore be largely concerned with the 
philosophical analysis of these two problems themselves and the sense in which 
LP. lb and LP. 2b (my 'continuous forms" of Locke's principles of identity and 
diversity) may survive them unscathed - or with isolating that sense in which 
LP. lb and LP. 2b may be applied unproblematically. 
That I should restrict my arguments within this section to a purely philosophical 
analysis requires, perhaps, some justification. At first sight it does not seem 
unreasonable to assume that the application of LP. lb and LP. 2b might be the 
subject of some form of empirical investigation. For example, the empirical 
work of Spelke and Van de Walle (Eilan, McCarthy and Brewer 1999 ppl32- 
62) seems to point towards the employment by infants of two kinematic 
principles (principles linking position, velocity and acceleration): (a) a 
Continuity principle - "objects inove only it? connected paths from one place 
and time to anotherý", and (b), a principle of Solidity - "no parts of distinct 
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objects ever coincide in space and tiMe, ' 38. These "kinematic principles" would 
seem then to refer respectively to LP. lb and LP. la (with which LP. lb is 
continuous). However, if valid, such claims do little more for the arguments of 
the current thesis than reiterate the already known fact that in our more mature 
descriptions we often employ the idea of continuity to 'explain' re-identification 
over finite spatial and temporal intervals [as considered in section 3]. Thus 
while such experiments may well be employed (albeit somewhat selectively) to 
support the claims of this thesis, I shall restrict myself in this section to a purely 
philosophical analysis. 
6.3 Problem A: The Problem of Lots Wife. 
In section 3 we have noted that when Wiggins asks: "Is a, the man sitting on the 
left at the back of the restaurant, the same person as b, the boy who won the 
drawing prize at the school I was a pupil at in 1951? " he admits that; ". . wlwt 
organizes our actual method is the idea of a particular kind of continuous path 
in space and time which the man would have had to have followed in order to 
end up here in the restaurant. ." (Wiggins 1980, p49). 
Here, of course, Wiggins 
does not suggest that this "actual method' is one of observing this continuous 
spatial and temporal history - since such a method would be unavoidably 
restricted to relatively small spatial and temporal intervals [or to the 
"discontinuities and limits on observation" (Strawson 1959 p33)]; merely that it 
is the assumption of the existence of such a history which constitutes (in par-t) 
what it is to be re-identified as the same object over space and time. However, 
311 In contrast to this, the idea that "reasoning about objects" actually involves the employment of 
d3mamic principles, or principles employing concepts of force and mass, is favoured by Pcacock- (Eilan, 
McCarthy and Brewer 1999 pl. 63-76). 
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there is one important case in which Wiggins would deny that spatial and 
temporal continuity (or a continuous spatial and temporal history) is sufficient 
to infer re-identification. 
As far as Wiggins is concerned, the tracing of continuants through space and 
time is a sortally dependent process, or is subject to the Thesis of Sortal 
Dependency D (Wiggins 1980 p48): 
D a--b if and only if there exists a sortal concept f such that 
(1) a and b belong to a kind which is the extension of f, 
(2) to say that x falls under f- or that x is an f- is to say what x is (in the sense 
that Aristotle isolated)39 
(3) a is the same f as b, or a coincides with b under f, i. e. coincides with b in the 
manner of coincidence required for members of f, .. 
In other words, if a is b, then there must exist a sortal concept (whether known 
or not) f, such that a is an f, b is an f, and a is the same f as b. It is within the 
Thesis of Sortal Dependency (D) that Nve first encounter problems in claiming 
that LP. lb applies universally to material bodies, or that spatial and temporal 
continuity is itself sufficient to infer continuant identity. For the Thesis of Sortal 
Dependency is directly incompatible with LP. lb if the following possibility 
(either real or imagined) can occur: That there mqy exist two objects writh a 
continuous spatial and tempgral history but which can be subsumed under no 
3' This phrase "In the sense that Aristode isolated" ID(2)] refers to the sense in which Aristotle attempted to 
define the category of second substance. For Aristotle the ultimate subject of predication is the concrete 
individual (first substance). For example, Adam, Red Rum, or the stone in your engagement ring. But if 
you ask what this 'concrete individual' essentially is, then you will have to specify some kind of substance 
(or second substance) (Joseph 1925 p50). For example, Adam is a man, Red Rum is a horse, and the stone 
in your engagement ring is a diamond. Here then, 'man!, 'hors4e and 'diamond' are types of fs. The reference 
to a and b belonging to "a kind which is the extension of V [(I)j employs the idea of extension (as opposed 
to intention) as in the relationship between genus and species - "in intension the species includes the genus, 
in extension is included in it" (Joseph 1925 p 135). For example, we might say that man (a species) is a kind 
of animal (a genus), and thus we include the genus in the definition of a species (intension), or we might 
say that the genus of animal includes (amongst others) the species man (extension). In modern logic, 
however, the term extension has become more closely associated with the mathematical definition; as, for 
example, when we replace the intentional definition of ! multiply an integer by two! with the set of ordered 
pair (1,2), (2,4), (3,6),.. In D(I) the "extension of V is the set of all things which are fs 
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common sortal concept. In this case, if there is no sortal commonality, and if the 
Thesis of Sortal Dependency is true, then spatial and temporal continuity is not 
itself sufficient to determine the continuant identity of material bodies - and 
thus, in this case, LP. Ib is violated. 
Although such cases do not obviously occur in reality, at least not without some 
degree of construction (as when we reidentify a butterfly with a caterpillar), 
they may occur in imaginary and allegorical situations. For example, Wiggins 
cites the case of Lot's Nvife who, in Genesis chapter 19, is transformed into a 
pillar of salt. In this case, or so we might imagine, even though there is a 
continuous spatial and temporal history between Lot's wife and the pillar of salt 
there is no sortal concept under which both Lot's NNrife and the pillar of salt may 
be subsumed (unless, as is rightly repugnant to Wiggins, we invent some kind of 
intermediate sortal concept 'woman-pillar'). Wiggins is then forced to argue, in 
accordance with D, that there is no continuant identity between Lot's wife and 
the pillar of salt, or that Lot's wife cannot be re-identified as the pillar of salt 
(Wiggins 1980 pp66-7). Now such examples as LoVs wife are, of course, 
somewhat artificial. However, they raise the serious question of our 
fundamental ideas about the continuity and re-identification of physical objects. 
For even if such events do not actually occur in reality, their analysis should 
reveal something of our actual ideas about continuant identity - i. e. whether, 
given such an example, Nve believe there to be a continuant identity between 
Lofs Nvife and the pillar of salt [in which case we are applying LP. lb - since 
there is nothing here but spatial and temporal continuity], or whether we believe 
there to be no continuant identity between Lot's -wife and the pillar of salt [in 
123 
which case we must be denying LP. 1b]. My argument is that at the most 
fundamental level we do in fact believe there to be some form of continuant 
identity between Lot's wife and the pillar of salt, and that this arises purely 
because of their continuous spatial and temporal histories. 
6.4 How Lot should treat his wife. 
Genesis Chapter 19 does not tell us about Lot's reaction to the transformation of 
his wife and so we may take the liberty of elaborating a number of possibilities. 
Suppose that having just witnessed this miraculous transformation, Lot 
(temporarily a strong believer in D) now believes his wife to be gone and this 
pillar of salt to bear no continuity or re-identification with his wife. Let us 
suppose also, that tired and hungry after his flight from Sodom, he produces a 
piece of meat from his pocket and, being partial to salt, sets about chipping a 
lump off the pillar (which, for the sake of argument, we shall assume to be 
Sodium Chloride) . Now in being a strong believer in D Lot feels no sense of 
shame at the possible impropriety of this action. There is no continuant identity 
between his wife and this pillar. There is no sortal concept under which they 
may both be subsumed. The principle by which his wife persisted is not the 
principle by which this pillar persists. What grief he may feel for the demise of 
his wife has nothing to do with his obtaining salt for his lunch. 
The question, of course, is: How do we feel about these imagined actions of 
Lot? Do we feel that he is acting correctly? Dowe feel that his actions are free 
of any moral sanction because, after all, he is merely taking salt from a pillar 
and grinding it up for his food? Or do we feel slightly uneasy about his actions? 
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Do we feel that his action is in some way callous or disrespectful to the memory 
of his wife? For if we feel uneasy about Lot's actions, then this can only be 
because we believe, at some fundamental level which is perhaps unavailable to 
philosophical analysis, that Lot's wife and this pillar of salt are in some sense 
the same, or that there is some kind of continuant identity between them (unless, 
of course, we harbour some kind of affection for that region of space which 
would have been occupied by Lot's wife but is now occupied by the pillar of 
salt). 
Let us now consider another situation (although in this case we must alter the 
original story slightly). Suppose that upon turning to look upon the destruction 
of Sodom, God's wrath is such that he makes Lot's wife instantly vanish (to 
reappear nowhere and thus to cease to exist). Let also assume that at the very 
instant that this act is performed a pillar of salt miraculously appears some 
twenty feet from where Lot's wife was standing. Once again, Lot sets about 
preparing his lunch and once again turns to the pillar for a supply of salt. 
How do we feel about the actions of Lot in this second situation? The true 
supporter of D must feel the same about Lot in both these cases. It must make 
no difference to them whether or not the pillar of salt is spatially and temporally 
continuous with Lot's wife. In both cases there is no sortal under which both 
Lot's Nvife and the pillar of salt may be subsumed, and thus in both cases there is 
no continuity of identity between these objects. 
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Let us go one step even further with this argument. Suppose that at the instant 
that Lot's wife vanished a pillar of salt miraculously appears some twenty miles 
away. It may, of course, be many hours before Lot and his daughters reach this 
pillar, but let us assume that there is some way in which Lot can be reliably 
informed that this pillar appeared at exactly the same time that his wife 
disappeared. If Lot now goes about obtaining salt for his lunch, then are we to 
express any moral indignation about his actions? 
Now I doubt that anyone, even the most staunch supporter of D, could really say 
that they were perfectly happy with Lot in the first example. All of us, I suspect, 
would feel some degree of unease or moral indignation with Lot for hacking off 
lumps of salt from the pillar which was spatially and temporally continuous 
with his (now 'e)e) wife. Equally, I believe that all of us would feel a lesser 
degree of uneasiness, or a lesser degree of moral indignation (if indeed we felt 
these things at all) in the second example - since in this case we are more likely 
to condemn Lot simply for eating at this terrible time rather than for his actions 
towards the pillar. Finally, I suspect that none of us (although of course I may 
be wrong) would condemn Lot in the third case - despite his knowledge that the 
pillar appeared at exactly the same time that his wife disappeared. It is only the 
true believer D who must feel exactly the same about Lot's actions in each of 
these three cases, and I suspect (although of course I may be wrong) we would 
be hard pushed to find such a person. 
Now I do not, of course, propose this as a serious analytical justification of my 
claims. But I would ask the reader to honestly reflect upon their moral or 
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emotional opinions of these three situations. And even if it should be the case 
that one is only slightly more uncomfortable or indignant in the first case than 
the second or third (but that there is a noticeable distinction; or that we do not 
feel exactly the same about each of these cases), then my point is made. For the 
only distinction between these cases is that in the first there is a continuous 
spatial and temporal history between the pillar of salt and Lot's wife, and in the 
second and third there is no such history. If then we can admit to such a 
difference in our response to these situations, then we have leamt something, 
not about the philosophy of individuation and re-identification perhaps, but 
about how we as human beings actually go about identifying and re-identifying 
material objects. It is not then philosophical analysis which draws us to 
condemn Lot (in the first of our examples) but the fundamental nature of our 
ideas about the continuity of material bodies. 
The important point, however, is that this belief manifests itself as a response on 
our part. Our feelings of indignation towards Lot (our 'response') arise because, 
in this case, we assign continuant identity upon the basis of spatial and temporal 
continuity regardless of the lack sortal commonality. But such a 'response' to 
the lack of sortal commonality is certainly not universal. For example, had we 
observed Lot's Nvife leaving Sodom and later encountered a pillar of salt outside 
the city, then I suspect that there is nothing which would convince us that there 
is any form of continuity whatsoever between these two things - and in arguing 
this position we might well cite the fact that there is no sortal concept under 
which both this pillar of salt and Lot's wife can be subsumed (as no doubt Lot 
would in the third of our examples above). In this case then, or in the case 
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where we do not know of a spatial and temporal continuity, the lack of sortal 
commonality between two objects might be the most important aspect in 
determining our 'response' to the claim of such an identity. What is important is 
that there are certain responses upon our part (pertaining to the identity and re- 
identification of material bodies) which can be characterised with respect to 
certain principles of identity and re-identification. In some cases these responses 
(and thus these principles) may depend upon sortal commonality, and in others 
they may depend upon spatial and temporal continuity. What I am interested in 
(in my interpretation of LP. 1b) are those cases where we know there to be a 
spatial and temporal continuity and nothing else matters in terms of our 
C response' to the claim of a continuant identity, i. e. when we may infer 
numerical continuity upon the basis of spatial and temporal continuity alone, or 
when LP. Ib may be applied unproblematically. 
I have not then, of course, dispatched Wiggins' thesis in these informal 
discussions on moral indignationýo. I am merely arguing that there are certain 
40 A more serious criticism of Wiggins' thesis would centre upon asking how he would 
consolidate his earlier claim that in re-identifying an object; "ahat organizes our actual method 
is the idea of a particular kind of continuous path in space and time" with the denial of some 
form of continuity between Lot's wife and the pillar of salt. For as I have previously argued 
(Section 3), the citing of such a path to explain re-identification implies the re-identification of 
an object over a vanishing spatial and temporal interval as a 'brute fact'. If Wiggins is then 
prepared to deny this 'brute fact' in the case of Lot's vAfe, then must he not equally abandon it 
in explanations of re-identifications citing a continuous path - and are we not then left with 
recourse to nothing more than an infinite number of transitivity arguments for accounting for 
this method which supposedly "organizes our actual method' ? It is not, however, my intention 
to attack Wiggin's theory here. For at the most fundamental level I would disagree with Wiggins 
as to what is at issue in the case of Lot's wife, and thus generally, with what is at issue in the 
question of re-identification (at least for the case of material objects - the re-identification of 
4persons' is no doubt more problematic). In claiming that a is re-identified as b, we should not 
suppose there is some answer to the question; 'is a the same as bT which is independent of our 
belief that 'a is the same as b'. In other words, there is not some truth to the matter which is 
independent of our knowing, although we may know by other means that what we once though 
to be re-identified is not. All there is to a re-identification claim is our belief in a re- 
identification.; there is not some truth of the matter which can be revealed by philosophical or 
logical analysis. For the 'objects of our everyday experience' re-identification is not the subject 
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'responses' which we make to certain situations and which are such that we 
believe that spatial and temporal continuity is indicative of numerical 
continuity, regardless of any other condition (i. e LP. lb). And if this is the case, 
then at a fundamental level there are ideas about the continuity of material 
objects, or of tracing continuants through space and time, which make no 
reference to the question of "what type of thing is it that moves? " or "what 
sortal concept it is subsumed under? ", or more accurately perhaps, there are 
ideas which lead us to formulate responses to situations as though it did not 
matter to us what sort of thing an object is. Indeed, Wiggins himself readily 
admits that we do not need to know what it is (or what kind of thing it is) that 
moves in order to know that it moves. And more importantly, that "Perhaps the 
man that makes the claim that something moves does not need to know the 
answer to this question, . ." (Wiggins 1980 p15). It is here, however, in this 
latter quotation from Wiggins, that part of our successful interpretation of LP. Ib 
lies. For why should it ever be the case, or in what circumstances might it be the 
case, that someone "does not need to know the answer to this question"? In 
other words, can we generally define those situations wherein it does not matter 
to us what sortal concept an object (like a tea cup, table, chair, cat, dog, tree, or 
mountain) is subsumed under? There are, of course, numerous ansivers to this 
question. If something is moving towards us very fast, then we do not need to 
know what it is, we just get out of its way. If something is blocking our path, 
then we do not need to know'what it is, we just move around it. If something is 
blocking a drain pipe, then we do not need to know what it is, we just push it 
out. In other words, in our basic mechanical interactions with (and 'responses' 
of metaphysics or ontology; it is the subject of psychology (the psychology of our 'inclinations 
to individuate'). 
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to) the physical world; picking things up, putting things down, walking around 
things, jumping over things, we do not necessarily need to know what 'kinds of 
things' things are. Of course, as a matter of survival, we have learnt that there 
are some things with respect to which we have to be more careful than others, or 
some things with respect to which we must (as a matter of survival) modify our 
fundamental mechanical movements. For example, it is useful to know that the 
thing before you is a Scorpion before you try to pick it up, or that the thing 
before you is a Lion before you try to jump over it - and perhaps this is all there 
is to sortal concepts; a sort of modification to 'normal' mechanical action in 
order to avoid danger of gain reward, or a way of reacting with objects which 
goes beyond (or is in addition to) a simple 'response' to the properties of their 
continuity and diversity. 
Underlying our common-sense conception of the world is a fundamental 
framework of identity, continuity, and diversity; and it is this 'framework' 
which we exploit when we move and act in such a way that it does not matter to 
us what type of thing we believe a particular object to be. It is this 'fundamental 
framework' which we exploit when we move identically with respect to a chair, 
or a table, or a television set, and it is this 'fundamental framework' which we 
formalise most explicitly within the descriptive basis of classical Mechanics 
(within which we do not have a mechanics for chairs and a separate mechanics 
for tables; simply a mechanics of objects in general). That in addition to this 
framework we also have concepts which lead us to avoid picking up Scorpions 
and jumping over Lions, simply means that we have additional capabilities 
which allow us to modify our actions, or to formulate actions which go beyond 
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a mere response to the identity, continuity and diversity of material objects. It is 
these 'additional capabilities' that we must fall back upon when we are 
presented with the question of re-identification over periods of non-continuous 
observation (when the spatial and temporal continuity of a material body is 
unknown to us via observation), and thus it is these 'additional capabilities' 
which manifest themselves within such ideas as the Thesis of Sortal 
Dependency. 
If I then claim that LP. lb and LP. 2b are principles of this 'fundamental 
framework' of identity, continuity and diversity, then LP. lb and LP. 2b are not 
principles of the identity and diversity of a natural kind or class of objects (or a 
class of objects for which membership of this class is defined by LP. lb and 
LP. 2b)41 . They are instead principles which account for, or describe, or arise 
within the analysis of, a certain 'response' upon our part to identity and re- 
identification questions. This is why I have been careful to avoid an ontological 
interpretation of Locke's principles, and have referred to them instead as 
principles pertaining to our own 'inclinations to individuate' (Section 2). LP. Ib 
and LP. 2b refer to our response to the identity and diversity of the material 
objects of our common experience, but only in those senses in which it does not 
matter to us what type of things objects essentially are. The identity and 
diversity of material bodies (in as much as this identity and diversity is 
unproblematically subsumed under LP. lb and LP. 2b) is defined, not by virtue 
of their being members of a natural kind, but by our own 'response' to them, or 
in terms of our own movement and actions with respect to them. 
41 Since I have argued here that they are the principles of identity and diversity of a class of 
material which are not subsumed under sortal predicates - and the philosopher is likely to 
question the existence of such a class of material bodies, 
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6.5 Problem B: The Problem of the Ship of Theseus. 
am not yet, however, free of contradiction in claiming that such a class is 
compliant to the principles of identity and distinction held in LP. Ib and LP. 2b. 
For there is another case in which it would seem that LP. lb is violated for the 
'objects of our common experience! - albeit only indirectly. This concerns the 
question of the identities of composite objects in relation to the replacement of 
their parts. For example, both Hughes (1997a) and Simons (1997) find the 
following two claims (about ships) non-problematic: 
rDU 
Qx-EPL) A ship may survive gradual but total part-replacement. 
(REAS) A ship may survive disassembly and subsequent reassembly of its 
parts. 
[Although Hughes goes on to modify these principles (Hughes 1997b), this 
modification need not concem us here] 
Here, (REPL) is essentially a statement of LP. I b, since the gradual replacement 
of parts is compatible Nvith the continuous spatial and temporal history of the 
ship. (REAS), on the other hand, would seem to be a new principle, or an 
additional means of determining re-identification - since the ship (as opposed to 
its part) is not continuous through space and time but disappears at one place 
and time and reappears at another. 
Now although (REAS) would seem to assign re-identification over an extended 
spatial and temporal interval (without a continuous spatial and temporal history 
- or the ship ceases to exist at one place and time and reappears at another), this 
is not itself in contradiction to LP. lb. All that LP. lb claims is that if you have 
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spatial and temporal continuity then you have continuant identity. That (REAS) 
might be true only affects our consideration of LP. lb because when taken in 
conjunction with (REPL) these two principles lead to a conclusion which is 
seemingly contradictory with LP. lb (or, more accurately, is in contradiction 
with LP. la with which LP. lb is continuous). It is relatively easy to see that, 
when taken together, (REPL) and (REAS) may seemingly lead to the direct 
violation of Locke's first principle (LP. 1a). In fact, as Simons has pointed out, 
they may lead both to the conclusion that two objects of the same kind may be 
at the same place at the same time (a violation of LP. I a), and that one object can 
be at two places at the same time (a violation of LP. 2a). 
Let us then firstly consider how these violations of Locke's principles arise. 
Suppose we have two indistinguishable ships [in the sense of what Baille refers 
to as a "qualitative identijy' (Baillie 1993)], S1 and S2, which are at two 
different places, PI and P2, at a given time Ta. If we now systematically replace 
each part of SI with its corresponding part from S2, and each part of S2 with its 
corresponding part from SI, then at time Tb we will once again have two 
identical ships at PI and P2. The question, of course, is what ship is where. If 
(REPL) is true, then SI is still at PI and S2 is still at P2. However, if (REAS) is 
true, then S1 is now at P2 and S2 is now at PI If, therefore, we accept both 
(REPL) and (REAS) as equally true, then at Th we have both S1 and S2 at P I, 
and both SI and S2 at P2. In other words, we not only have two objects of the 
same kind at one place at the same time, but we also have one object at two 
places at the same time (since either SI or S2 may be considered to be at two 
places at the same time). 
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6.6 How Theseus should treat his ship. 
To analyse further the nature of these assumption, lets us modify this 
description slightly. Suppose that as well as SI and S2 at PI and P2 at Ta, there 
was also a third ship S3 at P3 at Ta. And let us further suppose, that while we 
may inspect the disassembly and reassembly of SI and S2, we cannot see wbat 
happens to the parts in passing between SI and S2, nor what happens to S3. For 
example, we might imagine a screen which allows us to see SI and S2 but not 
the space in between them or S3. If them S1 is disassembled and reassembled 
from parts appearing from behind the screen, and if S2 is disassembled and 
reassembled from parts appearing from behind the screen, then can we now 
make any assumptions about where SI and S2 are at Th? We note firstly that 
(REPL) can be applied as before - since this principle does not rely upon the 
origin of those parts which are used for replacement, only that they are at least 
qualitatively identical to the parts which they replace. Also, (REPL) is 
commensurate vAth LP. lb (i. e. SI and S2 have a continuous spatial and 
temporal history throughout the process of part replacement). In this case then, 
we still have the solution that SI is at P1 at Ta and Th, and that S2 is at P2 at Ta 
and Th. The problem, of course, arises when we come to apply (REAS). For 
once the screen is in place we no longer know if the parts with which we are 
replacing parts of SI come from S2 or S3 (or indeed SI itself), and we no longer 
know if the parts with which we are replacing parts of S2 are coming from SI or 
S3 (or indeed S2 itself). In this case then, we are probably not even tempted to 
apply (REAS) at all, and would probably content ourselves with simply 
claiming (REPL), or that SI and S2 have persisted through the gradual 
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replacement of their parts - Locke's principle, and the principle that one object 
cannot be at two places at the same time, therefore remains intact. 
But what is really different between this second situation (where Locke's 
principle survives) and the first (where Locke's principle is seemingly violated)? 
The answer to this, of course, is simply that we no longer know the spatial and 
temporal histories of the parts. We do not know whether the parts which 
subsequently reassemble Sl are spatially and temporally continuous Nvith parts 
from S2 or S3 (or indeed SI itself). 
What we are really asserting when we claim that the identity of a ship may 
survive its disassembly and subsequent reassembly (REAS), is that if we take 
the same parts and put them together in the same form, then we have the same 
ship. But the criterion by which we decide if these parts are indeed 'the same 
parts' is (in this case) based upon LP. Ib- that the parts are known to be the 
same parts because they have continuous spatial and temporal histories. In other 
words, as formulated here, or as formulated by Hughes and Simons, or as 
implied vvitbin the classical problem of the Ship of Theseus, both (REAS) and 
(REPL) are ultimately dependent upon LP. I b. (REPL) is essentially just LP. Ib 
reworded, because the continuity of the ship and the continuity of its parts are 
dependent upon their continuous spatial and temporal histories (although it is 
not assumed that the same ships must have the same parts). In (REAS), whilst 
the re-identification of the ship is not dependent upon a continuous spatial and 
temporal history (of the ship itself) it is dependent upon the continuous spatial 
and temporal history of its parts. 
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Now (REAS) is peculiar in that it deals, not with two different ways of re- 
identifying objects within a common class (of which both ships and their parts 
are members), but with two essentially different types of objects - or objects 
which submit to different principles of re-identification. And this is due, I would 
argue, simply to a subjective element of analysis - of choosing those objects 
which will be considered as parts (and will thus be irreducible within the 
analysis) and those considered as ships (and thus emergent from, and reducible 
to, the arrangement of their parts). It is always possible, of course, to shift this 
subjective division. There is no actual fundamental division between, say, ships 
and planks. No doubt we could break down a plank into its parts (a number of 
splinters perhaps) and then reassemble them elsewhere to obtain [via a modified 
version of (REAS)] the same plank. However, we are still left with the case that 
the re-identification of these parts (this collection of individual splinters) is 
dependent upon their spatial and temporal continuity - or dependent upon 
LP. I b. The principle (REAS), in isolation, is regressive. We may break a fleet 
of ships down into individual ships, and individual ships into individual planks, 
and individual planks into individual splinters, and we could then reconstruct 
this same fleet at a different place and time from the same splinters, from the 
same planks, and from the same ships - all by successive modifications of 
(REAS). But at the bottom of this process we would require that the splinters 
are re-identified upon the basis of their spatial and temporal continuity, or their 
compliance to LP. lb. We require LP. lb to terminate this regress, and it is at the 
point where LP. lb is applied that the distinction between object types is drawn - 
or the distinction between parts (subject to no further reduction in the analysis) 
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and composite objects (or emergent objects which are reducible to the 
arrangement of their parts). 
Now if I am to claim that there is a non-contradictory class of objects which 
satisfy LP. lb and LP. 2b, then I have to get rid of this subjective division - and 
thus get rid of the combination of (REAS) and (REPL) for this class. Quite 
simply because we cannot allow that Locke's principle [with which LP. lb is 
continuous] may be violated. This can be done immediately, of course, simply 
by not allowing any composite objects (or objects made up of parts) within this 
class. However, this seems rather drastic since I have already said that this class 
includes (in a particular sense) such things as tea cups, tables, chairs, cats, dogs, 
trees and mountains - and we should hardly wish to have to accept that these 
things are not (in some sense) reducible to parts. In what sense then may we 
consider such things as tea cups, tables, chairs, cats, dogs, trees and mountains, 
to be irreducible - and thus in what sense may we claim them to be consistently 
compliant with LP. lb and LP. 2b [and free of the violation of Locke's principle 
imPlicit in (REPL) and (REAS)]? The answer to this question, I would suggest 
(because it is the same answer that I gave above), is in the sense in which we 
move, %vith respect to them. For example, in walking around a tree in order to get 
out of a forest I act as though the tree were simply an object to be avoided (since 
this tree and mYself cannot be at the same place at the same time). That I may 
suspect that the tree may be reduced to parts has no influence upon my physical 
movement with respect to it (in this case). Likewise, in picking up a radio to 
take it to another room, I act as though this radio were a simple irreducible 
ob ect. The fact that I know it to be composed of transistors and resistors and the j 
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such like, makes no difference to my physical interaction with it (in this case). 
In the most fundamental elements of our own mechanics; picking things up, 
putting things down, walking around trees, jumping over rivers, etc, our 
interactions'with 'physical objects' are interactions 'with thingswhich are treated 
as singular irreducible entities. That we later learn that these things are in fact 
reducible has no effect upon our most fundamental interactions with them. 
There are, of course, specialized actions which we perform which rely upon our 
understanding of the fact that things often have parts Oust as there are 
specialized actions which rely upon our understanding that things may be 
subsumed under a sortal concept). If I wanted to repair my radio rather than take 
it into another room, then I would exploit just such a understanding. But even in 
the process of this repair my most fundamental movements (picking things up, 
putting things down, avoiding bumping one thing into another) would be 
formulated with respect to objects which are subject to no further conscious 
reduction into parts. My picking up a capacitor and soldering it to a printed 
circuit board does not require me to act as though the capacitor were reducible 
to parts. Our most fundamental movement and actions are formulated with 
respgct to objects which are treated as irreducible. 
So finally then, I may define that class of objects which I claim are subject to 
the principles of identity and diversity contained in LP. lb and LP. 2b, i. e. that 
class of ob ects whose numerical continuity may be directly and j 
unproblematically inferred from their spatial and temporal continuity. But this is 
a definition, not of the intrinsic properties of objects, but of the relationship 
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between objects and our movement and interaction Nvith respect to them. These 
are: 
The objects of our immediate experience (such as tea cups, 
tables, chairs, cats, dogs, trees, and mountains) but only in the 
sense that: (a) It is with respect to their individuation that our 
physical actions are conducted, or with respect to their 
continuity that our successful motion isformulated, and (h) 
that they are individuated, identified and distinguished as 
irreducible entities, or that while they may befurther reduced 
to parts our interactions with them are independent of this 
possible reduction, and (c) that while they may be further 
subsumed wider sorial concepts our interactions with them 
are independent ofthese sortal characterizations 
(b) avoids the violation of Locke's principle which is seemingly inherent -within 
the combination of (REPL) and (REAS), and (c) avoids the possible violation of 
LP. Ib implicit within the Thesis of Sortal Dependency (D). In those cases where 
our more mature and reflective actions may depend upon ether the reduction of 
an object to its parts, or the characterization of an object under a sortal concept, 
then those objects with respect to which these actions are formulated are not a 
member of the class I here define. Likewise, if it is the case that our actions 
towards an ob ect are in part independent of its possible reduction to parts, or j 
characterization under a sortal concept, and equally, in part dependent upon 
these reductions and characterizations, then this object is a member of the class I 
have here defined only with respect to those aspects of our actions which are 
independent of this reduction to parts and characterization under a sortal. 
Now it may well seem that I have laboured the definition of this class 
somewhat; or that I have realised the limitations of LP. lb and LP. 2b and am 
now desperately trying to save them from philosophical criticism. But this is not 
the case. Individuation and action are intimately connected in the human being. 
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For in what sense may we say that we are 'inclined to individuate', if not in 
order to formulate some 'response' to those things which we individuate, and in 
what way may we more readily formulate a 'response' than in moving and 
acting in the physical world? 
6.7 Sumnwry 
In as much as we may describe our movement and actions with respect to 
material bodies, and in as much as some of these movements and actions are 
independent of the material body type (its sortal predicate) and its reduction to 
parts, Nve move and act in accordance with their identity, diversity and re- 
identification characteristics alone. In moving and acting with respect to simply 
the identity, diversity and re-identification properties of material bodies we 
move and act in accordance with Locke's principles (or my 'continuous form' 
of them as captured in LP. Ib and LP. 2b). 
But what are the ramifications of making such a claim about the way we move 
and act? What does it tell us about our movement and actions themselves? 
Suppose, for example, that it were the case that we moved and acted as though 
the world were made up of nothing but perfect cubes (and whether the world 
was actually made up of perfect cubes is neither here nor there). In this case, 
when we moved from A to B we would do so in a series of straight lines 
punctuated by right angle turns (because we ourselves would be cubes of 
course), and when we tried to put one thing on top of another we could do so 
only in a manner commensurate with the geometric packing properties of cubes. 
Equally, the rotational symmetry properties of cubes would be reflected in the 
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rotational symmetry properties of our actions. In this case then, it is relatively 
easy to see that 'what is true of cubes is true also of our (successful) movement 
and actionS42. What we could say about cubes, or what properties we might 
derive from their nature, we could also say, and derive, about our movement and 
actions. 
Now -%ve do not, of course, move and act as though the world were one of 
perfect cubes. Instead we move and act as though the world were one of 
material bodies whose identity and diversity characteristics are captured in 
LP. Ib and LP. 2b 43 . Must we not therefore equally assume that what is true of 
material bodies whose identity and diversity principles are captured in LP. lb 
and LP. 2b is true also of our (successful) movement and action? And if, as 
demonstrated in section 4, LP. lb and LP. 2b exhibit (even if as nothing more 
than a logical possibility) a clear relationship to purely temporal continuity, then 
can we not equally say that our movement and action may likewise exhibit 
42 In this case we are imagining a world which may or may not be made up of perfect cubes but 
is of such a nature that acting as though it were made up of perfect cubes is a way of 
successfully moving and acting within it. We then assume that some process of evolution has 
taken place via which has emerged a species of creatures that move and act as though the world 
were made up of perfect cubes. While these creatures can move and act in anyway they wish, 
only when acting as though the world were made up of perfect cubes would their movement and 
actions be successful or beneficial. So in the current example I should really replace the 
expression "moving and acting7 with "moving and acting successfully", but this is a detail upon 
which I do not wish to concentrate in this simple example. 
43 In this case we are imagining a world which may or may not be made up of material bodies 
whose identity and diversity principles are captured in LP. Ib and LP. 2b but is of such a nature 
that acting as though it were made up of such bodies is a way of successfully moving and acting 
within it. We then assume that some process of evolution has taken place via which has emerged 
a species of creatures that move and act as though the world were made up of material bodies 
whose identity and diversity principles are captured in LP. Ib and LP. 2b. While these creatures 
can move and act in anyway they wish, only when acting as though the world were made up of 
such material bodies would their movement and actions be successful or beneficial. So once 
again I should really replace the expression "moving and acting" with "moving and acting 
successfully", but this is a detail with which I do not wish to distract the reader. 
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(even if as nothing more than a logical possibility) just such a relationship to 
purely temporal continuity? 
This question would, of course, be nothing more than a mere abstract enquiry if 
it were not for the fact that when moving and acting in the way that we do (or 
when moving and acting as though the world were one of material bodies) we 
are indeed aNvare of a relationship to some form of (seemingly) purely temporal 
continuity. I refer here, of course, to our conscious awareness of our movement 
and actions and the fact that our mental events seem to be continuously located 
in time but not in space. 
There is nothing in these arguments, of course, which must lead us directly to 
the conclusion that the temporality of our consciousness and the nature of our 
movement and actions are intimately related. Just the suspicion that if what is 
true of LP. lb and LP. 2b is true of our movement and actions, then it is perfectly 
logically consistent to claim that they are. What these arguments do achieve, 
however, is to provide us with a means of moving forward with this speculative 
philosophical exercise. For we may now legitimately direct our attention to the 
possible philosophical relationship between Locke's principles and the 
temporality of consciousness - its "temporal phenomenology" (or what it feels 
like to feel time passing). 
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7. Phenomenological Time - Its Properties and Relation to Locke's 
Principles 
7.1 Introduction 
It has been my stated intention to pursue an interpretation of the analysis of 
Book I (the necessary and sufficient description of that statement formulated by 
S) in terms of infinitesimal temporal intervals which are defined otherwise than 
with respect to the 'instantaneous velocity' of a material body. Likewise, I have 
indicated in the introduction to this thesis that I shall be interested in the 
definition of isolated (non-quotiented) infinitesimal terms which arises within 
the analysis of purely temporal re-identification statements and the condition of 
purely temporal continuity which is associated with them [T(m)=T(m)+dTý,, n, - 
-> m=m']. In the previous section I have argued that, not only do the continuous 
form of Locke's principles apply unproblematically (or free from the 
philosophical criticisms discussed in the last section) to a certain description of 
our movement and actions, but that in being unproblematically related to these 
principles these 'certain aspects of our movement and actions' are equally 
sub . ect to the analytical conclusions of Book 1. Thus I have arrived at the 9 
problem of describing our movement and actions (or the movement and action 
of S) in relation to our 'knowing' (or S's 'knowing) that there are n material 
bodies moving around within a given region of space over a given interval of 
time. 
There is, however, no immediately satisfying route (other than by the arguments 
of Section 6-7) by which I can move from this position to the claim that it is the 
temporality of consciousness which must naturally concern us - or that it is the 
temporal phenomenology of S which is itself purely temporal (whether actually 
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or only seemingly so to S) and whose continuity may provide for S that very 
term (dT.,,,, ) with respect to which S may know n. We may, however, hint at 
such a claim, or more accurately perhaps, we may propose those arguments 
which make such a claim less extraordinary than it may at first appear. Firstly, 
there is the suggested link between the brain and our movement and action 
itself For example, as Greenfield puts it; "So the brain then, in whatever, shape, 
size and degree of sophistication, is somehow connected in a very basic way to 
ensuring survival as both a consequence and a cause of movement" (Greenfield 
1997). So if it is to the function of the brain that we must turn for the origin of 
our moving and acting in the -way that we do, and if part of this 'moving and 
acting' is to "move and act accordingly and independently of their [material 
bodies] sortal characterisation and reduction to parts", and if this itself requires 
of S at least reference to a "system of purely temporal re-identification 
statements [T(m); zT(mq A m=M7 and a purely temporal continuity 
[T(m)=T(m )+dT,,,,,.,, -; ý m=m 7, then where else should we look for this system 
of statements and continuity than "ithin the function of the brain itself. And 
whether actually or only seemingly so to ourselves we do indeed seem to find 
such a pure temporality in those operations of the brain with which we are most 
intimate and familiar, namely; within consciousness: "The things around us 
normally have spatial characteristics, such as size, shape, and location. By 
contrast, it makes no sense to think of our experiences, desires, thoughts, and 
feelings as having size and shape, and it is even unclear whether we can assign 
hodily location to these things" (Rosenthal 1991) - an idea which finds its most 
explicit formulation perhaps in what Ryle critically refers to as the "official 
doctrine" of Cartesianism: "It is a necessary feature of what has physical 
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existence that it is in space and time, it is a necessary feature of what has 
mental existence that it is in time but not in space" (Ryle G, 1949). 
Such arguments are, however, largely informal and will not provide for us the 
rigour which we require in order to at last place a philosophical interpretation 
upon the isolated infinitesimal term and, ultimately, question Q4a. as posed at 
the beginning of this work. Instead, I 'wish to address the topic of 
phenomenological time, or time as experienced by consciousness, directly 
(admitting for now that it is only a suspicion that leads us in this direction) and 
enquire as to its characteristics - in as much as it may be said to have such 
'characteristics'. Only if these 'characteristics' may themselves be shown to 
correspond, even if only more or less so, to the formal properties of the purely 
temporal continuity which we seek [T(m)=T(m')+dT,,., -)ý m=m'] may we 
then feel more confident in the leap from the formal properties of temporal 
continuity to the temporal phenomenology of consciousness which the above 
4 informal arguments would seem to imply' . 
Let us then turn firstly to the topic of phenomenological time itself and those 
issues (and problems) surrounding its seemingly purely temporal nature. 
44 1 do not mean to sound overly pessimistic in these comments, nor to be overly apologetic for 
my methods. The simple truth is that there is no strict methodology for moving from formal 
arguments (such as those presented in Book 1) to philosophical arguments (such as those which 
are the concern of Book 2). Analysis may only guides us towards, and lin-dt our stupidity in, the 
formulation of speculative philosophical arguments. Thus the comments here are merely 
intended to highlight the fact that in moving from the analysis of purely temporal re- 
identification statements to the claim that the temporal phenomenology of consciousness 
exhibits the same properties I am, in fact, still, making a highly speculative leap. 
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7.2 Phenomenological Time and its properties. 
Upon what basis upon do we at first distinguish phenomenological time from 
the 'measured time' of the physicist, or more accurately, what are the senses in 
which the temporal nature of mental events both coincide with and differ from 
the temporal nature of physical events? Given that the temporal nature of 
physical events are now firmly subsumed under the Theory of Special Relativity 
(Einstein 1922)45, then the question of whether, or to what extent, 
phenomenological time is either identifiable as, or distinct from, measured time 
comes down to the following question. Upon what basis do we proceed from the 
recognition of the temporal nature of mental events to the assumption that their 
temporal properties are subsumed under this theory? Let me firstly consider a 
specific and. highly relevant instance in which this assumption is seemingly 
made. 
It would seem that there is a suggestion [hinted at by Russell (1927, p 384), but 
certainly more specifically formulated by Weingard (1977) and Lockwood 
(1984a, 1984b, 1985)] that despite the traditional denial of the spatial location of 
mental events (e. g. Descartes - see the quotation from Ryle above), relativity 
theory can somehow be employed to demonstrate that such 'events' are indeed 
spatially located. For example, Lockwood proposes the following argument 
(Lockwood 1989, p 72): 'ý . according to special relativity, any two events 
which are temporally separated with respect to one frame of reference must be 
spatially separated with respect to some other frame. " If mental events are 
45 Perhaps I should refer here, not to the special theory, but the general theory of relativity. 
However, my arguments will not require me to move beyond the predictions of this 'special 
theory' and the nature of the 'General Theory' is so removed from common sense that to cite it 
in the context of this thesis would seem unnecessarily pedantic. 
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therefore temporally separated, Lockwood argues, then they must be spatially 
located ("somewhere"). 
While I do not agree with this particular argument6, the real question is why 
Lock-wood, or indeed anyone, should consider that Special Relativity can be 
directly applied to mental events in the first place? In answer to this, Lockwood 
proposes that; "mental events are located in time, in the same sense that 
physical events are", or that they "belong to the very same temporal order as do 
physical events" [a position which I believe Gibbins (1985) is justified in 
suggesting introduces a level of circularity into Lockwood's argument]. 
Yet Lockwood must, in some sense, be right. For it will lead to absurdities if we 
do not recognise that in certain circumstances, or under certain arguments, the 
temporal nature of mental events must submit to some of the prescriptions of 
relativity theory. Most importantly, there are quite clear cases in which we may 
arrive at the conclusion that, like physical events, mental events exhibit 
temporal inertial variance (that the temporal interval between two events may be 
different in two mutually inertial reference frames). Suppose, for example, that a 
man were to be observed picking up a sea shell, examining it, and putting it 
down again. We may assume that whatever mental processes accompany these 
46 It seems to me to imply that mental events may be spatially located with respect to some 
reference frames but not others - this itself violating, not only the principle of special relativity 
(since it implies the existence of privileged reference systems for the description of mental 
events), but also the co-ordinate transformation rules of Special Relativity itself [since it is only 
spatial and temporal separations which may vanish under the Lorentz Transformation (Lorentz 
1892), not spatial and temporal locations] Thus Lockwood's argument would seem to be 
incapable of escaping the inevitable circularity, namely, that to be spatially separated with 
respect to "some otherftame" requires them to be at least spatially located in all. Finally, the 
whole of Lockwood's argument would seem to rely upon the acceptance that mental events can, 
in any case, be unproblematically located with respect to an inertial reference frame - something 
which, as we shall shortly see, is not altogether obvious. 
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actions they are in some way closely related to these events themselves. The 
man is thinking about picking up the shell Nvhen he picks up the shell. He is 
thinking about examining it when he is examining it and he is thinking about 
putting it down when he puts it down. In other words, we may assume that there 
is some degree of simultaneity between these events and the mental processes of 
the man himself Let us then consider what happens when these actions are 
observed by two different observers. If the observer A observes the actions of 
this man from the perspective of the inertial reference frame K 47 , and the 
observer B observes the actions of this man from the perspective of the inertial 
reference frame K, and if K and K' are in a state of uniform relative motion 
(they are 'mutually inertial'), then the Special Theory of Relativity predicts that 
A and B will measure a different temporal interval between the man picking up 
the sea shell and putting it down. The only sensible solution is then to assume 
that the man is thinking faster with respect to one of these observers than with 
respect to the other - and thus we arrive at the opinion (as Lockwood suggests) 
that mental events "helong to the very same temporal order as do physical 
events". However, seductive as it may be, this argument is (as I shall shortly 
argue) itself at odds with the Principle of Special Relativity. 
Now the argument above looks attractive because it seems to be addressing the 
right topic. In co-ordinating space and time in relation to the principle of inertia, 
or in terms of 'inertial reference systems', classical mechanics is dependent upon 
those properties of physical systems which remain unchanged, or are 'invariant', 
under the simple linear transformations between one inertial reference system 
47 An inertial reference system is a system of co-ordinates with respect to which the principle of 
inertia holds true, or with respect to which the spatial co-ordinates of a 'freely moving' particle 
are a simple linear function of time. 
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and another. These 'invariants' are not spatial and temporal locations 
themselves, but are the magnitudes of the intervals between locations. Hence in 
Newtonian physics we have a mechanics based upon the invariance of 
independent spatial and temporal intervals under the Galileian Transformation, 
and in relativistic physics we have a mechanics based upon the invariance of the 
spatio-temporal interval under the Lorentz Transfonnation (Lorentz 1892). In 
mechanical theory therefore, it is the properties of invariants which are of 
primary importance, not the properties of variant location terms. The attempted 
absorption of the temporal properties of mental events under the Special Theory 
of relativity should not then be based upon attempting to argue that mental 
events are temporally located in the same sense as physical events (and thus also 
spatially located), but that their temporal intervals exhibit the same properties 
under transformation as do the temporal intervals of physical events. The 
argument above (about the man picking up and putting down sea shells) 
therefore seems to support the claim that the temporal nature of mental events is 
inertially variant in the same way as the temporal nature of physical events 
(which itself seems to lead us back to Lockwood's claim that mental events are 
spatially located). But this overlooks the most important aspects of mental 
events themselves. 
The temporal intervals of mental events are simply the wrong type of thing to be 
inertially variant; since they cannot be directly, or objectively, measured by an 
observer and there is no possible situation in which such intervals may be 
determined with respect to different states of relative motion. Only the man 
picking up and putting down sea shells knows what the temporal interval 'feels 
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like' between his thinking of picking it up and his thinking of putting it down. 
All that the observers 'A' and V can observe are the physical events 
themselves. In other words, the arguments above overlooks the first person 
subjectivity of the temporal nature of mental events. 
Let us consider another simple thought experiment which will make this 
position clear. Suppose that I were at a firework display when I see the flash of 
a particular firework and shortly after hear the sound of its bang. In this case, I 
am aware that the flash occurred before the bang and that between these two 
events there was a single definite temporal duration. Suppose now that during 
this display there is a neuroscientist (equipped with the appropriate apparatus) 
who is observing my brain activity in minute detail. Let us assume that as a 
result of the stimulation of my eyes by the flash this neuroscientist observes an 
event 'a' within my brain. Similarly, as a result of the stimulation of my ears by 
the bang, the neuroscientist observes the event V within my brain. Being a 
physicalist, the neuroscientist then claims that the physical event 'a' 
corresponds to'what is going on inside my head'when I perceive the flash, and 
that the event V corresponds to 'what is going on inside my head' when I 
perceive the bang. Now the events 'a' and V are, of course, perfectly normal 
observable physical events and could have been seen by anyone who had taken 
the trouble to observe my brain. The question that we want to ask however is; 
what is it, which can be observed and measured by the neuroscientist (and 
which can thus be considered as part of the physical world), which corresponds 
to my awareness that the flash occurred before the bang and that between these 
events there Nvas a single definite temporal duration? More accurately perhaps, 
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can we say that my awareness of the temporal relationship between the flash 
and the bang (-what this interval 'feels like' to me, or how I judge its duration) 
corresponds to the observed and measured temporal relationship between 'a' 
and V within my brain? 
The answer to this is absolutely and fundamentally "No". The neuroscientist can 
measure nothing that corresponds to my intuition of the temporal duration 
between the bang and the flash - and we can see this by considering the 
consequences of the reverse claim. Let us designate my intuition of this duration 
as AT',, b and the temporal interval between the events 'a' and V, as measured 
by the neuroscientist, as ATIab, and let us claim that AT',, b =ATiab (or that in 
measuring the time between the events 'a' and V the neuroscientist has actually 
also measured my intuition of the duration between my awareness of the flash 
and the bang). Let us now posit the existence of another neuroscientist 
(equipped with perhaps even more remarkable equipment than the first) who is 
travelling towards both the first neuroscientist and myself in a state of uniform 
relative motion, and let us assume that this second neuroscientists also measures 
the temporal interval between the events 'a' and V within my brain - AT 
2 
ab say. 
Now the Special Theory of Relativity insists that because of the uniform relative 
motion between the two neuroscientists AT 
2b 
#ATIab, and thus AT2 ab: 9ATiab- 
We should then immediately see the problem. If the first Neuroscientist's 
measurement is a measurement of my awareness of the temporal relationship 
between the flash and the bang, then the second neuroscientist's measurement is 
not. In which case we have a violation of the Principle of Special Relativity 
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(that all mutually inertial reference systems are equally suitable for the 
fonnulation of physical laws, or that there exist no 'privileged' inertial reference 
systems for the description of physical events). Claiming that any measurement 
whatsoever of the temporal interval between the events 'a' and V (within my 
brain) is a measurement of my intuition of the interval between the flash and the 
bang, or a measurement of my awareness of this interval, is to claim that there 
must exist privileged inertial reference frames - and thus to negate the Principle 
of Special RelatiVity48 
The temporal proper-ties of mental events cannot therefore be subsumed under 
the terms and principles of relativity theory - since paradoxically perhaps, the 
claim that they may is itself a violation of the principle of special relativity - and 
thus it is not true that they "belong to the very same temporal order as do 
physical events". But surely we should know this anyway (regardless of these 
more fon-nal arguments from relativity theory). My awareness of the temporal 
interval between two events (what this interval 'feels like' to me, or how I judge 
its duration) cannot anyway be related to the measurement of the interval 
between two events in 'measured time'. Two students sitting through a second 
year Mechanics lecture may experience completely different intuitions of the 
49 It is tempting, perhaps, to suggest that the first of these neuroscientists does indeed occupy a 
special position with respect to my own temporal phenomenology, namely that, providing that 
there is no relative motion between this neuroscientist and myself, then we are both located 
within the same inertial reference system. But this can mean nothing more than that this 
neuroscientist and myself would 'measure' (using a clock) the same temporal interval between 
the flash and the bang of the firework (and we should note that this neuroscientist, in 
'measuring' the interval between the events 'a' and V within my brain, is, in effect, 
'measuring' nothing more than the interval between the flash and the bang within his or her own 
inertial reference system). We must accept the Principle of Special relativity to be telling us that 
there is nothing of significance in the claim that x and y 'measure' time with respect to the same 
inertial reference system. Further, there is nothing within this claim which insists that the 
phenomenological experience of the duration between the flash and the bang is the same for this 
neuroscientist and myself. 
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last ten minutes of the lecture - for one the time may seem to pass quickly (such 
that upon looking up at the clock she is surprised to find the lecture nearly 
ended), while the other may find the time to pass slowly (such that no matter 
how often he looks at the clock the last ten minutes seem interminable). 
Measuring the temporal intervals between physical events cannot measure the 
phenomenological duration between those events that we experience, nor can 
we say that the magnitude of the phenomenological duration between two 
events as experienced by one individual is the same as, or different from, the 
magnitude of the phenomenological duration between two events as 
experienced by another individual - for what is the objective criterion by which 
we could claim that one such magnitude is the same as another? 
These then, or so it would seem, are at least two of the defining characteristics 
of phenomenological durations (the time between physical events as 
experienced by consciousness): 
(a) Their first person subjectivity; that no one individual may experience the 
phenomenological durations of another (these durations are somehow 
separate - as minds are separate perhaps - and exist in independent temporal 
domains). 
(b) That we may not identify (either as objects or as magnitudes) the extent of 
one individual's phenomenological durations Nvith the phenomenological 
durations of another. 
7.3 Are mental events located in time at all. 
It seems somewhat paradoxical, perhaps, that having laboured my interest in the 
temporal nature of mental events I should now ask if such events are located in 
time at all. What I mean to ask, of course, is are mental events located in time; 
where by 'time' we mean the measured time of the physicist? The initial 
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response to this question might be to suggest that I can at least correlate my 
mental events Nvith physical events (the positions of the hands on a clock face 
for example) and in this much my mental events must be in time in the same 
way that these physical events are in time. However, from the discussions of the 
previous section we now know that physical events themselves (like the 
positions of the hands on a clock face for example) are not simply 'in time' (or 
at least their intervals and durations are not simply 'in time') they are located 
with respect to an inertial reference system - and it makes all the difference 
when talking about the times and the simultaneity and the intervals and the 
durations of physical events, to state what inertial reference system these 
simultaneities, intervals and durations are measured with respect to. 
Fortunately, we have to hand a relatively simply definition of what it is to be 
located with respect to a given inertial reference system. If two physical events 
'a' and V are 'located' with respect to the inertial reference system K, then the 
interval (both spatial and temporal) between them can be equally determined, 
either by repetitive operations performed upon measuring instruments (i. e. by 
actually measuring the interval between 'a' and V with a measuring rod and a 
clock) or by calculation based upon the known locations of 'a' and V (within 
the reference system) and the known geometry of the inertial reference system 
itself Only if these two methods of determining the interval between 'a' and V 
yield the same answer may we claim that 'a' and V are located with respect to 
the inertial reference system K- since in what sense may we claim that two 
events are located with respect to an reference system if their interval (as 
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actually measured) is not that predicted from the geometry of the reference 
system itself 
But surely I have already argued that it is itself contrary to the principle of 
special relativity to claim that the phenomenological interval between two 
mental events can be identified with the temporal interval between two physical 
events within any inertial reference system (my arguments about the 
phenomenological interval between my awareness of the flash and the bang of a 
firework)? If this is so, then our definition of location within an inertial 
reference system simply cannot apply to mental events. 
Mental events may be correlated with physical events which are themselves 
legitimately located with respect to an inertia reference system. However mental 
events cannot be likewise located. And this, of course, should be obvious. The 
example of the two students in the final ten minutes of a second year Mechanics 
lecture should be sufficient to convince us that there is no intersubjectively 
testable geometry of phenomenological time - no geodesic along which 
phenomenological time may be claimed to characteristically pass. Two 'clock 
watching' students may indeed correlate their own mental events with the same 
physical events (the clock indicating 9: 50 and the clock indicating 10: 00 say) 
and these physical events may well be located with respect to the inertial 
reference system K, but if one of these students feels time to be passing quickly 
while the other feels it to drag, then each in their turn would 'feel' their own 
phenomenological temporal intervals as different from the other (although if 
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questioned each could only claim that ten minutes had passed), and thus there 
can be no geometry of phenomenological time. 
The principle of Special Relativity tells us that there is no privileged inertial 
reference system for the description of the intervals between physical events 
(there is no 'ultimate' space and time of Newton). Thus the description of 
physical events must always imply (even if not stated) the stipulation of the 
reference system with respect to which they are described. If the 
phenomenological temporal intervals between mental events fail even the most 
fundamental definition of location (with respect to an inertial reference system), 
then what sense is left to us in the claim that mental events are located in 
cmeasured' time? 
Thus we arrive at that conclusion which we knew all along. There is no possible 
way in which the phenomenological intervals of two different individuals may 
be compared (be said to be the same or different). More worrying perhaps, nor 
is there any way to say that the phenomenological temporal locations of mental 
events of two different individuals are actually correlated with the same 
physical event - i. e. if the individual Y correlates the mental event 'm,, " with 
the physical event TF, and the individual 'y' correlates the mental event 'myl 
with the same physical event 'Pl' (if indeed it is possible to say that the mental 
events of different individuals are correlated with the 'same' physical event - 
and I suspect that there are serious difficulties with claiming this), then there is 
no sense whatsoever in saying that 'm,, ' and 'my' are 'at the same time'. In other 
words, the temporal correlation of mental events with physical events is not 
156 
transitive. If 'm,, ' is correlated with 'Pl' and 'my' is correlated Nvith TF, then 
we cannot infer that 'm,., ' is correlated with 'my'. 
Thus to those properties of phenomenological time [(a) and (b)) identified in 
Section 7.2 we may add an important third: 
(c) The temporal correlation of mental events and physical events is not 
transitive. 
7.4 A Derivation of the Properties of Purely Temporal Continuity. 
We have concluded then, that phenomenological time (or time as experienced 
by consciousness) is not to be identified with measured time, and further, that 
far ftorn being illusory at least some of the properties of phenomenological time 
are easily characterised and familiar to us a1149. In this section I wish to argue 
that these easily characterised and familiar properties of phenomenological time 
may themselves be derived (or at least implied) from that condition which we 
have already derived upon purely logical grounds as a legitimate solution to the 
necessary and sufficient formulation of Lockean cardinality statements (Section 
1.4), i. e. 
T(m)=T(m')+dT.,., -> m=m'. 
It should be remembered that this continuity condition is proposed (and its term 
dT,., detennined as resistant to finite division) in the logical consolidation of 
49 Of course this is somewhat contradictory to my previous arguments in the introduction to this 
thesis. What I seem to be saying is that these properties are familiar to S where S is a variable 
amongst a range of individuals. In this case, however, we would be hard pressed to come up 
with a strict criterion of S's 'knowing' that T 'knows' these properties. My only justification for 
this claim is that in Book 2 of this thesis we are simply placing a philosophical speculation 
around the more rigorously derived statements of Book I- and in this much a degree of 
informality is unavoidable. 
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two statements. Firstly, a purely temporal re-identification statement over the 
small but finite temporal interval 6TMM,: 
T(m)=T(m')+8Tmm, /\ m=m' 
and secondly a definition which ensures the transitivity of the identity 
relationship in such finite purely temporal re-identification statements, i. e. 
T(m)=T(m') -> m=m' 
It was claimed, in Section 1.4, that in a manner directly analogous to the non- 
regressive description of continuous classical motion, the second conjunction of 
the expression T(m)=T(m')+8Tm,,,, A m=m' becomes an inference [and thus 
continuous with T(m)=T(m) -> m=m'] in the limit as 8T,,,,., 'tends towards 
zero'. 
It is perhaps obvious from initial inspection that this inference cannot apply to 
the description of re-identifications in 'measured time', or what Searle refers to 
as "real time" (Searle 1994 p127). If we start with two instances of this 
expression: 
T(m)=T(m')+dTý,,, m, -> m=m' 
T(n)=T(n')+dT ..... -> n--n' 
and if we allow the vanishing terms dTn,,,,, and dT,,,, to actually become Zero 
(as a logical exercise only perhaps), then we obtain: 
T(m)=T(m') -> m=m' ... (iii) T(n)=T(n') -> n=n' ... 
Ov) 
from which Nve may deduce: 
T(m)=T(n) -> m=n (V) 
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In other words, any two objects (of the type m and n- whatever 'n' and W 
may refer to) which are at the same time [T(rn)--T(n)] must be the same object 
[m=n]. Thus (i), for example, cannot refer to ordinary material bodies and 
measured time - or else at any one time there could be no more than one such 
entity. How then may we account for a diversity of the form m#n - assuming, 
that is, that this diversity is sensible (since we do not at present have any idea 
what it is that m and m' refer to)? 
If the expression m#n is valid, then we may claim the following conjunction to 
be unproblematically true: 
mg, -n A [T(m)--T(m') v T(m); &T(m')] 
However since the negation of m; -I-n (i. e. m=n) is directly inferred from the 
condition T(m)=T(m'), then we may deduce that the only condition which may 
be conjoined with m#n is T(m)#T(n): 
m; &n A T(m); &T(m') ... 
In other words, if ever we claim (of entities of the type m and n) that m#n, then 
the only condition that we may apply to the temporal locations of m and n is 
T(m)#T(n). So if m and n are different (not numerically identical), then rn and n 
must be at different times 50 . This is, of course, a somewhat peculiar conclusion; 
for it claims that if m3, -Ln, then m and n cannot be at the same time. If then there 
exists a class of objects for which the condition T(m)=T(m')+dT.,,,,, -> m=m' 
50 1 am holding back from claiming that the condition m#n directly infers the condition 
T(m)#T(n) since, strictly speaking this conclusion requires the additional (independent) 
assumption that given m#n we may directly infer whether T(m)=T(n) or T(m)#T(n). 
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applies, then each of these objects exists within its own unique time, and any 
time at which one such object exists cannot be a time at which any other such 
object (numerically distinct from the first) may exist. In other words, such 
objects exist in independent isolated temporal extensions - they exist, if you 
like, within their own personal and isolate temporal domain (as perhaps minds 
exist independently and inaccessibly to each other) - and surely this is at least 
something 'like' the property (a) of phenomenological time addressed above? 
Let us now apply the condition (vi) in conjunctionwith (i) and (ii), i. e. 
m3l-n A T(m)#T(n) (Vi) 
T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,., -> m=m' ... 
W 
T(n)=T(n')+dT,,, w -> n7-n' ... (ii) 
If m#n and m'#n', then we may deduce [from (vi)] that: 
and if 
T(m):;, -LT(n) 
T(m')#T(n') 
dT.,,,,, = T(m) - T(m') and dT,,,, =T(n)-T(n') 
then there is no condition under which we can ever claim that dTn,,,,, = dTn W51 
Thus if m#n, then we cannot claim that any interval of the time over which m 
and m' are re-identified is the same as the interval of time over which n and n' 
are re-identified. In other words, not only are objects such as m and n located in 
independent temporal domains (different times), but we cannot equate any 
interval (duration) of time in one with any interval of time in the other - and 
51 Strictly speaking this formal argument applies to the claim that dT,,, m, cannot be the same interval as dT,,,, (i. e. dT,,.. and dTn,. cannot be two names for one and the same interval). It 
does not mean that the magnitude of dT,, W cannot be the same as the magnitude of dT.,,,.. 
However, given that T(m)#T(n) and T(m')#T(n'), any claim that the magnitude of dT,,,,., is the 
same as the magnitude of dT,,,. would require a criterion of the identity of magnitudes which 
cannot be derived from these expressions alone. 
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surely this is at least something 'like' the property (b) of phenomenological time 
addressed above? 
We have therefore derived, from the purely temporal continuity 
T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,,,, -> m=m', two properties which are at least reminiscent of 
those properties of phenomenological time derived earlier: 
(a) Their first person subjectivity; that no one individual may experience the 
phenomenological durations of another (these durations are somehow 
separate - as minds are separate perhaps - and exist in independent temporal 
domains): 
T(m)=T(n) -> m=n, 
m#n A T(m)#T(ml) 
(b) That we may not identify (either as objects or as magnitudes) the extent of 
one individual's phenomenological durations with the phenomenological 
durations of another. 
dTm,, n, ;& ff, ý,. 
and to these two properties we may add an important third: 
(c) The temporal correlation of mental events and physical events is not 
transitive. 
If m:; &n A T(m); L-T(n) then we cannot correlate T(m) and T(n) via a third tenn, 
since if T(m)==Tl and T(n)--TI then T1#T1 
Now in demonstrating that the formal properties of the continuity condition 
T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,, & -> m--m' are 'like' the familiar properties of 
phenomenological time, I have not, of course, proved that it is the temporal 
phenomenology of S which allows S to 'know' that there are n material bodies 
within a given region of space over a given interval of time (and I am not even 
sure what would constitute the proof of such a claim). I shall try to take this 
final step (in full acceptance of the fact that I shall not take it as anything other 
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than a speculation) upon the basis of consistent philosophical argument in the 
next Section where I shall concentrate upon the philosophy of Bergson and his 
description of the relationship between the intuition and the intellect. For now I 
shall simply complete this section by returning to the topic of Locke's principles 
themselves (or at least my continuous form of them). 
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75 Locke's Principles and Phenomenological Time. 
We arrive then at a remarkable (although not perhaps highly satisfactory) 
interpretation of my previous analysis of Lockean cardinality; one which 
embodies not only the characteristics of our common sense understanding of 
physical systems (in terms of material bodies in space and time), but which 
equally captures the nature of our own temporal phenomenology (in, of course, 
some limited degree). This then is an interpretation which captures the nature of 
physical systems on the one hand, and the nature of the mind on the other. It 
links our understanding of the world with our appreciation of ourselves - or in 
Bergsonian terms (which will concern me in the following section) it links our 
"comprehension ofmatt&" with our "intuition oflifie". It describes the origin of 
our temporal consciousness in evolution by telling us how the nature of 
consciousness may "serve our ends"52 
Ol/ T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,,. -> m--m' 
The properties of 
Phenomenological 
time? 
al/ P(al)-=P(al')-i-dP.,,,,,, A CT(al)= T(m) A T(al')=T(m')]-> al=al 
bl/ P(a2)=P(a2')+dP,, 2,,, 2, A [T(a2)= T(M) A T(a2')=T(m')]-> a2=a2, 
The Lockean 
cl/ P(an)=P(an')+dPanan, A [T(an)= T(m) A T(an')=T(ml)]-> an=an' Cardinality of 
I 
material bodies 
dl/ P(al)#P(a2') A [T(al)--T(m) A T(a2')=T(m')]-> al#a2' 
el/ P(al)#P(a3') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a3')=T(m')]-> al; *3' 
P(an-I)t-P(an') A [T(an)=T(m) A T(an')=T(m')]-> an-l#an' 
52 The expression presented here is based upon the direct substitution of the temporal interval in 
Ol/ (dT.,., ) for the temporal intervals within expressions al/-fl/. If we repeat this operation for 
the temporal interval defined in the continuity term T(n)=T(n')+dT,,,, -> n=n' where n?, -rn, then 
we shall encounter a problem. For example the two substitutions 
dTn, n, = d7fý, 1,1, 
and dT,,, m. = dT.,,.,. 
become contradictory if we apply the property of purely temporal continuants derived in the 
previous sub-section, namely n#mA dT,,. # dT.,,,,, since this would imply dT,,,,,,,, # dT"j, j. - 
which we may interpret either by saying that dT.,,,,,, does not exist (since all things which exist 
must be identical to themselves), or else that we should not use direct substitution within the 
formulation of Lockean cardinality statements but should instead use some defined symbolic 
non-transitive form. 
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How much faith we can place in this interpretation (as it stands) is, of course, 
questionable; and I should be pushing the credibility of the reader too far to ask 
them to accept that there is, within this description, anything approaching a 
formal proof All that I have done here is attempt to construct an argumentwith 
respect to which the philosophical descriptions of the following section may 
appear less abstract, or Nvith respect to which these 'philosophical speculations' 
may arouse within us the suspicion that they deal directlyvvith a problem which 
(after the trials of this thesis) are quite familiar to us. 
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8. A Philosophical Speculation Based Upon Mitchell and Bergson 
8.1 The Needfor a Philosophical Interpretation 
In claiming in this section to present a 'philosophical speculation' (or an 
example of a 'philosophical speculation') I mean simply to propose an 
interpretation of my previous (largely analytical) arguments within the wider 
context of a philosophical system, or within the wider context of some theory of 
the world, or of ourselves, or of our knowledge 53 . 
Firstly, however, let me summarise those claims which have until now 
concemed me. 
The analysis of Lockean Cardinality statements (or the claim that there 
exists n material bodies within a given region of space over a given 
interval of time) reveals a formal relationship to the purely temporal 
expression T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,,, w A m=m'54 (Section 4). 
2. Such an expression may be directly interpreted in terms of the analysis of 
purely temporal re-identification statements and their associated 
expression of purely temporal continuity T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,,., -), m=m' 
(Section 1). 
3. The purely temporal continuity expression T(m)=T(m')+dTm",,, -* m=m' 
pertains to a continuity which exhibits properties notably similar to the 
properties of the temporality of consciousness (Section 7). 
if it is these claims themselves which are to be consolidated within a 
philosophical speculation (or consolidated within some wider context of our 
understanding of the world, or of ourselves, or of our knowledge), then I am 
53 As I have already stated, it is my belief that there exists no rigorous route for progressing from 
analysis to philosophy. The 'philosophical speculation' which I present in this section is 
therefore merely an example of the type of philosophical problems which must be 
accommodated and overcome in order to establish my analytical claims within a wider 
philosophical context, I make no claims as to this 'philosophical speculation' being a self- 
contained philosophical argument; merely a demonstration of the way in which my analytical 
claims may be seen to both bound and limit the nature of our speculations themselves. 
54 It should be remembered that in Section II take Lockean Cardinality statements to be 
numerically quantifiable derivatives of the more informal claim that the world is one of material 
bodies moving about in space and time. 
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interested in identifying at least one philosophical system within which (a) the 
temporality of consciousness has about it the nature of a persistence [since the 
expression T(m)=T(m')+dTm,. ý -> m=m' itself implies a description of time in 
ten-ns of the persistence of entities through it], and (b), where there is some clear 
relationship between this 'persistence', on the one hand, and our understanding 
that the world is composed of material bodies in space and time on the other. 
My choice of the %vork- of Mitchell for this purpose arises (as ive shall shortly 
see) not simply because his work relates a temporally persistent view of 
consciousness to our understanding of physical systems, but because his work 
will also allow us to accommodate another topic discussed within this current 
work, namely; 
4. That numerical identity, diversity and re-identification are not observable 
properties. 
In other words, Mitchell will present us with an example of a philosophical 
system (a wider philosophical context) within which we sball be able to 
accommodate each of the points I to 4 above. 
Given my objectives for this section (that of demonstrating how my analytical 
claims may be accommodated within a wider philosophical context) I have no 
need to progress beyond the claims of Mitchell himself - for while there may be 
limitations to, and inconsistencies within, Mitchell's claims, it is not the 
intention of this section to propose a definitive philosophical argument (that is 
best left to the philosophers themselves). However, as we shall discover, 
Mitchell treats persistence as a primitive property of the temporality of 
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consciousness (or as just one of many properties of consciousness which lay 
beyond further analysis - 'consciousness' itself begin some undefined thing in 
itself which can possess properties such as temporal persistence). As it turns out, 
this view presents a number of technical problems which, in the end will lead us 
away from Mitchell's arguments upon the basis of contradiction. 
Thus even though it is not my aim here to present a purely philosophical 
argument (but merely to demonstrate how my analytical claims may be 
accommodated within a wider philosophical context) I would have failed in my 
objective if the philosophical context within which my analytical claims are 
accommodated is itself inconsistent. 
My solution to this problem is to move from Mitchell (maintaining what is 
useful in his claims) to Bergson - whose philosophy will more consistently 
accommodate the claims I to 4 above. However, in moving to the philosophical 
ideas of Bergson we depart radically from the philosophical context of the work 
of Mitchell. Most importantly, Bergson does not treat the temporality of 
consciousness as merely a property of consciousness ('consciousness' itself 
being a thing which may possess properties like temporality), instead, Bergson 
treats consciousness as identical with temporality. For Bergson, consciousness 
is time (in a rather specific sense). Not only does Bergson differ from Mitchell 
in this respect, but he also differs on the nature of time itself While Bergsonian 
philosophy does indeed allow of a description of time in terms of persistence 
[and thus in terms within which we may accommodate the purely temporal 
expressions T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,,, --> m=m'and T(m)=T(m')+dT ....... Am=m'] he 
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also introduces the idea of "real duration" and claims this to be more primitive. 
In Bergsonian terms then, not only is consciousness to be identified Nvith 
temporality, but temporality may have a description in terms other than that of a 
cpersistence'. 
It might seem then that Bergson is a rather unpromising example to pick for the 
purposes of this current section. After all, Bergson's "real duration" cannot 
itself be interpreted in terms of those purely temporal expressions which have 
concerned me up to now in this thesis (since it is not of the nature of a 
persistence). However, Bergson introduces us to a rather useful distinction 
between what he calls "intuition" and "intellect". For Bergson, the "intellect" is 
basically our "comprehension of matter" (or to use an expression of Russell's: 
the power of "separating one thing from another"). On the face of it then, 
Bergson's definition of the "intellect" is the perfect place to look for an 
interpretation of Locke's principles (by which one thing is numerically 
distinguished from another) and their application in Lockean Cardinality 
statements. The problem is that Bergson's definition of the "intuition" is one of 
an immediate awareness of our own "real duration" (which is not of the nature 
of a persistence). Thus while Bergson's definition of the "intellect" provides a 
perfect point for discussing Lockean cardinality statements, his definition of the 
"intuition" will not subject itself to an interpretation in terms of the purely 
temporal expressions T(rn)=T(rn')+dTn,. --> m=rn' and T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,, - A 
m=m'. My argument, however, will be that if we can formulate Lockean 
Cardinality Statements via the "intellect" (our "comprehension of matter"), and 
if such Lockean Cardinality Statements reveal a relationship to the purely 
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temporal expressions T(m)=T(m')+dTmj., -> m=m'and T(m)=T(m)+dT,,,,,, A 
m=m', then there must (within the Bergsonian context) be a description of time 
via the "intellea" which (unlike the "intuition") has about it the nature of a 
persistence. In other Nvords, if consciousness is time (according to Bergson), 
then there are equally both two types of time and two types of consciousness - 
"real duration" on the one hand and persistence on the other - or at least two 
different Nvays of describing the same thing (one through the "intuition" and one 
through the "intellect")55 
I should re-iterate, however, that whatever the reader's opinion about the 
philosophy of Bergson, it is the intention of this section, not necessarily to 
promote a Bergsonian view, but to demonstrate the tylvs of problems which we 
may need to overcome in placing my analytical claims within any wider 
philosophical context. 
8.2 Philosophical Conted. 
This conception [of Bergson's] of the simultaneous growth of 
matter and intellect is ingenious, and deserves to be understood. 
Broadly, I think what is meant is this: 1ntellect is the power of 
seeing things as separate one from another, and matter is that 
which is separated into distinct things. In reality there are no 
separate solid things, only an endless stream ofbecoming, in which 
nothing becomes and there is nothing that this nothing becomes. 
Bertrand Russell 1946. 
55 We raight say (or so 1, at least, would argue) that Bergson is committed to a kind of second 
order perception (a perception of persistence via the "intellect') of a passage of a first order 
("real &irafioti'). 
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In being concerned with phenomenological time, or time as experienced 
consciousness, we are presented at first with a choice regarding the nature of the 
relationship between consciousness and its temporality. Is temporality a 
property of consciousness or is temporality consciousness itself? Is the 'feeling' 
of time passing sometime which consciousness facilitates or is this 'feeling of 
time passing' consciousness itself? In adopting here a Bergsonian philosophical 
context it is the latter of these options to which we must subscribe. For while an 
intimate association between time and mind has a heritage going back as far as 
Augustine, who describes time as "affections of the mind' (Confessions, 
11.27.36), and Kant, who argued that time is a [form of] "internal sense" (Kant 
1781 - Politis 1997 p56), it is not until Bergson (1859-1941) that we find a 
more explicit identification between time and consciousness itself, "When we 
consider a living being, however, wefind that time is the very essence of its life, 
the whole meaning of its reality. " (Wildon-Carr 1911 p 17). Thus while both 
Augustine and Kant would have us remove time from its traditional role as a 
property of the world and place it instead clearly within the properties of the 
mind - as though the temporality of consciousness were, as Lockwood puts it, 
"a kind ofparadigm of temporal relatedness, which we then extend to the world 
at large" (Lockwood 1989) - Bergson would have it that time exists within the 
world as manifested in life; or that life is time (or "real duration"; the durie) 
and that the awareness or intuition of life (consciousness) is the awareness or 
intuition of this real duration: "The principle then of this philosophy is that 
reality is time, that it can oidy be expressed in terms of time, that there is no 
stuff more resistant nor more substantial than time, that it is the very stuff of 
which life and consciousness are made. " (Wildon-Carr 1911 p76). Thus within 
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this context I may unashamedly identify consciousness Nvith "real duration-56 , 
or to put it in more contemporary terrns; phenomenological time is not a 
property of consciousness but is consciousness itself 
It is Bergson then, more than any other philosopher perhaps, Nvho takes 'real 
duration' seriously; to the extent that the idea of time as an objective 
quantifiable phenomenon, such as that envisaged by Newton (or time in which 
measurements may be made by setting temporal states side by side in 
juxtaposition so that they may be counted) is rejected upon the grounds that it 
"surreptitiously brings in the idea ofspace" (Bergson 1910 p85) and thus 'fiails 
to capture time's true essence". (Bergson 1922, Ed. Durie R, 1999 vi). 
Phenomenological time, or time as experienced by consciousness, Bergson 
argues, is best characterised by what he refers to as a "multiplicity of 
interpenetration", or as Durie puts it; "Pure duration .. is encountered when 
consciousness refrains from separating its current state from previous states, 
ftom t7ying to setpsychic states alongside one anoth&" (Durie R, 1999 vi). 
The context of Bergson's extraordinary claims as to the distinctions between 
time and space lies in his attempts to validate the reality of human free will from 
an analysis of our immediate experience of time (Bergson 1910). More 
specifically, in order to validate the reality of human free Nvill, Bergson 
subscribes to a dualism between this "inner experience of time" ("real 
duration", the durie) and space outside (Bergson 1910). Most importantly, Bergson 
" More specifically, Bergson would claim that "trzie duration is 101olvil to us by direct inner 
perceiving, cui intuition ... And the inie duration uhich we kiow when we have this intuition is life" (Wildon-Carr 1911 p 21). 
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argues that real duration is qualitative and heterogeneous with "no hint of predictability 
or linear determinism" (Mullarky 1999, p9), whereas space is quantitative, 
homogeneous and static. It is therefore in the scientific description of time (where the 
similarities between time and space are most importantly highlighted) that Bergson 
would argue that the concepts of space are surreptitiously brought into the concept of 
time (or the scientific description thereof). It is the description of 'space-like' scientific 
time that involves the "elimination of real change" (Robinet 1972). 
After Einstein, of course, some such distinction between 'measured time' and 
'real duration' is necessary if we are maintain the special status of the 
temporality of consciousness, or to single it out (as I intend to do) as being of 
special relevance to the description of the mind. If time is forever left to refer 
exclusively to the 'measured time' of the physicist then the Theory of Special 
Relativity makes a nonsense of Ryle's cbaracterisation (and derision) of the 
doctrine of Cartesianism and thus a nonsense of applying any particular 
significance to the temporality of consciousness in the description of the mind. 
More commonly, however, many contemporary philosophers simply choose to 
avoid the subject of temporality altogether; as, for example, in Searle's 
characteristically honest claim that "Two subjects are crucial to consciousness, 
but I will have little to say about them because I do not yet understand them 
well enough. The first is temporalily ...... and later that; "Notoriously, 
phenomenological time does not exactly match real time, but I do not know how 
to accountfor the systematic character ofthese disparities" (Searle 1994 p127). 
Yet Searle is nonetheless right to claim that temporality is "crucial to 
consciousness", and equally right to mirror Bergson in distinguishing 
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phenomenological time from what he calls "real time"; for if Bergson is correct, 
then the temporality is not merely a feature of consciousness (to be lumped 
together with other features such as its subjectivity, intentionality and physical 
efficacy); it is consciousness itself57 
While Bergson Nvill therefore largely define the philosophical context of this 
work, or account (in part at least) for my insistence upon addressing the topic of 
consciousness via its temporal phenomenology (its 'real duration'), I shall 
equally exploit other aspects of Bergsonian philosophy within my methods. 
Most importantly, as outlined above, I shall exploit that aspect of Bergson's 
distinction between "intuition" and "intellect" which may be captured in the 
claim ". .. true duration is known to us by direct inner perceiving, an intuition, 
and not by an intellectual act such as that by which we perceive the objects 
around us and the laws of their successive states" (Wildon-Carr 1911 p 21). 
While this is, of course, partial support for the special status of "real duration" 
in the description of consciousness, it is also, and more importantly, a 
distinction between our knowledge of that which we essentially are ("real 
duration") and that which we consider the physical world to be ("the objects 
around us and the laws of their successive states") - this being, as much as 
57 This much may itself be evident from the central role that we might expect temporality to 
play in an understanding of the phenomenological nature of consciousness. For example, when 
Nagel suggests that we cannot know "what it is like to be a bat' (Nagel 1975), he is no doubt 
largely correct - or correct in the proposition that one conscious individual may not directly 
know the phenomenology, or the "what-its-like-nessý', of another. However, if bats are indeed 
conscious (and I have no reason to assume that they are not) then they have at least this in 
common with ourselves; their intuition of life is equally Bergson's 'real duration'. To perceive 
by the en-dssion and detection of high frequency sound (as Nagel puts it: "7heir brains are 
designed to correlate the outgoing impulses with the subsequent [my emphasis] echoes, . . ") is itself indicative of a process of perception which is dependent upon 'real duration' - unless, that 
is, we are willing to admit that for the bat, unlike ourselves, what is "subsequent" is subsequent 
in 'measured time' and thus abandon any hope of unifying bat consciousness and human 
consciousness under any common understanding. 
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anything perhaps, the true concern of this current section. More accurately, I 
shall pursue the suggestion that -%vhat Bergson refers to here as "an intellectual 
act ... by which we perceive the objects around us and the laws of their 
successive states" is in fact an act of personification (for Nvant of a better Nvord), 
or is an application of a Bergsonian intuition (a "direct inner perceiving", or the 
direct inner perceiving of our own "true duration") to the representation of our 
experiences. 
This step requires, however, that we should firstlY turn from Bergson to his 
contemporary Mitchell for a description of the individuation of those objects 
which we perceive around us. For Mitchell (whose book "The Structure and 
Growth of the Mind" was published in the same year, 1907, as Bergson's 
"Creative Evolution") informs us that the individuality of a material body 
(indeed any entity) "is borrowed from our own" (Mitchell 1907, pp154-5). 
Mitchell therefore provides for us a mechanism of representation via 
personification; a familiarity with the world or a 'fellow feeling" towards it 
(Mitchell 1907 pp 146-163). The individuation of the world around us, its 
division into those "objects around us and the laws of their successive states" - 
our knowledge of which Bergson separates from the "intuition" of our own 
"real duration" - therefore results from the imposition of our own individuality 
upon it or the recognition of our own individuality within it. 
It is with the consolidation of Bergson's identification of the significance of 
'real duration' (in the description of life and our awareness of it - 
consciousness) and Nlitchell's identification of personification, or 'ye-Ilow 
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feeling", in the processes of individuation that the concerns of this section lie; 
for I shall demonstrate that Mitchell's claim is itself intimately related to, and 
indeed dependent upon, both Bergson's interpretation of time and his distinction 
between the intuition and the "intellect". 
8.3 Mitchell's Personifying Claim. 
In attempting to account for our formulation and application of Locke's 
principles (within our 'inclinations to individuate'), and in attempting to account 
for those fonnal properties of Lockean cardinality revealed in section 4, and in 
attempting to accommodate within this account my claim that identity and 
diversity are not observable properties (section 2), 1 adopt at first the 
personifying claims of Mitchell, namely; that "Our thoughts of an object must 
consist entirely of what we have experienced, and merely for that reason we 
may be said to read nothing into these things except ourselves, meaning by 
ourselves our experience present andpast. In this sense we read ourselves into 
the ultimate properties of matter; into those, namely, by which we accountfor 
the change andpermanence of things" (Mitchell 1907, p152) . That this claim 
extends even to the identity or individuality of objects themselves is evident in 
the later quotation: - "A tune, a shape, a movement, a thing, a group of things, 
may seem to need no constructingfor our apprehending them. But they do; they 
need construction as mere sensations, andfurther constructing as objects of 
thought. Both constructions imply our individuality, and the individuality that 
we ascribe to the objects as real is horrowedfrom our own" (Mitchell 1907, 
p155). 
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The attraction of this claim, of course, lies in its ability to accommodate the fact 
that the numerical identity, or individuality, of a material body is not itself 
observable (or that mere sensation may not reveal to us the identities of external 
things - Sections 2). In Mitchell's claim the individuality of an object is 
"borrowedfroin our own", or has an "individualhy' like our own imposed upon 
it. Mitchell's claim does not require that the identity of a thing must be made 
available to us via experience and thus provides for us an explanation of the 
very origin of individuation itself Individuation is, if you like, simply the 
projection of our oxvn "individua1hy' (or, more accurately, the properties of this 
"individualhy') upon the world in our attempts to represent it. In Mitchell's 
claim the individuality of a material body presupposes our own. 
Yet we cannot consider Mitchell's claim ftilly, nor can we even begin to accept 
it as a theory of individuation, until ive have understood something of what he 
intends by the term "individuafiljP; for while he avoids any explicit definition of 
this term he clearly identifies this "individuafiV' with our own predominantly 
temporal character: "Our sensations occupy time, and there is usually, if not 
always, some sense of their duration and the order of their coming; and to feel 
continuity or an order of sensations we must be the same throughout the 
change" ( Mitchell 1907 p 155). It would therefore seem that Mitchell at first 
locates our own "individuali4? ' within the nature of our own temporal 
persistence. If to be individual, or to be possessed of an individuality or identity, 
can mean little more (perhaps) than the ability to enter as a subject into 
relationships of identity and diversity, then to remain unchanged, or the "same 
throughout the change", implies the necessary re-identification of that which 
remains permanent. It would seem then that the very notion of persistence (or 
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permanence with respect to change) must itself imply some notion of continuant 
identity (the ability to re-identify that which persists with itself) and thus, in the 
loosest sense, some form of "individualhy'58. If then individuality, or the sense 
in which something is the same, is (for Mitchell) to be "the saine throughout the 
clwnge", then Mitchell characterises our own "individuafiV' in terms of our 
own temporal persistence - we are, if you like, that unavoidable sense of 
permanence which must seemingly accompany any perception of change. We 
are that which persists, or that which persists unchanged throughout change 59 . 
While this notion of our 'persistence' (and its relation to our "individuafiv') 
stands patently in contradiction to the overriding Bergsonian tones of this 
current section (as discussed in Section 8.1), we should nonetheless be clear on 
the indispensability of this idea in any attempt to consolidate Mitchell's claim 
with the formal properties of Lockean cardinality outlined in the previous 
sections. 
That Mitchell's claim (when thus formulated) is itself consistent with the 
formulation and application of Locke's principles, and indeed goes some way to 
explaining them, can be justified by noting that this idea of our persistence (and 
thus our "individualhy') lends itself to a description in terms of temporal re- 
identification. For example, persistence between the times TI and T2 
(corresponding to some awareness of change perhaps) would then seem to 
58 The question of whether either of these notions, 'persistence' or 'individuality', may be truly 
said to presuppose the other, or whether they must equally presuppose each other and therefore 
in some sense are two descriptions of the same thing, shall not be pursued here. 
59 1 shall discuss this characterisation, of change further in the following sub-section. 
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imply that there is something, 'a' say, which is associated Nvith TI, and 
something, V say, which is associated with T2, and that a--b (although of 
course in this case, or in the case of our own perceived persistence, we may find 
it extremely difficult to say what it is that 'a' and V refer to). In terms of my 
previous terminology of temporary names we can express this idea of 
persistence as the conjunction of a temporal and an identity condition T(a)--; &T(b) 
A a=b, i. e. the conjunction of a temporal interval and an identity with no 
necessary reference to spatial terms. It is then a small step to argue that for the 
persistence T(a)=T(b)+ 5T,,, b A a--b over a small but finite temporal interval 
8T., b Nve require recourse to an infinitesimal to avoid an infinite regress (as 
discussed in section 3 and Appendix 1) and thus arrive at the description of 
persistence captured in a conjunction of the form: T(m)=T(m')+ dTmm. A m7--m'. 
If then the Necessary and Sufficient formulation of Lockean Cardinality 
statements demands only that we reference a conjunction of the form: 
T(m)=T(m')+ dT,,,,,., A m=m' (Section 4), then NEtchell's claim is fully 
consistent Nvith the formal properties of the identity and diversity of material 
bodieS60. Put simply, any theory of individuation which is consistent with the 
formal properties of Lockean cardinality outlined in the previous section must, 
as a minimum requirement, account for the occurrence of conjunctions of the 
form T(m)=T(m')+ dT,,.,., A m=m. Mitchell's claim accounts for this 
60 We might note, however, that while Mtchell obviously intends to suggest that our persistence 
is temporal, there is nothing in this justification of Nfitchell's claim which insists that this should 
be so. If my claim of consistency is based upon the identification, within NEtchell's claim, of 
conjunctions of the form T(m)=T(m')+ dT,,,,, A M=M', then -we may equally satisfy this 
condition with the claim that we are ourselves material bodies which "persisP through time (i. e. 
that we are bodies whose continuity condition is captured in: P(m)=P(m')+dP ...... /\ 
T(m)=T(m')+ dT., m. A m=m' ). An exclusively temporal solution to Mtchell's claim, and one 
which will place his claim clearly within the topic of consciousness, will require an 
interpretation in relation to Bergson's concept of duration (as will be discussed shortly). 
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con unction, not in the claim that the identities of material bodies are "borrowed j 
ftom our own" (-vvhich merely accommodates the non-observable nature of 
material individuality), but in his characterisation of our own "individuafioP in 
terms of temporal persistence - the characterisation of ourselves as entities 
which persist unchanged through those changes of which we are aware. Thus 
Mitchell's characterisation of our "individualiV' in terms of our "persistence" 
would seem to be a necessary requirement for the validation of his claim with 
respect to the formal properties of Lockean Cardinality identified in the 
previous section. 
In Nfitchell's claim then, the familiar formulation of the continuous form of 
Locke's principles (LP. Ib and LP. 2b) become: 
T(m)=T(m')+ dT.,,., A m=m' 
A 
P(a)=P(b)+ dP,,, b A T(a)=T(m) A T(b)=T(m') --> a=b 
and 
T(m)=T(m')+ dT,,,,,., A m=m' 
A 
P(a)-tP(b)+ dPa, b A T(a)=T(m) A T(b)=T(m') -> a: 71-b 
where the continuity expressed in the conjunction T(m)=T(m')+ dT,, ..... A m=m' 
is in some way related to our own perceived temporal continuity. 
8.4 Mitchell and Bergson. 
Mitchell's claim has much to recommend it. Not only may it accommodate the 
fact that the identity of a material body is unobservable (or that mere sensation 
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may not reveal to us the identities of external things) but it also presents us Nvith 
a theory of individuation which is demonstrably consistent with the formal 
analysis of Lockean cardinality statements - insomuch as Mitchell locates our 
own "individua1hy' within the nature of our own temporal persistence. 
However, as soon %ve start to examine Mitchell's claim more critically we 
discover that its structure is somewhat more complicated and indicative of a 
subtle assumption which will, ultimately, lead us back to Bergson. 
To claim, as Nfitchell does, that the "individua1hy' of a extemal object is 
"horrowedfrom our own", must require that we may become aware of some 
element of experience (or feel some 'Yellowfeefing" towards it) which, once an 
"individuafiV' like our own is imposed upon it, has the character of persistence 
(like our own) - i. e. the character of permanence Nvith respect to change. For if 
our own "individuafiV' lies in the nature of our persistence, then what other 
than the persistence of the permanent may result from the imposition of this 
"individualiV' upon experience? If it were not persistence of the pennanent 
which resulted from this process, then how could Mitchell claim that 
individuality is "horrowedfrom our own". Thus if we are to support Mitchell's 
claim, then we must assume that experience may no more reveal to us the 
persistence of external things than it may reveal to us their individualities - for if 
persistence could be revealed to us via experience then so also could that which 
persists (and there would be no need for Mitchell7s claim in the first place). 
Mitchell's claim therefore actually requires that there is something within 
experience which, for want of a better phrase, we might call 'persistence 
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without the persistent pennanent', or 'endurance without that which endures' 
onto which our own "individualijy' may be imposed - or something which, 
when our own "individualiV' (the nature of our own persistence) is imposed 
upon it, becomes to us a persisting thing - as a chair, or a tea cup, or a tree, may 
become a persisting thing in our representation of it. 61 Nonetheless, to adopt 
Mitchell's claim we require also that there is something about this mysterious 
persistence without the persistent permanent, or endurance without that which 
endures with respect to which we can experience a 'fiellow feeling" - some 
aspect which is like ourselves, or sufficiently familiar to draw our attention to it. 
And while we may arbitrarily invent words for this element of experience, and 
while we may well speculate upon its origin, we need in fact look no further 
than Bergson for its description - for it is already what Bergson describes as 
"real duration". Bergson claims that Nve (or our conscious selves) are not things 
which persist unchanged through time, we are time itself (as I shall consider in 
more detail in the following section). Thus even in this simple reading of 
Mitchell we are draw inexorably towards Bergson's conception of change, or 
more accurately, are drawn to contrast and consolidate these respective and 
seemingly contradictory notions of change in a single understanding of the 
processes of individuation. 
61 The expressions "persistence without the persistent permanent" and "endurance without that which 
endur&' are treated here as largely informal expressions which arise from the recognition that 
Mitchell's claim suffers from an unavoidable denial that experience may reveal persistence to us. That I 
should then go on to interpret these informal expressions in terms of Bergson's real duration (the dur6e) 
is a methodological step on my part by which I shall shift my concerns from Mitchell to Bergson. 
These informal expressions are not Bergsonian terms, and indeed are expressions to which Bergsonian 
philosophers may well take exception. Nonetheless, and regardless of whether these expressions have 
any real meaning, they capture the consequences of the analysis of Nfitchell's claim (the denial that 
experience may present persistence to us), and having captured these consequences they lead us to ask 
if such a description of change has any heritage within philosophy - and having asked this question we 
arrive, almost inevitably I would suggest, at Bergson. 
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8.5 Bergson and Change. 
Disputes over the nature of change are, of course as old as Philosophy itself 
Heraclitus (c. 500 BC), for example, argued that "everything is in a state offlux; 
there is no real Permanence in things" (Thilly 1914, p 15) -a position denied by 
The EleatiCS62 who considered change to be inconceivable; "a thing cannot 
become something other than itseý(, whatever is, must remain what it is; 
permanence, not change, is the significant characteristic of realijy' (Thilly 
1914, p15). Resolution of these opposing ideas comes at first from Empedocles 
(c. 495435 BC) who agees with the Eleatics that absolute pbange is impossible 
but holds Nvith Heraclitus that change does occur, namely; in the form of the 
rearrangement of "permanent unchanging elements". It is then in Empedocles; 
and the Atomists that the idea of the persistence of the permanent through 
change at first appears within Western Philosophy; and although not universally 
adopted, has become a dominant position. For example Kant claims that "In all 
changes of appearance, substance is permanent and the quantum thereof in 
Nature is neither increased nor diminished' (Politis 1997 p 168), or "only the 
permanent can change" (Joseph 1970, pl 3). 
There is then something fundamental in this idea, which Mitchell adopts, that 
change involves the persistence of the permanent. Indeed Joseph claims that this 
concept of change is a consequence of the more fundamental law of Identity 
62 The 'Eleatics' take their name from the town of Elea in southern italy and include within their 
number Xenophanes (c. 560-470 BC), Paramenides (c. 480 BC) and of course Zeno (c. 470 BC) 
whose paradoxes of motion we have already considered. 
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(one of the "Laws of Thoughe 763); "It is because what is must be determinately 
what it is ... This is why wefind a difficulty in admitting the reality of ultimate 
change, change where nothing remains the same; for then we cannot say what it 
is which changes" (Joseph 1970, p13). I do not therefore Nvish to dismiss this 
idea of change; for in dismissing it I would abandon, not only the demonstrable 
consistency between Mitchell's claim and my previous analysis of Lockean 
cardinality, but also an element of our understanding of ourselves which seems, 
if not altogether undeniable, then at least extremely familiar. 
Even in adopting this pragmatic position, however, we may still discern 
problems with consolidating Mitchell's major claim (that the individuality of an 
extemal thing is "borrowed from our own") vAth his adopted position on 
change. If the identity of an object is "borrowedfrom our own", then the very 
concept of diversity (as the not-sameness of two objects - or a relationship 
between two things whose identities are each known to us) cannot enter into our 
comprehension of the world until we have imposed our own "individuafioP (or 
the nature of our own "individuafiV') upon those objects which we ourselves 
have individuated; for how might we comprehend the idea of diversity if the 
only entity which we have perceived is that embraced by our own 
"individuafiV'. Wherein then lies our understanding of that diversity within 
change with respect to which we are supposed to persist? Surely the idea that we 
are 'things' which persist through change implies that change may itself be 
characterised, and how else might we characterise change (as distinct from our 
63 Normally taken to be general principles exemplified in all thinking and comprising of Yhe 
Law ofIdentily ('what ever is, is'), The Law of Contradiction ('a thing cannot be and not be so') 
and Me Law qf&cludedMiddle ('a thing either is or is not so'). 
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own permanence) than via terms of diversity? Mitchell's claim might therefore 
appear to become somewhat contradictory if we allow both that the 
individual iti es. of objects are "borrowed ftom our own" and that our own 
"individualiV' is a 'thing' which persists through change. 
Now this may, of course, be too strong a criticism of Mitchell. It may perhaps 
be the case that we can characterise change without recourse to a fully fledged 
notion of diversi . However, the idea of permanence with respect to change 
would still seem to be dependent upon some notion of diversity embedded, as it 
were, within our very perception of persistence itself If nothing else, that 
which persists unchanged must seemingly be diverse (different from) change 
itself But these are perhaps problems which I have little hope of solving here. 
In Bergson, however, we find a radically different description of change. For 
Bergson claims that reality is first and foremost time (a constant becoming) and 
denies a reality of timeless things persisting through change (and thus echoes, 
perhaps, the earlier opinions of Heraclitus). We are not then, according to 
Bergson, permanent 'things' which persist unchanged through change, we are 
change itself. Furthermore,, surely this Bergsonian view is less paradoxical than 
Mitchell's adopted idea of change; for we no longer need to argue that the ideas 
of identity and diversity precede it. Surely the whole point of Bergson's 
"multiplicity of interpenetration" is that, while employing the language of 
diversity, it denies the role of individuation and diversity within the intuition of 
our duration? As Russell puts it (in his description of Bergson's concept of 'real 
64 One in which diversity is a relationship between entities whose identity are known to us, or 
supposed by us. 
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duration'): "Itforms the past andpresent into one organic whole, where there is 
mutual penetration, succession without distinction" (Russell 1946 p759) In our 
appreciation of a musical tune, for example, we do not individuate its notes in 
time but allow them to coincide without diversity; to form, as it were, a single 
intuition of duration. Perhaps I am guilty of personalising my argument, but it 
seems to me that at any given time (or any instant in the measured time of the 
physicist) that I am enjoying a tune, it is not memory which relates the past to 
the present (in the sense that I may remember my first day at school, or my first 
kiss) but simply the feeling of the past still bearing upon the present - as though 
the immediate past (the preceding notes of the tune) were still tangible to me; 
still within the grasp of my immediate perception. In appreciating music we (in 
effect) de-individuated events in the immediate past and immediate future and 
refuse to distinguish them in time (refused to perceive their diversity in time). 
Our "real duration" is one in which the immediate past, the present and the 
immediate future collapse into the enduring instant free of the individuations of 
reflective analysis - and thus by our "duration" we must mean something other 
than our "persistences"; for whereas our "persistence" entails identity and 
diversity, our "duration" does not. Try to listen to a tune and individuate its 
notes, or assign each to a time and recognise the diversity between these 
individuated times. It can be done, of course, but in so doing all pleasure and 
feeling in the tune Nvill be lost. The very act of individuating its notes and 
attending to their diversity in time is enough to distract us from an appreciation 
of its musical character - the "intuition of life" (which we feel each time we lay 
back and let the tune flow over us) is fragmented by individuation and diversity 
and dies Nvith them. 
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But if, as Bergson argues, we do not persist through time (as permanent things) 
but are time itself, and if (as I argue) "real duration" does not presuppose the 
relationships of identity and diversity, then why do we seem to have both the 
intuition of our own duration (as, %vhen we may appreciate a musical tune) and 
the idea of our own individuality (as something persisting unchanged through 
change)? Why is the image of ourselves as something persisting unchanged 
through time so attractive when we may so readily de-individuate our 
perceptions of time itself (and let the past, the present, and the future melt, un- 
individuated as it were, into the single enduring instant)? Why do we have both 
the perception of our "real duration" and the perception of our persistence when 
each is the antithesis of the other - for we cannot persist through that which is 
not itself diverse. 
The answer to this question, I would suggest, is that our "individualhY' and our 
"real duration" are merely two terms for one and the same thing -Vuration" 
being that name which we give to an intuition (the irreducible intuition of our 
own "real duration") and "individuality' being that name which we give to this 
intuition when viewed via the intellect, i. e. when it stands in relation to other 
distinguishable durations (or other distinguishable durations within our 
comprehension of matter) - and just as a tune may be appreciated without any 
effort but becomes something else when we try to individuate and distinguish its 
notes, so the nature of our 'real duration' (our "intuition of life") becomes 
something else when Nve construct about it relationships of identity and diversity 
- or when we notice its diversity from other durations within our 
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comprehension of matter. It is our comprehension of matter (the "intellece'), 
that crude awakening from the innocent state of our 'real duration', which 
accounts for our "individualijy' and our persistence. 
Joseph may himself be a guide to us in this matter. The Laws of Thought, which 
he argues are the basis for our inability to admit to ultimate change, are 
themselves an aspect of Bergson's conception of the intellect (whose role it is to 
"comprehend matter"); ". . if we think about anYthing, then (1) we must think 
that it is what it is; (2) we cannot think that it at once has a character and has it 
not; (3) we must think that it either has it or has not it not" (Joseph 1970, p13). 
Surely these "anythings" to which the Laws of Thought apply are first and 
foremost objects of the "intellect" (our "comprehension of matter") and only as 
an afterthought perhaps, and only then when fully developed, projected back 
upon the qualities of ourselves as made apparent in the intuition (the intuition of 
our 'real duration) 
Thus Mitchell's adopted potion on persistence (that it is the persistence of the 
permanent through change) survives within this Bergsonian interpretation - it 
has simply moved from the "intuition" to the "intellect"; the view of ourselves 
as things which persist through time is a view which exists only in relation to 
our comprehension of matter (before we comprehend matter we are nothing but 
"real duration"). And surely we have gained something beneficial to Mitchell's 
claim from this shift; for we need no longer assume that our appreciation of 
"individuafiV' and diversity spring, fully formed as it were, from the 
perception of our own persistence. Our own individuality is as much a product 
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of the "intellect" (our "comprehension of matter") as are the individualities of 
those objects which we perceive around us. Equally, we have moved from a 
mechanistic description of individuation (one which assumes the a priori 
appreciation of identity and diversity) to a more evolutionary or developmental 
description. For in having the intuition of our own "real duration" we may be 
drawn to similar durations within experience (we experience a 'fiellow feeling" 
towards them) and thus must unavoidably recognise our distinction from it - and 
thus make available to ourselves both the idea of our own individuality and its 
diversity from other persistence. In short, our ideas of identity and diversity 
arise, not from an a priori intuition of our own persistence but from that process 
by which we impose the nature of our own duration upon experience, or 
recognise our own nature within it. Of course this is not a simple mechanism. 
As the intellect slowly forms (as we grow to comprehend matter) the feeling of 
our own individuality will grow also (fuelled by the increasing appreciation of 
its diversity from other durations) and will then be echoed back ever more 
rigorously upon those durations which we recognise within experience until we 
find ourselves unavoidably an individual within a world of individuals (and our 
duration has become our persistence). Thus Mitchell is right in claiming that the 
identity of a material body is "borrowedfrom our own" but is wrong, in my 
opinion, in assuming that our own "individualiV' springs fully formed from the 
prior perception of our own persistence. Our persistence (as unchanging things 
through change), and those relationships of identity and diversity which 
characterise this 'persistence", arise only within our comprehension of matter. 
When we forget this 'comprehension' (as when we refuse to individuate the 
notes of a musical tune in time) we revert to our un-individuated selves; we 
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cease to persist through time but become time itself We are in part persistence; 
for we may perceive ourselves to persist unchanged in relation to those objects 
which we ourselves have individuated in our comprehension of matter, and in 
part 'real duration'; for we may forget our comprehension of matter and neglect 
to individuate events in time (as when we appreciate a musical tune). Thus we 
do not need to argue that there is some 'self', or some entity, which must persist 
as the same thing throughout our life or any part of it. Our persistence is not 
continuous but is punctuated by our 'real durations'. We exist, if you like, in 
two states (the transitions between which are natural and unproblematic). The 
first is a state of persistence which we perceive via the "intellect" and which 
exists in relation to our comprehension of matter. The second is a state of "real 
duration" which we perceive directly via the "intuition" (or Bergson's 
conception there of) when we refuse or neglect to individuate events in time. 
Neither is more characteristic of ourselves than the other. 
Thus we arrive at a philosophical context (that of Bergson's) within which the 
four points (I to 4) with which I began this section may be consolidated. A 
notion of consciousness as persistence [T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,, m, -> m=m'] survives 
within this Bergsonian scheme, and survives within the "intellect". It is within 
the "intellect" that we also find our comprehension of matter and thus the 
formulation of Lockean. cardinality statements whose description may be 
captured in the necessary and sufficient fonn: 
Ol/ T(m)=T(m')+dT.,,,, A m=m' 
al/ P(al)=P(al')+dP,, I, al'A [T(al)= T(m) A T(al')=T(m')]-> al=al' 
bl/ P(a2)=P(a2')+dPa2, a2, A [T(a2)= T(m) A T(a2')=T(m')]-> a2=a2' 
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cl/ P(an)=P(an)+dP,,,, a,, - A [T(an)= T(m) A T(an')=T(m')]--> an--an' 
dl/ P(al)#P(a2') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a2')=T(m')]--> al#a2' 
el/ P(al)#P(aY) A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a3')-=T(m')]-> al: #a3' 
fl/ P(an-l):;, -LP(an') A [T(an)=T(m) A T(an)=T(m')]-> an-l#an' 
Thus it is persistence, or our own persistence [T(m)=T(m')+dTn,, m, -> 
which serves here for 0/ and which enables us to formulate such statements - or 
which enables us to 'see' the world in terms of material bodies in space and 
time and act (and act successfully) accordingly. And yet the numerical identity 
of material bodies need not be observable within this scheme, nor need our own 
individuality be presupposed from theirs. Both our own individuality and the 
identities of material bodies which are "borrowed' from it arise simultaneously 
within the formation of the "intellect". It is in that very process by which we 
come to "comprehend matter" (the process by which we come to separate one 
thing from another) that we come to 'see' ourselves as individuated and to 
persist (as the same thing) through time. 
It is not, however, my intention to defend this view as a self-contained philosophical argument. 
It has simply served to highlight the types of issues which we shall need to address in attempting 
to accommodate the analytical aspects of this work with any wider philosophical context (and 
no doubt there may be many such contexis with respect to which these analytical aspects may be 
accommodated). Thus while there is no clear route from the analytical aspects of this thesis to 
purely philosophical issues, we can clearly see that these analytical aspects lead us directly to 
consideration of certain distinctively philosophical topics - most importantly perhaps the nature 
of temporal change itself. 
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9. Summary of Book 2 
1 started Book 2 armed only with the analysis of that statements formulated by S 
(that there are n material bodies within a given region of space over a given 
infinitesimal interval) expressed in the necessary and sufficient form: 
Ol/ T(m)=T(m')+dT ...... IA M=M' 
al/ P(al)=P(al')+dP,, I, al'A [T(al)= T(m) A T(al')=T(m')]-> al=al' 
bl/ P(a2)=P(a2')+ClPa2, a2, A [T(a2)= T(m) A T(a2')=T(m)]-> a2=a2' 
cl/ P(an)=P(an')+dP.,,. 'A [T(an)= T(m) A T(an, )=T(m')]---. * an=an' 
dl/ P(al)#P(a2') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a2')=T(m')]-> al#a2' 
el/ P(al)#, P(a3') A [T(al)=T(m) A T(a3')=T(m')]-> al;, -a3' 
P(an-I)t-P(an') A [T(an)=T(m) A T(an)=T(m')]-> an-It-an' 
and the logical claim that we may account for the infinitesimal term dT,,,., 
(otherwise than in tenns of the first order derivative of position with respect to 
time of a material body) from an analysis of purely temporal re-identification 
claims of the form T(m)#T(m') A m=m', i. e. the argument that the conjunction 
in T(m)=T(m')+8Tmm,, A m=m' bccomcs an infcrencc [and thus continuous with 
T(m)=T(m') -+ m==in'] in the limit as 8T,.,,,, 'tends towards zero'. 
I have therefore approached the philosophical concems of Book 2 with little 
more than a demonstration that the analysis of spatio-temporal continuity 
converges with the analysis of purely temporal continuity at the point of 
interpreting isolated infinitesimal terms in the necessary and sufficient analysis 
of Lockean Cardinality statements. 
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In section 7, however, I have presented arguments which may lead us to believe 
that the unproblematic philosophical interpretation of those expressions 
employed within the analysis of Book I refers, not to an interpretation of object 
types themselves, but to an interpretation of object types only in as much as we 
ourselves may move and act with respect to them. In other words, the arguments 
of section 7 have brought the analytical claims of Book I squarely into the 
realm of talking about ourselves, our movement, and our actions. It is then a 
small step from recognising the significance of my earlier analysis to our 
movement and actions (an analysis which demonstrates the convergence of the 
properties of spatio-temporal continuity with purely temporal continuity) to 
suspecting that it is S's own temporal phenomenology (time as experience by 
consciousness for S) which is to concern us in the interpretation of that 
statement formulated by S. 
I have attempted to strengthen this suspicion in section 8 where I have argued 
that the familiar properties of phenomenological time are 'like' the formal 
properties of the purely temporal continuity T(m)=T(m')+dT,,,, m -* m=m'. It is 
not until Section 8, however, that (bounded by the formal and philosophical 
claims of the previous sections) the real philosophically speculative element of 
Book 2 begins. For it is here that I have 'pinned my colours to the mast', as it 
were, and have opted to interpret my analysis in terms of Mitchell and Bergson 
rather than in terms of any number of other philosophers who may have equally 
served my purpose. And thus, via this not altogether satisfactory route, I arrive 
at an answer to that question which has concerned me throughout this thesis: 
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Q4a. How does S (or T) know that there are n (rather than n +I or 
n-1) material bodies moving about within a given region of space 
over some given infinitesimal interval oftime? 
The answer (or that answer which I have presented here) is that S is conscious 
(possesses an "an inner perception" of S's Bergsonian 'real duration' - the 
"intuition" of which is consciousness) and "comprehends matter" via the 
intellect. In as much as S is conscious in this sense, S is not a thing which 
persists through time, but is time itself [a unique time that is S-m; &n A 
T(m)#T(n)]. It is within the intellect that S perceives himself or herself to persist 
- in the sense to which Mitchell refers - and thus it is within the intellect (S's 
"coinpression of matt&") that S has access to purely temporal re-identification 
statements of the form T(m)#T(m') A m=m' which are themselves based upon 
the purely temporal continuity condition T(m)=T(m)+dTn,,,, -> m=m'. These 
are properties, not of S's consciousness (S's 'real duration'), but of Ss intellect 
(S's "comprehension of matter"). It is in the very process by which S 
"comprehends matter", or by which S "sees things as separate one from 
another" that S himself or herself becomes a persisting thing, and thus it is the 
properties of S's own persistence which (via Mitchell's claim) become 
recognised by S in S's personification of experience (S's "comprehension of 
matter"). In reality, of course: "there are no separate solid things, only an 
endless stream of becoming, in which nothing becomes and there is nothing that 
this nothing becomes. , 
65 
65 Not unlike the collapse of the wave function perhaps? 
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Appendix 1: Infinitesimal Terms and Their Role in the Termination of 
Infinitely regressive Arguments. 
The problem of infinite regress (any infinite regress) would not be a problem 
unless -vve did not believe, in some peculiar sense which we are unwilling to 
abandon, that a definite answer exists to a problem which reason will allow us 
to approach only by an infinite number of steps. Where such a regress involves 
the infinite division of a continuous mathematical function (as in the 
determination of the derivative or the definite integral) its termination is 
achieved by the introduction of the infinitesimal term. 
The origins of the infinitesimal start, perhaps, with Zeno of Elea (c. 470 BC). In 
the paradoxes of motion (reported by Aristotle) Zeno argued that change, and 
particularly those changes which we refer to by the motion of material bodies, is 
impossible. For example, in the paradox of the 'race course' (also referred to as 
the 'stadium' or the 'dichotomy') a "runner has to run a given length. Before 
running the whole length he must run hat(of it. Then, before running the second 
ha6r, he must run ha6r of that haý' And so on. Since the division again never 
terminates, the whole stretch is composed of infinitely many successive pieces, 
each of some length. But the runner cannot finish the task of traversing 
infinitely many substretches in succession. " (The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy, 1995, pp 922-3). Now we know, in some peculiar sense which we 
are unwilling to abandon, that a runner can run a given length. We are therefore 
faced Nvith a conflict between intuition and reason - and. it is reason, in this case, 
which must give way (and no doubt rightly so). But we should not suppose that 
by the introduction of the infinitesimal by the mathematicians and philosophers 
of the 17"' Century that a new method of reasoning was introduced by which 
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such infinitely regressive arguments were eliminated. Quite the opposite. The 
introduction of the infinitesimal, in whatever terms one may wish to dress it, is 
simply the admission that if intuition is to be maintained then infinite regression 
must be terminated somewhere. The infinitesimal is simply the place where the 
thinkers of the 17t" century decided that regression would stop. 
It is not surprising then that Cavalieri chose to describe the infinitesimal as an 
'indivisible' (Kline 1980 pp 132-3), nor that this interpretation was, initially at 
least, supported by Newton. For if there are such indivisibles (in the description 
of motion, for example), then the infinitely regressive arguments of Zeon are 
terminated. It is to Leibniz, however, that we owe our more contemporary view 
of the infinitesimal (a view at which Newton equally, albeit eventually, arrived), 
namely; that the infinitesimal is neither zero nor finite but 'tends towards zero', 
or may be 'as small as we please', or "quantities infinitely small such that when 
their ratio is sought, they may not be considered zero but which are rejected as 
often as they occur with quantities incomparably greater" (Kline 1980. p 137). 
But it is clear from these terms that the properties of the infinitesimal must arise 
when a ratio is "sought", or when a nwnber is "considered', or "rejected', or 
"compared' - and it is we ourselves, not points and lines and motion, who 
4seek' or 'consider' or 'reject' or 'compare. The infinitesimal is a solution to 
infinite regress, or more accurately it is the admission that infinite regress must 
be terminated somewhere. The properties of the infinitesimal are the 
consequences of this decision, not a consequence of the fact that in the world 
there are really such things. 
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ALI The Derivative and the Differential Coefficient. 
For the continuous and differentiable function y=f(x) we may define the 
derivative at the value of the free variable x--a as 
f (a) = Lim (a+h) -F(a))/h n h *7 
It is conventional, however, to reserve the familial term dy/dx for the 
differential coefficient, or the variable value of the derivative over the values of 
2 
the free variable of a function. For example, if our function ivere Y==x , then we 
may define dy/dx (the differential coefficient) in the following fashion. 
dy/dx = Lim ((x+h)2 _ X2) /h h-+O 
Lim (x 2+ 2xh + h2 - x2)/h h--), O 
=Lim2x+h h--), O 
= 2x 
In this case dy/dx = 10 Nvhen x=5, and dy/dx = 20 when x= 10 - and in this 
much the familiar dy/dx is merely a symbol, i. e. dy/dx (the differential 
coefficient) =f (a) (the derivative) when x=a. To discuss the derivative as the 
ratio of infinitesimal terms, we must invent a new terminology. For example: 
dv,, /dx,, =f (a) 
or 
dy/dx = dy,, /dx,, when x=a. 
or 
f(a') = Lim - f(a))/AXa = Lil z AYa/AXa = dYa/dXa 
'L,, _. O(f(a+AXa) 
no 
We may then say (not knowing necessarily whether that Nve say anything 
meaningful) that dya and dXa are vanishing or infinitesimal terms, or terms 
which are neither zero nor finite but which 'tend towards zero', or which can be 
&as small as Nve Nvish'. 
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I labour this definition simply to clarify the point that my concerns here lie Nvith 
the derivative dy,, /dXa and not the differential coefficient dy/dx, or lie with the 
value of the differential coefficient of the function f(a) for the single value of the 
free variable x--a. 
My concerns with the derivative itself lie only in supporting certain claims as to 
the indivisibility of the infinitesimal (where 'indivisibility' here means nothing 
more than a condition which may terminate an otherwise infinitely regressive 
argument) - an indivisibility which is captured, for example, in the theorem: 
If dya/dx,, is the derivative of f(x) at x--a, and if dy, /dx, is equally the 
derivative of f(x) at x--a, then dy., = dy, and dxa = dx,. 
However, in claiming the infinitesimal to be indivisible (even in this somewhat 
conditional sense) we must be extremely careful. For one infinitesimal may be 
divisible by another in the formation and interpretation of ratios ("quantities 
infinitely small such that when their ratio is sought, they may not be considered 
zero") but are not divisible by a finite value, and thus, in all interpretations to 
which we are sensible, are not divisible at all. At the outset, however, we must 
firstly consider how infinitesimals are divisible by other infinitesimals, or how it 
is we may apply to such infinitesimals the analogous idea of magnitude - for 
only in understanding how an infinitesimal is divisible by another may we 
understand why an infinitesimal is not divisible by a finite value. 
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AL2 Apparent Magnitudes of lite Infinitesimal Term. 
That the infinitesimal term may be treated, in some respect, as a magnitude, or 
that it may be said in some cases to be greater than or less than something else 
(some other infinitesimal) arises from its definition in the derivative (or 
alternatively in its definition in the definite integral - but I shall not consider the 
definite integral here). For example, if it should be the case that dy,, /dXa is a 
finite value greater than 1, then given the definition of this derivative as a ratio 
(albeit a ratio of terms which are neither finite nor zero, or a ratio of terms 
which 'tend towards zero', or a ratio of tenns for which we can find no 
immediate concept of magnitude) we cannot but help to suppose that dy. is in 
some sense greater than dx,, - since this is what we mean by a ratio greater than 
I- or that there must be a sense in which although dya and dXa both 'tend 
towards zero', dx. somehow tends more closely towards zero than dya. It is in 
this sense then, or in the sense that one infinitesimal may tend more closely 
toward zero than another, that we feel that we may apply to them the 
relationships of magnitude (of one value being greater than or less than 
another). Similarly, if we take the differential coefficient of f(x) at the value of 
the free variable v--b (where b: f-a) to be dyb/dxb, and if Nve Nvere to claim that this 
finite value is smaller than the finite value of dya/dXa, or that dya/dx,, ) dyb/dxb, 
then we cannot help but conclude that the extent to which dx,, tends more 
closely towards zero than dya is greater than the extent to which dXb tends more 
closely towards zero than dYb- In treating infinitesimals as magnitudes, or in 
claiming that one such infinitesimal is greater than or less than another, we do 
not actually claim that these infinitesimal tenns have a magnitude in the sense 
of finite numbers (since they are neither finite nor zero) but that one such 
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infinitesimal may 'tend more closely towards zero' than another. We might start 
to see then why an infinitesimal is not divisible by a finite value. For in the ratio 
of dx, and 2, say, we cannot claim that dXa tends more closely towards zero than 
2, or that 2 tends more closely towards zero than dx,, ý since 2 does not 'tend 
towards zero' at all (it does not, for example, tend more closely to zero than 3). 
More accurately perhaps, in the absence of any clear understanding of what 
infinitesimals actually are (other than that their use may terminate an infinite 
regress), we simply deduce their supposed relationships of magnitude from their 
definition in the derivative (a definition in tenns of the ratios of infinitesimals) 
and the relationships of magnitude that one such derivative may bear to another. 
However, if we have reached the conclusion that one such infinitesimal term 
may be greater than or less than another in the formulation of the derivative, or 
if one such term may tend more closely to zero than another, then what 
determines the extent to which any one infinitesimal tends towards zero in any 
one particular case? In asking this question we must firstly distinguish between 
free and dependent variables; in the sense that for the function y--f(x) the 
variable y is dependent upon the value of the free variable x, or in the sense that 
in the forinulation of the differential coefficient it is Ax which we allow to 'tend 
towards zero'. 
AL3 The 'Tending Towards Zero'of the Dependent Variable. 
For the function y--4x), the extent to which the dependent tenn (y) 'tends 
towards zero' in the formulation of the derivative at x--a depends solely on the 
extent to which the free variable (x) tends towards zero. The terins dya and dXa 
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are related in such a fashion that their ratio should be commensurate with the 
function f(x) at the value of the free variable x=a. Suppose, for example, that 
our continuous function were y=3x. In this case, when x=a then ya = 3a. If we 
increase a by a small but finite value Ax,, then we obtain Y,, +Ay,, = 3(a+Ax,, ), 
which may be equally expressed y,, +Aya = 3a + 3AXa. Subtracting the original 
identity (y. = 3a) from both sides then gives Ay,, = 3Ax.. If (as has already been 
described above) we define the derivative at x=a as 
Lim Ay,, /Ax,, = dy,, /dx,, =3 
&---+0 
then no matter how closely we allow Axa to 'tend towards zero' AyýWill always 
'tend towards zero' in such a way that Ay,, /Axa = 3. The extent to which Aya 
'tends towards zero' in the fonnulation of the derivative dy,, /dx. is therefore 
determined by the extent tovvhich Ax,, 'tends towards zero'. 
Now given such a description it is tempting perhaps to say that a dependent 
infinitesimal 'follows' or 'precedes' the free infinitesimal (to which it is related 
by a function) as this free infinitesimal 'tends towards zero'. But this is merely 
our fondness for analogy. When we graphically plot any function which 'tends 
towards' any value (not necessarily zero) using pencil and paper, it is natural to 
feel that we may follow this curve with the eye as it approaches closer and 
closer to this value. It is no doubt natural that we may imagine this dynamic 
process continuing as the function becomes infinitesimally close to its value - 
and thus apply to our concept of the infinitesimal a dynamic property of 
'tending towards' which it cannot possibly possess (for there is nothing dynamic 
about the function y==x2 for example). The absurdity of this analogy is revealed 
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more clearly when we realise that the finite and the infinitesimal would then be 
required to be continuous with each other. Dynamic analogies of the idea of 
'tending towards zero' will then simply not do. That dXa 'tends towards zero', or 
posseses an 'extent towards which it tends towards zero', should not be 
mistaken for the idea that dXa is somehow involved in some dynamic process of 
'tending towards zero'. 'Tending towards zero' is a static property of an 
infinitesimal whose quality (which we mistake as its magnitude) is the 'extent to 
which it tends towards zero'. Indeed it is this very property of the infinitesimal 
which allows for its employment in the termination of infinitely regressive 
arguments. 
AL 4 The 'Tending Towards Zero' of the Free Variable. 
We have seen then that if dya/dXa and dyb/dyb are the two derivatives of the 
function f(x) for the values of the free variable x--a and x--b respectively (where 
a#b), then the extent to which values of the dependent terms Ay. and Ayb 'tend 
towards zero' will be dependent upon the extent to which the free tenns AXa and 
AXb 'tend towards zero'. But what determines the extent to which Ax,, and AXb 
'tend towards zero' in the detennination of dya/dya and dyb/dXb? Do the free 
tenns Ax,, and AXb tend equally towards zero (are they indistinguishable? ), or, 
given that infinitesimals (as we have seen) may be sensibly distinguished in the 
sense in which they 'tend towards zero' (a distinction which leads us to treat 
them as magnitudes), is there some sense in which one tends more closely 
towards zero than another? 
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To make a start at addressing this question let us first look at finite 
approximations to the derivative. This is not to suggest that Nve may extrapolate 
directly from the properties of such finite approximations to the properties of the 
derivative, and certainly not that we can extrapolate from the properties of the 
small finite intervals used in such approximations to the properties of 
infinitesimals (since infinitesimals are not continuous with finite values). An 
examination of finite approximations is useful simply because it Nvill reveal to 
us the nature of the regress that the introduction of the infinitesimal will 
terminate, and further, that the examination of such 'finite approximations' may 
guide us to an understanding of what properties the infinitesimal must possess 
in order to terminate this regress. 
Suppose that our continuous function y=f(x) were the function y=x2. We have 
already seen how the variable differential coefficient for this function (dy/dx) is 
given by 2x. In other words, when the value of the free variable x equals 5, then 
dy/dx equals 10, and when the value of the free variable x equals 10, then dy/dx 
equals 20. Since these derivatives equal the gradients of the tangent at these 
values of the free variable (see figure 1) we can obtain an approximation to 
these gradients in the following fashion. If from the point at x=5 we plot the 
point at x--5-Ax, then we know that the line passing through these two points 
('a' and V in Figure 2) will tend towards the tangent at x=5 as Ax 'tends 
towards zero'. Equally, if from the point at x=10 we plot the point at x=10-Ax, 
then we know that the line passing through these two points (V and V in 
Figure 2) will tend towards the tangent at x--10 as Ax 'tends towards zero. As 
an approximation then, Nve may consider these lines Nvhen Ax is small but finite. 
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Figure I- approximations to the derivative. 
Table I shows a typical set of results for such an approximation. The first 
column shows that value of Ax used in each approximation, while the second 
column (marked 'Gradient of ab') shows the calculated value of the gradient of 
the line passing through the points 'a' and V (Figure 1) for the given value of 
Ax. The values in the second column are calculated from the simple formula [5 2 
- (5-Ax)2]/ Ax. The third column (markedW) shows the percentage of the true 
gradient at x--5 captured in the approximation (in the sense that if the calculated 
gradient is equal to 10 - the known derivative at x--5 - then this calculated 
gradient will be 100% of the true gradient at x--5). Columns 4 (marked 
'Gradient of cd') and 5 are similar to 2 and 3 but apply to approximations to the 
gradient at x= 10, i. e. column 4 shows the value of the approximation at x= 10 
obtained from the formula [10 2- (I O_Ax) 2]/ Ax and column 5 shows the 
percentage of the true gradient at x--10 captured in the approximation. 
With reference to the values captured in Table I we may make the following 
important observations. In the first roxv, for example, or for the approximations 
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using a value of Ax=0.5, we obtain an approximation of the tangent at x=5 of 
9.5 (or 95% of the true tangent) and an approximation of the tangent at x=10 of 
19.5 (or 97.5% of the true tangent). In other words, our approximation using 
Ax--0.5 seems to give a better result at x--10 than at x--5. Indeed, this trend is 
continued through the whole data. In each row the level of the approximation at 
x--10 exceeds that at x--5. We might say that as Ax decreases, the approximation 
at x--10 tends more closely to the value of the true tangent at x=10 than the 
approximation at x=5 tends towards the value of the true tangent at x=5. 
Alternatively, we might say that in order to obtain the same level of 
approximation to the true tangent at x=5 and x--10 (expressed here as a 
percentage), we would need to use different values of Ax at x--5 and x--10 
Ax Gradient of ab % Gradient of cd % 
0.5 9.5 95 19.5 97.5 
0.4 9.6 96 19.6 98 
0.3 9.7 97 19.7 98.5 
0.2 9.8 98 19.8 99 
0.1 9.9 99 19.9 99.5 
0.05 9.95 99.5 19.95 99.75 
10.01 9.99 1 99.91 19.99 99.95 
Table 1- Calculation of gradients 
Do we expect this situation to continue as Ax decreases to ever smaller values, 
or do we expect there to be a unique value of Ax at which the same level of 
accuracy, or the same percentage of the true tangent, is reached for both x=5 
and x--10? If there is such a value of Ax, then we may calculate it in the 
following fashion. The percentage of the true gradient at v--5 given for the value 
of Ax is: 
[52 - 
(5-AX)2]. 100% 
IO. Ax 
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Similarly, the percentage of the true gradient at x--10 given for the value of Ax 
is: 
(102 
_ 
(, O_Ax) 2]. Ioo% 
20. Ax 
The value of Ax needed to ensure an identical level of accuracy, or to give the 
same percentage of the true gradients at x--5 and x--10 can the be resolved from 
the identity: 
[5 2- (5-AX)21 . 
100% = [102 - 
(10-AX)2 
. 
100% A 
IO. Ax 20. Ax 
which solves at Ax2 = '/2Ax2 or Ax = Ax/42. This condition can only be true for 
Ax=O. In other words, as longs as Ax is finite and non-zero there is no solution 
to the identity A. 
I now wish to place two interpretations on the infinitesimal term based upon 
what we have learrit about the nature of finite approximations to the derivative - 
both of which lead to the same conclusion. 
A]. 5 First Interpretatiom 
It would seem then that as long as Ax remains finite, and as long as we use the 
same value of Ax in our approximations at x--5 and x--10, then our 
approximation at x=10 will always be closer to the true value of the tangent than 
our approximation at x--5. However, when we apply the methods of the calculus 
to obtain the variable differential cocfficient dy/dx over all values of X-Y2 we do 
not suppose that the accuracy of this value (or its determination of the derivative 
or the true value of the tangent at a point) is variable Nvith respect to the value of 
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the free variable x. Somehow, dy/dx is supposed to give us the actual derivative 
at all values of x. 
Now it seems relatively straightforward that if we wanted to determine an 
approximation to the value of the true tangent at x=5 and x--10 which (in both 
cases) was say 99.999% of the true value of the tangent at these points, then we 
should need to use two different values of Ax in these two approximations. In 
this case, we would say that the value of AX5 needed to give an approximation of 
99.999% to the true value of the tangent at x---5 is determined by the function 
Y=X 2 and the value of the free variable x--5. Similarly, the value of AxIO needed 
to give an approximation of 99.999% of the true value of the tangent at x--10 is 
determined by the function Y=X2 and the value of the free variable x=10. Can we 
then believe, that in moving from a finite approximation to the deterinination of 
the derivative via the differential calculus, or that by allowing Ax5 to 'tend 
towards zero' at the value x--5 and by allowing AxIO to 'tend towards zero' at 
x--10, that we refer to the same infinitesimal dx in both these cases, or that dx 
may be equally expressed by saying that Axs 'tends towards zero' or AxIO 'tends 
towards zero'? Are we not forced to conclude, on the contrary, that Ax must 
tend more closely to zero at x--5 than at x=10 in order that the calculus provide 
us with 100% of the true value of the gradient at these two points (why, for 
example, should we apply greater significance to a 100% accuracy than a 
99.999% accuracy, or why should we assume that some fundamental change in 
this situation is required in moving between 100% accuracy and 99.999% 
accuracy)? 
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Should we not perhaps more accurately say that dy5/dx5 is determined when AX5 
has tended close enough to zero to determine dy5/dx5 and that dylo/dxlo is 
detennined when AxIO has tended close enough to zero to detennine dyO/dxjO. 
And since we know that such infinitesimals are quite sensibly distinguished as 
magnitudes, or distinguished in the extent to which they 'tend towards zero', 
then such a claim sits comfortably with both the known properties of 
infinitesimals and the properties of finite approximations to the derivative. 
It is of course dangerous to generalise from such a limited example. But in this 
case we have arrived at an interpretation of the extent to which AXa MUSt 'tend 
towards zero' in order to arrive at the value of the derivative dy,, /dXa which is 
dependent upon the nature of the function f(x) and the value of the free variable 
x--a. If dyb/dXb is the derivative of a different function y=g(x) for a value of the 
free variable x7-b, then we conclude that while the extent to which Axa must 
'tend towards zero' in order to arrive at dy,, /dxa is determined by f(x) and x--a, 
the extent to which Axb must 'tend towards zero' in order to arrive at dyb/dXb is 
determined by g(x) and x=b. Whether we then go on to claim that these two 
terms 'tend towards zero' to the same extent (dx,, ýdXb) or to different extents 
(dx,, #dxb) depends upon f(x), g(x), x--a and x=b. 
Finally then, we might suggest: in the determination of the derivative of f(x) at 
x=a, the extent to which the dependent term Ay,, 'tends towards zero' is 
dependent upon the extent to which the free term Ax,, 'tends towards zero', and 
the extent to which the free term Axa 'tends towards zero' is determined by the 
function f(x) and the value of the free variable x=a. 
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This interpretation has one significant consequence: 
If dya/dxa is the derivative of y=f(x) at the value of the free variable 
x--a and dy, /dx, is the derivative of the same function y--f(x) at the 
same value of the free variable x--a, then dx,, = dx, and dya = dy,,. 
Now this is a seemingly trivial claim. However, it captures what is perhaps the 
single most important characteristic of the infinitesimal, namely; that the 
infinitesimal terms of a single derivative are not divisible except by the 
infinitesimal terms of another derivative. In other words, given a single 
derivative there is no meaning whatsoever to dividing its infinitesimal terms. 
For the single derivative 
Lim Ay,, /Ax,, = dy. /dxa &X. -40 
there is only a single meaning to the claim that AXa 'tends towards zero' [and 
this 'meaning' is determined by the function f(x) and the value of the free 
variable x--a]. The claim V2Axa 'tends towards zero' means exactly that same 
thing, or refers to exactly the same extent of 'tending towards zero', as the claim 
that Ax,, 'tends towards zero'. 
AL 6 Second interpretation. 
In our consideration of finite approximations to the derivatives of y=x2 for the 
values of the free variable x---5 and x--10, we concluded that the accuracy of the 
finite approximation (or its percentage of the true value of the tangent) at x---5 
could never be equal to the accuracy of the finite approximation at x=10 as long 
as both approximations employed that same value of Ax and as long as Ax 
remained non-zero and finite (regardless of how small we might allow it to 
become). This itself Nvas based upon the fact that the condition for the equality 
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of accuracy required a value of Ax given (in this particular case) by Ax = Ax/42. 
Obviously, no finite value can be equal to itself divided by a finite value and 
thus we concluded that an equality of accuracy at x--5 and x--10 must remain 
impossible while Ax remains finite. 
In our first interpretation (above) we extended this idea into the realm of 
infinitesimals and insisted that in the determination of the derivatives at x--5 and 
x--10 we actually required that Ax must 'tend towards zero' to different degrees 
in order to arrive at dya/dxa and dyb/dXb. Let us now, however, consider an 
alternative interpretation. Let us assume that, regardless of the arguments above, 
it is implicit within the differential calculus that the same value of Ax is to be 
used in all finite approximations to the tangents of y==xý and all derivatives for 
all values of the free variable are to be detennined by allowing this single value 
of Ax to 'tend towards zero. If this is the case, then there will be a value of dx 
(arising from allowing this single value of Ax to 'tend to zero') applicable to the 
determination of the derivative at each point on Y=X2, or a single value of dx 
with respect to which the tangent at each point on Y=x2 is determined to an 
accuracy of 100%. 
With respect to this argument and the properties of the finite approximations 
discussed above, we know for the derivatives at x--5 and x--10 we require of this 
infinitesimal the property that: 
dx = dx/42 
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This being a property which we already know to be true of Ax=O. In other 
words, if dx is the extent to which a single value of Ax must tend in order to 
determine the true (100%) values of the tangents at x=5 and x=10, then Ax is a 
term which 'tends towards zero' and reflects the properties of zero, i. e. that dx is 
something which equals itself even when divided by the finite value 42. This 
'finite value' is of course in this case dependent upon our choice of the values of 
the free variables x--5 and x--10 of the function y=x2. However, generally we 
might say that, in the case of the current interpretation, we require of a fteely 
decreasing infinitesimal, which is suitable for the determination of the 
derivatives of a function, that it be: equal to itself Nvhen divided by a finite 
value. 
In other words, that its division by a finite value has no effect upon it, or that it 
is 'indivisible'. We note, however, that this is a condition on the infinitesimal 
expression of the free value of a function and we may thus conclude that: the 
extent to which the dependent tenn Ay. 'tends towards zero' is dependent upon 
the extent to which the free term Axa 'tends towards zero', and the extent to 
which the free term Ax,, 'tends towards zero' is detennined by its 'tending 
towards' an indivisible state. As such if dy, /dXa is the derivative of f(x) at x--a, 
then there is no meaning to allovAng dy,, and dx,, to tend even more closely 
towards zero and becoming say 1/2dx,, and '/2dx,,, since dx,, = 1/2dxa. And thus we 
may conclude, as above, that: 
If dya/dxa is the derivative of y=Rx) at the value of the free variable 
x=a and dyjdxý is the derivative of the same function y=f(x) at the 
same value of the free variable x---a, then dx,, = dx, and dy, = dya. 
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AL 7 Third Interpretatiom 
The third interpretation which we may place upon the nature of the infinitesimal 
term is a pragmatic one, and one which does not refer to the properties of finite 
approximations to the tangent at a point (as discussed above). This is simply to 
assume that the infinitesimal has no implicit meaning but must instead be 
interpreted simply in relation to its emergence and use as a term in the process 
of determining the derivative. In this sense, infinitesimals are peculiar terms 
which exhibit the properties of ratio with respect to each other but not 
magnitude with respect to finite terms 
We can see this characteristic of infinitesimals (that they exhibit the properties 
of ratio but not magnitude with respect to finite terms) in the determination of 
the differential coefficient of the function y=x 2 (as outlined above), ie. 
dy/dx = Lim ((x+h)2 _ X2) /h (a) h-->O 
Lim (x2 + 2xh + hý - x2)/h (b) h->O 
=Lim2x+h (C) h--W 
= 2x (d) 
Step (a) to (b) simply substitutes (x+h)2 for its expansion. In moving between 
step (b) and (c) we not only remove x2-x2 to leave (2xh + h2)/h, but we divide 
2xh +h2 by h to leave 2x + h. However, this process requires that we divide h2 
by h to obtain h and divide h by h to obtain 1, i. e. 
Lim h2/h = Lim h h-->O h-40 
Lim h/h =I h--->O 
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In other words, although we insist that h is tending towards zero, we still 
maintain that h exhibits the properties of ratio. In the step between (c) and (d) 
however, h has somehow vanished - it has been replaced by zero, i. e. 
2x + Lim h= 2x 
h-->O 
In this final step then, h has no magnitude with respect to the finite term 2x and 
may thus be removed from any expression in which it is conjoined with 2x as an 
addition. We cannot however simply assume that h is actually zero as it tends 
'towards zero', since this would mean that h2/h = 02/0 and h/h =0/0 in the step 
from (b) to (c) which is meaningless. All we can assume is that h (as it tends to 
zero) has no magnitude with respect to the finite term 2x. In other words, h (as it 
tends towards zero) exhibits the properties of ratio (h2/h=h and h/h=l) but not 
the properties of magnitude with respect to finite values (2x+h = 2x). 
We may use this property of infinitesimals to demonstrate their indivisibility 
with respect to finite terms. Consider the two limits: 
tim (2x+h) = 2x 
and 'o 
Lim (4x+h)/2 = Lim (2x+h/2) = 2x h--), O h--*O 
In the first case we have the expansion 
Lim (2x+h) = 2x + Lim h= 2x (e) h-+O h-3,0 
In the second we have 
Lim (4x+h)/2 = 2x + Lim b/2 = 2x + 
1/2 ýýim h= 2x 
0 h-*O h-+O 0 
Thus from (e) and (f) 
Limh=V2Lim h 
h-*O h--->O 
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In other Nvords, the infinitesimal Lim h cannot be divided by a finite term, or is h--*O 
'indivisible' with respect to finite terms. With respect to the process of division 
with respect to finite values, the infinitesimal has the same properties as zero. 
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AppendIv H- Numerically Quantifiable Derivatives of Philosophical and 
Psychological Questions and Propositions as to S knowing P. 
AILI Variable Subjects within Philosophical and Psychological Questions and 
Propositions. 
I include within this appendix a more detailed exposition of those 
epistemological arguments outlined in Section 1. These notes are therefore 
intended to outline the wider philosophical context within which I address 
numerically quantifiable derivatives of philosophical and psychological 
questions and therefore outlines the epistemological justification for the chosen 
route of the analytical aspects of Book I of this thesis. 
The intersubjective nature of philosophical and psychological questions and 
propositions, or indeed any question or proposition in which we attribute a 
property to a variable subject, demands that we justify the intersubjective nature 
of the property thus attributed, and thus the variable nature of the subject with 
respect to this property. Most commonly, to claim that S knows P, where S is a 
variable within a range (or set) of individuals (or where S is not the only 
individual that knows P) presupposes that there exists at least one individual Sl 
(different from S) and that SI knows that S knows P. Without this condition 
(which is not itself sufficient to justify the variable status of S), the variable 
status of S is meaningless - for if there is not at least one SI that knows that S 
knows P, then there cannot be an individual that knows that S and some other 
individual knows P, and thus there can be no meaning whatsoever in attributing 
to Sa variable status with respect to P. However, we might immediately see the 
beginnings of a significant regress. For if SI is itself equally a variable (if SI is 
not the only individual that knows that S knows P), then there must likewise 
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exist at least one S2 (different from S I) that knows that SI knows that S knows 
P- and may -, ve not then go on to ask as to the variable status of S2, and S3, and 
S4, and so on ad infinitum. 
Formally we may express this regress: 
a/ S knows P. 
If S is a variable, then A= (GIG knows P}, S c= A 
b/ S1 knows that S knows P. 
If S and S1 are variable, then B= {(H, I)l H knows that I knows P), 
(SI, S)c-B. 
C/ S2 knows that S1 knows that S knows P. 
If S, SI and S2 are variable, then C= {(J, K, L)l J knows K knows L 
knows P), (S2, S1, S)EEC 
and so on 
The regress may be at first terminated, or so we might expect, in the case where 
both Sa and Sa+l know P and where both Sa and Sa+l know each other to 
know P; since in this case the variable status of both Sa and Sa+I can be 
justified without recourse to a third party (Sa+2), and thus without the need to 
specify that set within which S, S1, S2, . ., Sa+2 are variable. However the 
full 
tennination, of the regress actually requires that every individual under 
consideration (the members of the set A) not only knows P (the condition for 
membership of A) but also knows that any and every other member of A also 
knows P. 
Under this condition we may terminate the regress by replacing c/ as follows: 
c'/ If the I't projection of B= (JI(J, K)eB) =A 
And 
If the 2 nd projection of B={KI(J, K)eB)= A 
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Then B= ( (H, I)IH Ei A, I EE A) = AxA - the 'Cross Product' of A. 
The condition for both the I't and 2 nd projections of B being the set A is, of 
course, that every member of A knows that every other member of A knows P. 
This condition is, I would suggest, implicit in every proposition of the form S 
knows P and where S is a variable within a range of individuals. 
Suppose, for example, we were to claim that S knows P and that T knows Q but 
that S does not know Q and T does not know P. In this case S and T are not 
equally variables within the same range of individuals defined by their 
knowledge of either P or Q, i. e. 
A=(GIG knows P), Sr=A, ToA 
Al={HIH knowsQ), SO-Al, Tr=Al. 
The variability of S xvith respect to A (and knowing P) and the variability of T 
with respect to Al (and knowing Q) still requires, if regress is to be avoided, 
that every member of A knows that every other member of A knows P, and that 
every member of AI knows that every other member of AI knows 
To try to get around this by claiming that S and T are variables within some 
range of individuals who can, in principle perhaps, know both P and or Q- 
whether they actually know P and or Q or not - leaves us with the same 
condition: 
A2 = (111 can know P and or 
since the members of this range Nvill only avoid the regression above if every 
member of A2 knows that every other member of A2 can know P and or 
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Equally, we do not avoid this logical structure by defining a general range of 
individuals %vho can 'know things in general' (including P and Q), for this 
would involve: 
Agen ý-- fJj J can know things including P and Q), S E=- Agen, T E: Agen- 
Once again, the non-regression of this definition requires that every member of 
A., knows that every other member of A,,,, can know things including P and 
Any philosophical or psychological question or proposition of the forrn How 
does S know P? or S knows P, where S is a variable within a range of 
individuals, must therefore be formulated either in the specific form: 
A= {Gj G knows P), Sc= A. 
or the generalised form 
JJJ J can know things including P), S (=- Ag,,,. 
The first requires (for the avoidance of regression) that every member of A 
knows that every other member of A knows P, and the second requires that 
every member of Agen knows that every other member of Agm can know P. Each 
of which would seem to pose roughly the same question, namely; how does S 
know that another individual knows P, or how does S know that another 
individual can know P? Thus any philosophical or psychological question or 
proposition referring to S's knowing something must unavoidably be associated 
with the question of S's knowing that other individuals may also know this 
'something'. Formally 
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S knows P 
If S is a variable, then A= {GIG knows P), S(=-A 
If A exists then AxA exists. 
AxA is the range of ordered pairs with respect to which SI and S are variable 
and where S1 knows P and SI knows that S knows P. 
And thus we arrive at the conclusion that any philosophical or psychological 
question or proposition referring to S's knowing P, and where S is a variable 
within a range of individuals, is only a valid question or proposition if it can be 
demonstrated that for any two individuals (within this 'range of individuals') 
each knows P and that each knows that the other knows P. In other words we 
cannot pose the question how does S know P?, nor frame the proposition S 
knows P, unless either we are willing to admit that S is not a variable, or that we 
have some way of knowing how S knows that T knows P, or some way of 
justifying that S knows that T knows P. 
More accurately, to claim that S knows P, or to ask how does S know P? Nvhere S 
is a variable within a range of individuals, is only a valid question if there exists 
some known orjustifiable epistemological criterion ofSs knowing that Tknows 
P. If there exists no such criterion, or if such a criterion cannot be justified, then 
such propositions and questions are invalid - or they suffer from an 
epistemological shortcoming. 
The archetypal example in this respect is the problem of other minds, i. e. given 
that, or assuming that, S and T are conscious, how does S know that T is 
conscious and how does T know that S is conscious? Traditionally, we treat the 
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problem of other ininds as one of the problems of mind - to be lumped together 
with the problems of its first-person subjectivity, its intentionality and its 
physical efficacy for example. However, the above epistemological arguments 
would seem to suggest that to claim that S is conscious, where S is a variable 
within a range of individuals (and the claim is invariably framed in this sense), 
itself requires, for the epistemological validity of the claim, that we should have 
before us an answer to the question of how S knows that T is conscious. In other 
words, the problem of other minds is not simply one of the problems of mind, it 
is the central problem of mind - for without its solution we cannot rigorously 
frame the proposition that S is conscious in the first place (not, that is, if by 'S' 
we intend to mean a variable within a range of individuals - including, in this 
case, or more often than not, you and me). If there exists no epistemological 
criterion of Ss knowing that T is conscious, then the claim that S is conscious 
suffers from the epistemological shortcomings outlined above - and in making 
this claim I am aware that I condemn the philosophical speculations of Book 2 
of this thesis. 
Now in presenting these epistemological arguments I mean to imply no 
criticism of the Nvork of any philosopher or psychologist (present or past). We 
may know (or at least may feel that we know) that S may know that T knows P 
without being able to write down a strict epistemological criterion q Ss ýf 
knowing the T knows P. In fact most philosophy and psychology works upon 
this basis and who am I to criticise this approach. In this thesis, however, I have 
chosen, not the purist approach of insisting that such a criteria must be 
rigorously formulated and expressed before we can examine the claim that S 
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knows P or the question of how does S know P?, but simply the modified 
approach of claiming that there are certain types of questions and propositions 
which lend themselves more naturally, or more satisfyingly, to a criterion ofSs 
knowing that T knows P than others and that these 'certain types of questions' 
are both easily identifiable and, in some cases, identifiable as derivatives of 
more problematic philosophical and psychological questions and propositions. 
Thus while far from providing a perfect philosophy, addressing these 'certain 
types of questions and propositions' allows us to both acknowledge the 
epistemological shortcomings of certain philosophical and psychological 
questions and propositions and to move one step closer to avoiding them. 
A112 Numerically Quantijilable Derivatives of Philosophical And 
psychological Questions and Propositions. 
As outlined in the introduction of this thesis, and as evidenced by the content of 
Book 1,1 do not take these comments on the 'epistemological shortcomings' of 
philosophical and psychological questions and proportions to be insurmountable 
- merely that we must be extremely careful in the questions and propositions 
which we frame (for these 'epistemological shortcomings' apply as much to the 
questions and propositions of empirical science as they do to philosophy and 
psychology, and yet, to some degree at least, the empirical scientist has 
overcome them). More specifically, I suggest that with respect to philosophical 
and psychological questions and propositions regarding S's knowledge of P, 
where S is a variable within a range of individuals, there exists a class of 
questions which are, in certain circumstances, derived from them (or are 
'derivatives' of these questions and propositions) which do not suffer from the 
cepistemological shortcomings' discussed above - or which at least suffer from 
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them less. These are what I shall refer to as 'Numerically Quantifiable 
Derivatives of Philosophical and Psychological Questions and Propositions' - 
and since I shall deal with only one such derivative within this thesis this itself 
may serve here as an example. 
If we consider the question how does S know the world to be one of material 
bodies moving arowid in space and time?, or the proposition S Imows the world 
to be one of material bodies moving around in space and time, then the 
epistemological arguments outlined above would seem to insist that the validity 
of this question and proposition relies upon a criterion of Ss knowing that T 
knows the world to be one of material bodies moving around in space and time 
- and while we may live our lives upon the assumption that we may ourselves 
know that T does indeed 'see' the world in this way, a strict epistemological 
criterion is, in this case, likely to be extremely difficult to formulated. 
A 'numerically quantifiable derivative' of this question or proposition is then 
one which is derived from it (or from them) but whose intersubjective 
corroboration involves the intersubjective, corroboration of a number rather than 
a concept or an idea. The advantage (or so I have argued in Section 1.1) is that 
in the intersubjective, corroboration of a 'numerically quantifiable derivative' of 
a philosophical or psychological question or propositions we may, in effect, 
intersubjectively test the properties of an abstract aritlunetic and the principles 
by which this 'abstract arithmetic' is applied to the subject of the question or 
proposition. In this case I therefore claim that the question how does S know the 
world to be one of material bodies moving around in space and time? has the 
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'numerically quantifiable derivative' question of how does S biow that there 
are n (rather than n+1 or n-1) material bodies within a given region ofspace at 
a given time?, and the proposition that S knows the world to be one of material 
bodies moving around in space and time has the 'numerically quantifiable 
derivative' proposition: S biow that there are n (rather than tz+l or n-1) 
material bodies within a given region ofspace at a given time. 
Thus in Book I of this thesis I am concerned purely Nvith the analysis of 
4numerically quantifiable derivative' questions and propositions - for these 
questions and propositions, while not totally free of the 'epistemological 
shortcomings' of the philosophical and psychological questions and 
propositions from which they are derived, are nonetheless somewhat closer to 
being epistemologically sound - at least to the degree that the questions and 
propositions of an empirical science are 'epistemologically sound' (and this is, 
perhaps, as much as we may ask). 
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